State v. Satterfield

• Decision Date: 14 May 1930
• Docket Number: 393.
• Citation: 153 S.E. 155,198 N.C. 682
• Parties: STATE v. SATTERFIELD.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

153 S.E. 155

198 N.C. 682

STATE v. SATTERFIELD.

No. 393.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 14, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Shaw, Special Judge.

Norvell Satterfield was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.

Reversed.

To make case of culpable negligence at common law, it is necessary to show higher degree of negligence than necessary to establish negligence in civil action.

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter arising out of the alleged negligent operation of an automobile, resulting in the death of Mrs. Alice Johnson. The defendant, as required by the statute, moved to dismiss the action as in case of nonsuit. Denied. Exception.

The evidence most favorable to the state tended to show the facts to be as follows:

The accident occurred approximately three-quarters of a mile outside the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro on highway No.

10. At the place of the accident the highway is intersected or crossed by a road, the name of which on one side of the highway is the Pinecroft road and on the other Lathamtown road. At the place of intersection, No. 10 has a hard surface 30 feet wide according to one witness and 40 feet wide according to another. On each side there are dirt shoulders about 10 feet in width. The Pinecroft road has a hard surface about 18 feet in width, with slight dirt shoulders. The collision took place between a White mortorbus and a car driven by the defendant. The bus left High Point going in the direction of Greensboro at 8:30 or 8:40 in the morning. The weather was cold; it was raining and sleeting; there was ice on the highway. The driver of the bus said "there was ice in spots in the road." It was a 22-passenger bus and carried 6 or 7 passengers at the time of the injury. It had a windshield wiper which was in use. It was traveling about 25 or 30 miles an hour. As it approached the intersection referred to, a car driven by the defendant came out of the Pinecroft road into highway No. 10, turned in the direction of Greensboro, straightened out, and was a few feet in front of the bus. The speed of the car was estimated by one witness for the plaintiff at less than 15 miles an hour and by another at 25 or 30 miles an hour. The bus overtook the car the right fender of the bus striking the left fender of the car; the bus swerved to the left, skidded, went about 75 feet, crossed a ditch 3 to 6 inches deep, ran up an embankment, and turned on its right side. Mrs. Johnson, who was a passenger on the bus, suffered injuries from which she died a short time afterwards.

A person coming into highway No. 10 on the Pinecroft road can see No. 10 at a distance estimated at from 100 to 180 yards. On the right side of the Pinecroft road there was a regulation stop sign, and the defendant did not bring his car to a full stop before entering the highway.

The state contends that the defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter; the defendant contends that he is not guilty of any offense.

The jury returned a verdict of manslaughter, and from the judgment pronounced, the defendant appealed.

Brooks Parker, Smith & Wharton, of Greensboro, for appellant.

Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State

ADAMS J.

In deciding whether the conviction and judgment can be sustained we must consider the evidence as having been accepted by the jury with all its legitimate inferences. Thus considered does the evidence make a case of ""involuntary manslaughter"?

This offense consists in the unintentional killing of one person by another without malice (1) by doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony or naturally dangerous to human life; or (2) by negligently doing some act which in itself is lawful; or (3) by negligently failing or omitting to perform a duty imposed by law. These elements are embraced in the offense as defined at common law. Wharton, Homicide, 7; 1 Crim. Law (11th Ed.) 622; 1 McClain on Crim. Law, 303, § 335; Clark's Crim. Law, 204. The definition includes unintentional homicide resulting from the performance of an unlawful act, from the performance of a lawful act done in a culpably negligent way, and from the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. For the present purpose we may lay aside the common-law doctrine of culpable negligence in the performance of a lawful act and the common-law doctrine of unintentional homicide caused by an unlawful act not forbidden or made unlawful by any statute. Examples of the latter class may be found in decisions which from early times have maintained the elementary principle that if a person drives a vehicle on a highway recklessly or at an unusually rapid speed and runs over another and kills him he may be guilty of manslaughter. Rex v. Walker, 171 Eng. Rep. 1213.

The prosecution of the case before us was conducted upon the theory of an alleged breach of a positive injunction of the following statute: "The State Highway Commission with reference to State highways and local authorities with reference to highways under their jurisdictions are hereby authorized to designate main traveled or through highways by erecting at the entrances thereto from intersecting highways signs notifying drivers of vehicles to come to a full stop before entering or crossing such designated highway, and whenever any such signs have been so erected it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail to stop in obedience thereto. That no failure so to stop, however, shall be considered contributory negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property; but the facts relating to such failure to stop may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether the plaintiff in such action was guilty of contributory negligence." P. L. 1927, c. 148, § 21; Code (Michie) § 2621(63).

The defendant admits that on the Pinecroft road there was a "stop sign," or sign notifying drivers to come to a full stop, and that he did not observe this warning.

Sometimes responsibility for death turns upon the question whether the unlawful act is malum in se or malum prohibitum, as in State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945, 1 L. R A. (N. S.) 991, 111 Am. St. Rep. 818, 4 Ann. Cas. 797; but in State v. McIver, 175 N. C. 761, 94 S.E. 682, 684, the court said: "It is, however, practically agreed, without regard to this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a statute intended and designed to prevent injury to the person, and is in itself dangerous, and death ensues, that the person violating the...