State v. Saunders

• Citation: 302 N.J.Super. 509,695 A.2d 722
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Keith SAUNDERS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1997
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 509

302 N.J.Super. 509

695 A.2d 722

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Keith SAUNDERS, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted April 30, 1997.

Decided June 23, 1997.

[695 A.2d 724] Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, for defendant-appellant (Barbara A. Hedeen, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel, and on the brief).

Peter Verniero, Attorney General, for plaintiff-respondent (Michael J. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel, and on the brief).

Before Judges SHEBELL, P.G. LEVY and BRAITHWAITE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BRAITHWAITE, J.A.D.

Following a jury trial, defendant appeals from his conviction of third-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10c. He was sentenced to a custodial term of five years. On appeal, he contends:

POINT I

BECAUSE IT CONTAINS NUMEROUS UNDEFINED PHRASES, THE STALKING STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD IN

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. (Not raised below)

POINT II

MR. SAUNDERS' CONVICTION OF THIRD DEGREE STALKING WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS THERE WAS NO PROOF THAT HE "REPEATEDLY FOLLOWED" THE COMPLAINANT, THAT HE INTENDED TO ANNOY HER, AND THAT ANY ACTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE ENGAGED IN WERE "IN VIOLATION OF AN EXISTING COURT ORDER PROHIBITING THE BEHAVIOR." (Not raised below)

POINT III

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO DEFINE CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND ERRONEOUSLY DEFINED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT, THAT IS, THAT MR. SAUNDERS HAVE ACTED WITH THE INTENT TO ANNOY THE COMPLAINANT. (Partially raised below)

POINT IV

EVIDENCE THAT MR. SAUNDERS HAD WATCHED MS. WILLIAMS IN PRIOR YEARS AND THAT HE HAD AGREED IN 1989 "NEVER TO HARASS NURSE WILLIAMS AGAIN" WAS SO OVERWHELMINGLY PREJUDICIAL THAT ITS ADMISSION DEPRIVED SAUNDERS OF A FAIR TRIAL.

POINT VI

IN SENTENCING MR. SAUNDERS TO THE MAXIMUM TERM ALLOWABLE UNDER THE CODE, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.

We reject defendant's contentions and affirm.

I

At trial, the State produced the following evidence. The victim, Javonda Williams, a registered nurse who worked at St. James Hospital in Newark, had known defendant since 1973. Their friendship ended the same year. Defendant and Williams were never romantically involved. Nonetheless, defendant would repeatedly stand at the gate of the hospital's employee parking lot when Williams arrived for work at 7:15 a.m. and when she left work at about 4:00 p.m. During these times, defendant would stand and watch Williams. On one occasion in 1988, as Williams was going into the hospital, defendant "grabbed [her] by the arm" and "used profanity." Williams was able to enter the building and called security.

On May 20, 1989, Williams' children saw defendant in the hospital cafeteria, and they called Williams and reported defendant's whereabouts. Williams then notified security personnel, who removed defendant from the cafeteria. They also questioned defendant about his actions, and he signed a statement stating:

I declare I will not come on St. James premises, 155 Jefferson Street, Newark, N.J. Also I declare never to harrass [sic] Nurse Williams, JaVonda again. I know should I return to these premises I will be sent to jail for any of these act [sic]. Statements above on my free will.

In 1993, defendant stood outside the hospital and watched Williams on at least thirteen specific dates. Defendant's actions frightened Williams, and she reported his conduct to the police. On August 30, 1993, while standing "at the emergency exit driveway where [Williams] had to cross the street everyday," defendant mumbled something incoherent to Williams as he attempted to approach her. Williams was "afraid and frightened" by defendant's conduct.

On March 21, 1994, defendant sent Williams a letter. The letter listed defendant's name, address, age, telephone number, religion, and social security number. He sent a similar letter to Williams in 1995. Following defendant's telephone number, the letter stated, "ask for me."

On January 13, 1995, defendant entered a guilty plea to a charge of harassing Williams. The judgment of conviction ordered that he avoid all contact with Williams as a condition of a suspended sentence.

In June and July 1995, defendant continued to stand and watch Williams. On July 26, 1995, he approached the passenger side of Williams' vehicle. He got within five feet of her vehicle, which frightened Williams so much that she drove through a red light. Later that day, after work, defendant was standing and watching Williams. Williams then reported defendant's conduct to the police.

Defendant testified and denied that he intended to harass, frighten, or annoy Williams. He explained that he frequented the neighborhood to visit with co-workers of his father, who died in 1988. He also stated that he was in the area on several occasions because he had legitimate business at the hospital.

Defendant also contended that he had known Williams since 1974 and that she was his former girlfriend. He claimed that the relationship ended in 1977. Further, he testified that Williams attacked him in 1980 and cut him with a knife. On rebuttal, Williams denied that this incident occurred.

Defendant acknowledged that he signed the 1989 agreement not to enter the hospital or harass Williams. He testified that he sent the letters to Williams to correspond with her, not to harass or annoy her.

II

In point one, defendant contends that the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, violates both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions because it is vague and overbroad. We note that this challenge was not raised below. See R. 2:10-2.

Defendant was convicted of violating the original version of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, ¹ the pertinent parts of which read as follows:

a. As used in this act:

(1) "Course of conduct" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person, composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose which alarms or annoys that person and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as to cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct."

(2) "Credible threat" means an explicit or implicit threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat, so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for that person's safety.

b. A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposely and repeatedly follows another person and engages in a course of conduct or makes a credible threat with the intent of annoying or placing that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury c. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking in violation of an existing court order prohibiting the behavior.

d. A person who commits a second or subsequent offense of stalking which involves an act of violence or a credible threat of violence against the same victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

e. This act shall not apply to conduct which occurs during organized group picketing.

[Ibid.]

Here, defendant was charged with a course-of-conduct violation of the statute committed after a prior court order precluded him from following the victim.

A.

Declaring a statute unconstitutional is a serious matter that courts may not lightly undertake. See State v. Jones, 198 N.J.Super. 553, 561, 487 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.1985). The United States Supreme Court has outlined the analytical process as follows:

In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.

[Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982) (footnotes omitted).]

The Court went on the explain that depending on the type of law, the Constitution tolerates some degree of vagueness, requiring less strict scrutiny of economic regulations and more careful scrutiny of criminal laws. See id. at 498-99, 102 S.Ct. at 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d at 371-72. And, it added, vagueness may be mitigated by a scienter requirement, especially when a court examines a challenge claiming that the law failed to provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. See id. at 499, 102 S.Ct. at 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d at 372.

B.

Overbreadth is a doctrine rooted in substantive due process principles that addresses the statute's reach but not its clarity. See State v. Morales, 224 N.J.Super. 72, 79, 539 A.2d 769 (Law Div.1987). Overbreadth exists when a statute infringes or inhibits the First Amendment rights of the complainant or others. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2707, 53 L.Ed.2d 810, 833-34 (1977).

We conclude that defendant's argument that the former stalking statute is overbroad fails. We note that the reasoning applied in evaluating whether New Jersey's harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, was overbroad is instructive in analyzing defendant's claim. See State v. Hoffman, 290 N.J.Super. 588, 676 A.2d 565 (App.Div.1996); State v. Finance American Corp., 182 N.J.Super. 33, ...