State v. Santillanes
| Decision Date | 10 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 19,000.,19,000. |
| Citation | 128 N.M. 752,998 P.2d 1203 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan SANTILLANES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.
Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Christopher Bulman, Chief Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Appellant.
Certiorari Granted, No. 26,170, March 3, 2000.
Certiorari Denied, No. 26,173, April 4, 2000.
{1} In this appeal, we address whether a defendant can be punished for a single death under two different statutes. Under the specific facts of this appeal, we answer that question negatively. Defendant appeals his convictions of five counts of vehicular homicide, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 66-8-101 (1991), and four counts of child abuse resulting in death, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1(C) (1997), along with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and other related offenses. Defendant's convictions resulted from a traffic accident in which five persons were killed, four of them children. Defendant contends that the vehicular homicide and child abuse convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. He also raises other issues involving the sentence he received for the vehicular homicides, merger of the DWI conviction, the jury instructions on reckless driving, the change of venue, and instructions on causation relating to the vehicular homicide charges. We affirm the vehicular homicide convictions but reverse on the double jeopardy and merger issues. We therefore remand to the trial court to (1) vacate the convictions for child abuse resulting in death and DWI and (2) resentence Defendant. We affirm on all other issues.
{2} On the day of the accident giving rise to the criminal charges, Defendant was driving a motor vehicle. His girlfriend and four children were in the vehicle with him. As Defendant approached an intersection where he was going to make a left-hand turn, he saw a truck "quite a ways off." He proceeded through the intersection. The truck, which was traveling much faster than the posted speed limit, hit Defendant's vehicle, killing everyone in the vehicle but Defendant. Evidence established that Defendant had a blood alcohol level of .15 at the time of the accident. The blood alcohol level of the other driver was .23. Defendant admitted to drinking as much as a six-pack of beer that day. There was an open container of beer found in the vehicle after the crash. He also admitted to smoking marijuana that morning and having taken cocaine the night before. The cocaine was detected in Defendant's blood. We include additional facts in our discussion of the issues.
{3} Defendant was convicted of nine homicide crimes—five counts of vehicular homicide and four counts of child abuse resulting in death. He contends these convictions impermissibly subject him to multiple punishment for four of the five deaths caused by the accident. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, N.M. Const. art. II, § 15. Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. See NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963) ().
{4} In cases involving multiple punishment, we apply a two-step process. Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 13, 810 P.2d 1223, 1233 (1991). We first must determine whether a defendant's conduct was unitary. If it was not, then there is no double jeopardy violation and our analysis ends. See State v. Livernois, 1997-NMSC-019, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 128, 934 P.2d 1057. If the conduct was unitary, however, then we must consider whether the legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses. In determining whether conduct is unitary, we "inquire into whether [the] `two events are sufficiently separated by either time or space (in the sense of physical distance between the places where the acts occurred) ... [or whether] the quality and nature of the acts or ... the objects and results involved' can be distinguished." Id. ¶ 20 ().
{5} In this appeal, we must inquire whether we can distinguish between the acts leading to the convictions for vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death. The vehicular homicide charges were based on the fact that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs and that his actions caused the deaths. Concerning the criminal charges of child abuse resulting in death, it was the State's theory and contentions at trial that, by driving while he was intoxicated, Defendant placed the children in a dangerous situation that resulted in their deaths. In our view, therefore, the same conduct of driving while intoxicated was used by the State to establish both vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death.
{6} The State argues on appeal, however, that the conduct constituting the vehicular homicide and the conduct of child abuse resulting in death were distinguishable. It contends that the child abuse committed by Defendant was allowing the children to enter the vehicle, thus placing them in a situation that endangered their lives. It also argues that the crash and death occurred later but that the abuse had already taken place. We disagree. The Supreme Court in Swafford clearly stated that "[t]ime and space considerations... cannot resolve every case and resort must be had to the quality and nature of the acts or to the objects and results involved." 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234. Here, Defendant was intoxicated and drove with four children in his vehicle. He was involved in an accident that caused the deaths of the children. By focusing on the nature of the acts and the results involved here, we conclude that the conduct underlying the vehicular homicide charges and the conduct underlying the child abuse resulting in death charges were the same. The conduct was therefore unitary.
{7} Having determined that the conduct was unitary, we must proceed to determine whether the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses for such conduct. In the absence of an express declaration of such intent, we must compare the statutory elements of the different statutes and determine whether one crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not, or whether one is subsumed by the other offense. See State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 23, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075. Here, the statutes stand independently of one another, and neither subsumes the other because the charge of child abuse resulting in death requires only the death of a child and vehicular homicide requires that the death occur as a result of a defendant driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Consequently, because the two statutes stand independently, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of multiple punishment. See id. That presumption may be overcome by some other indicia of legislative intent, such as the language, history, and subject of the respective statutes. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234.
{8} In this appeal, we believe that the presumption is rebutted by the generally accepted notion that one death should result in only one homicide conviction. See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 53, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660; State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86, 792 P.2d 408, 418 (1990). "`The means of committing an offense may not be [used] to multiply the number of offenses committed.'" State v. Landgraf, 1996-NMCA-024, ¶ 31, 121 N.M. 445, 453, 913 P.2d 252, 260 (quoting Carter v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)). Thus, even if the cause of death satisfied the elements of two or more statutory offenses, there is nonetheless only one death. In context of the two statutes, it is the death of another that the Legislature intended to punish, not the manner in which it was accomplished. We do not believe that the Legislature intended multiple homicide convictions for one death. We thus hold that Defendant's convictions and sentences for both vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death violated his right to be free from double jeopardy.
{9} When this violation occurs, the general rule requires that the lesser offense be vacated. See Pierce, 110 N.M. at 86-87,792 P.2d at 418-19. In this instance, the vehicular homicide conviction is the lesser offense (a third-degree felony, compared with child abuse resulting in death, a first-degree felony). Defendant argues, however, that this case requires a different result. He contends that under the general-specific rule, we should vacate the child abuse convictions rather than the vehicular homicide convictions because the vehicular homicide statute is the specific statute. The general-specific rule states that if one statute deals with a subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another statute addresses part of the same subject matter in a more specific manner, the latter controls. See State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. Additionally, if both a general and a specific statute address the same criminal conduct, the specific statute should govern "`to the extent of compelling the state to prosecute under it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 369, 60 P.2d 208, 210 (1936)).
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