State v. Saunders
| Decision Date | 17 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 38022-6-II.,No. 37621-1-II.,37621-1-II.,38022-6-II. |
| Citation | 220 P.3d 1238,153 Wash.App. 209 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Christopher Israel SAUNDERS, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
David L. Donnan, Washington Appellate Project, Vanessa Mi-jo Lee, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Christopher I. Saunders (Appearing Pro Se), Forks, WA.
Kathleen Proctor, Pierce County Prosecuting Atty. Ofc, Thomas Charles Roberts, Attorney, at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Christopher Saunders appeals his Conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, arguing in his statement of additional grounds for review (SAG)1 that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights and that other facts require reversal.2 Because the trial court violated Saunders's speedy trial rights, we reverse the trial court and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charges against Saunders under CrR 3.3(h).
¶ 2 Saunders is a sex offender required to register with the Pierce County Sheriff. He failed to update his registration as a transient sex offender. On August 7, the State charged Saunders with failure to register as a sex offender.
¶ 3 It appears that the State took Saunders into custody on September 17, 2007.3 Saunders's trial was initially set for November 6 but his attorney moved for a continuance on October 31, over Saunders's objection and despite his refusal to sign the continuance,4 to December 5 for "more time to prepare for trial" under CrR 3.3(f)(2). Clerk's Papers (CP) at 61. On November 27, Saunders's trial was again continued to January 8, 2008, after his attorney moved for a continuance for "ongoing invest[igation]/negotiations, defense attorney in trial" under CrR 3.3(f)(2) and Saunders again refused to sign the continuance. CP at 62.
¶ 4 On January 8, the State and Saunders's attorney moved for a continuance until February 20 for "further negotiations." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 8; 2008). at 3. Saunders refused to sign the continuance and he disagreed with his attorney's request, stating, RP (Jan. 8, 2008) at 4. The order granting the continuance on January 8 states that it was an agreed request for "Further Negotiations" but did not specify whether it was pursuant to CrR 3.3(f)(1), CrR 3.3(f)(2), or "for administrative necessity." CP at 63.
¶ 5 Saunders, without his counsel's participation, unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the action on February 13 based on CrR 3.3, CrR 8.3(b), and the "speedy trial [c]lauses of the State and Federal Constitutions." CP at 3. Following argument on Saunders's initial motion to dismiss on February 20, the trial court asked the State and defense counsel THE COURT: [Prosecutor], anything for the State? Who's the prosecutor on this?
¶ 6 After further argument from Saunders, the following discussion occurred:
. . . .
THE COURT: Well, the explanation isn't as detailed as it might be, but there appears to be some explanation, although if the State is acting diligently, one might wonder better [sic] why someone in the negotiating unit has a case that's 155 days old. That may not be the State's fault. Two were at [appointed defense attorney's] request. Further negotiations, I don't know what that means. Apparently they've been fruitless.
... I'm going to grant one more continuance, last continuance without good explanation, which I haven't actually heard. I think this is a fairly simple case to try. I'm going to continue this to March 18th.
¶ 7 But the signed order from February 20 states that the motion for continuance was "upon agreement of the parties pursuant to CrR 3.3(f)(1)," states that the reason was "Prosecutor in trial," and was signed by the appointed defense attorney and the assigned prosecutor, neither of whom was at the hearing. CP at 64. Saunders again refused to sign the continuance form and the judge appears to have written on the continuance form, "Last continuance] w[ith]out good explanation." CP at 64. The February 20 written order, granting the State's request for a continuance, clearly contradicts the record because the matter was still with the assigned prosecutor, who was in the prosecutor's negotiating unit, Saunders did not agree to the continuance, and, as it turns out, Saunders's case was still assigned to the negotiating unit on March 18.
¶ 8 On March 18, the State moved for yet another continuance. The discussion was as follows:
¶ 9 The trial court granted a final continuance, checking the box for a continuance that states, the continuance "is required in the administration of justice pursuant to CrR 3.3(f)(2) and the defendant will not be prejudiced in his or her defense" in order to allow assignment of the case to a prosecutor for trial. CP at 65. The court commented, RP (Mar. 18, 2008) at 16. Saunders refused to sign this continuance form as well. The court called the trial to begin on March 24 but it then recessed until the beginning of voir dire on March 25.
THE COURT:.... I'm not continuing your case until tomorrow. I'm recessing it until tomorrow. In other words, we have started the trial, and I'm recessing it until tomorrow morning to allow [the State] to finish up with another case.... I know it sounds like a technicality, but there is a difference between a continuance and a recess, so I have started your case.
¶ 10 The jury convicted Saunders for failure to register as a sex offender. Saunders appeals. We consolidated his personal restraint petition with this appeal
¶ 11 Saunders argues that the trial court violated his constitutional speedy trial rights and CrR 3.3, and requests that we vacate his conviction and dismiss the charge against him.7 We agree with Saunders that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3, thus, we do not reach his constitutional speedy trial right argument and other issues.
¶ 12 "[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Downing, 151 Wash.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). An appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's decision unless the appellant or petitioner makes `a clear showing ... [that the trial court's] discretion [is] manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" Downing, 151 Wash.2d at 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)).
¶ 13 A defendant has a right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. See State v. Carson, 128 Wash.2d 805, 820 & nn. 63-64, 912 P.2d 1016 (1996). Although CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i) requires trial within 60 days when the defendant is in custody, this requirement "`is not a constitutional mandate.'" Carson, 128 Wash.2d at 821, 912 P.2d 1016 (quoting State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632, 651, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)). Under CrR 3.3(h), the trial court must dismiss charges when the applicable speedy trial period has expired without a...
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