State v. Sauls

• Decision Date: 02 February 1905
• Citation: 50 S.E. 17,70 S.C. 393
• Parties: STATE v. SAULS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

50 S.E. 17

70 S.C. 393

STATE v. SAULS.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 2, 1905

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Hampton County.

William Sauls was convicted of crime, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. S Tillinghast and Jno. S. Reynolds, for appellant. James E Davis, Sol., for the State.

WOODS J.

The defendant was indicted for fornication, the woman with whom the offense was alleged to have been committed not being included in the indictment. Before the trial began, the defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that neither the man nor the woman could be separately indicted. The motion was refused, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced.

The first exception, alleging error in the circuit judge in refusing to quash the indictment, cannot be sustained. The general rule is that the participants in the crime of fornication may be either jointly or separately indicted. 9 Ency. P. & P. 645. But the defendant relies upon the peculiar words of the statute to sustain his position. Cr. Code 1902, § 290, provides that ""any man and woman who shall be guilty of the crime of adultery or fornication shall be liable to indictment," etc. Section 292 defines "fornication" as ""the living together and carnal intercourse with each other, or habitual carnal intercourse with each other, without living together, of a man and woman, both being unmarried." The defendant's view is that the words "with each other," in this last section, should be regarded as necessarily implying that the man and woman should be indicted together, and not separately, especially when it is considered that the statute provides for the indictment of any man and woman, not any man or woman, who shall be guilty of the crime of fornication. The practical objection to this construction is that it is extremely technical, and would result in allowing one guilty party to escape if the other should die before indictment. But aside from this, the principle has been long since settled. While it requires the combined action of at least three persons to constitute the crime of riot, it has never been doubted that one of such persons may be indicted separately; the indictment stating the names of the others, or alleging them to be unknown. State v. Brazil, Rice, 257.

On the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness, the circuit judge excluded the question: "Did you bring the case yourself, or did somebody get you...