State v. Satterfield

Decision Date30 June 1965
Docket NumberNo. 51514,51514
Citation257 Iowa 1193,136 N.W.2d 257
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John C. SATTERFIELD, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Wm. H. Napier, Fort Madison, for appellant.

Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Don R. Bennett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert B. Dickey, Lee County Atty., for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The net effect of the defendant's contentions in the case at bar, if they were sustained, would be to amend the statute of limitations applying to criminal offenses and greatly shorten the period provided therein in which prosecutions may be brought. We are unable to agree that this result should be reached.

The defendant was sentenced on October 30, 1961, to confinement in the state penitentiary at Fort Madison to serve an indeterminate sentence upon conviction of the crime of forgery. He was paroled about May 20, 1963, to a parole officer, and by the terms of his parole was restricted to Polk County, Iowa. He violated this parole, was found in Princeton, Missouri, was taken into custody there, and on October 21, 1963, was returned to the Iowa penitentiary and there incarcerated. On March 20, 1964, a county attorney's information was filed against his charging him with violation of sections 745.1 and 745.3 of the Code of Iowa of 1962, I.C.A., in that he escaped by leaving the territory to which he was confined by the terms of his parole. Section 745.1 is the general escape statute; section 745.3 is quoted:

'If any person having been paroled from the state penitentiary or state reformatory as provided by law, shall thereafter depart without the written consent of the board of parole from the territory within which by the terms of said parole he is restricted, he shall be deemed to have escaped from the custody within the meaning of section 745.1 and shall be punished as therein provided.'

Another code section is also important here. Section 247.9, Code of 1962, I.C.A., so far as material, is set out:

'All paroled prisoners shall remain, while on parole, in the legal custody of the warden or superintendent and under the control of said board, and shall be subject, at any time, to be taken into custody and returned to the institution from which they were paroled.'

The case as made by these statutes seems entirely free from doubt. The defendant was paroled; he violated the terms of his parole, thereby being guilty of escape as defined by section 745.3, supra. His technical custody under section 247.9, while on parole, remained with the warden of the penitentiary; and he was subject at any time to being taken into actual custody and returned to the institution from which he had been paroled. This was that happened to him. At all material times after he was returned to the penitentiary he was serving the sentence from which he had been paroled. This sentence had never been entirely served; it was suspended while he was on parole, and when he violated the terms of his parole agreement, he was returned to complete the sentence, or until he was again paroled.

But the defendant's contention is that if he was going to be charged with violation of section 745.1 and 745.3 there was a duty upon the state to do it at once. His argument centers around section 795.1 of the same code, as amended by Chapter 332 of the Acts of the 60th General Assembly. This is also quoted:

'When a person is held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment be not found against him at the next regular term of the court at which he is held to answer or within thirty days, whichever first occurs, the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. An accused not admitted to bail and unrepresented by legal counsel shall not be deemed to have waived his privilege of dismissal or be held to make demand or request to enforce a guarantee of speedy trial, and the court on its own motion shall carry out the provisions of this Act as to dismissal.'

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11 cases
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 25, 2017
    ...1290–91, 10 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1943), overruled on other grounds by Gorham , 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also State v. Satterfield , 257 Iowa 1193, 1195–96, 136 N.W.2d 257, 258 (1965) (noting the rules "represent protection for one who is charged by a preliminary information, that he must be indi......
  • State v. Trudo
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 20, 1977
    ...represented a statutory implementation of the speedy-trial provisions of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Satterfield, 257 Iowa 1193, 1195, 136 N.W.2d 257, 258 (1965). In Critelli we noted the rule's opening clause creates "an exception permitting suspension of the rule for goo......
  • Schneider v. Swaney Motor Car Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1965
    ... ...         Plaintiff, 25, a State College of Iowa graduate in 1958 was at the time of the accident (February 4, 1961) teaching physical education, driver's training and coaching high ... ...
  • Parrott v. Haugh
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1968
    ...158 N.W.2d 158, filed April 9, 1968; State v. Dillon, 258 Iowa 784, 785, 786, 139 N.W.2d 925, 926, 927; State v. Satterfield, 257 Iowa 1193, 1195, 1196, 136 N.W.2d 257, 258, 259; State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 847, 134 N.W.2d 906, 908; State v. Long, 256 Iowa 1304, 1308, 130 N.W.2d 663, II......
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