State v. Savage

• Citation: 69 Me. 112
• Parties: STATE v. JAMES M. SAVAGE.
• Decision Date: 28 January 1879
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

69 Me. 112

STATE v. JAMES M. SAVAGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

January 28, 1879

ON EXCEPTIONS.

INDICTMENT for manslaughter, charging the defendant with feloniously and wilfully killing Eliza A. Savage, on November 15, 1877.

The deceased was the wife of the accused. There was evidence tending to prove that both had been intemperate in their habits for years, and that he had been in a state of intoxication, more or less, for some ten days prior to the death of the wife, which occurred on Thursday, and that she had drank some; that on Friday previous they came to Augusta together. Testimony in regard to what was said between them at that time, was admitted, against the objection of defendant's counsel, as follows:

Harriet N. Cummings, called by the government: " I saw Mrs Savage the Friday before she died; saw her come out of the house and get into a wagon; Mr. Savage was with her; Mr. and Mrs. Savage had conversation at that time; he seemed to be harnessing the horse."

Ques. " You may state what the conversation was." [Conversation the Friday before is objected to by counsel for the respondent.]

The court: " It will depend upon what it is. I cannot say until we hear it. You may put it in."

Witness " She stood waiting for him, and told him she did not feel as if she could go down there. She said she had not eaten a mouthful of victuals to-day, and the pig hadn't been fed and the horse hadn't had anything to eat, and she did not want to go. He said, ‘ G--d d--n you, you have got to go.’ He seemed to be harnessing the horse. He was nearly an hour harnessing his horse. When they got in the first time she told him to get out, that he did not know enough to harness a horse; told him to get out and fix the harness in some way. He got out and got in again. She then told him something was wrong, and he got out again. I am not sure whether he got out the third time. At any rate, she thought it was not right the third time. He said, ‘ By G--d, I am going to drive now.’ Then they started out."

There was other testimony tending to prove that the accused had assaulted and ill-treated the deceased prior to her death that she was affected with a disease known as bleeding purpura at the time they started to come to Augusta on Friday, and up to the time of her death, and that the accused neglected and refused to provide her with proper care, attendance, necessaries and medical treatment to restore her health, but there was no evidence that the accused, his wife or anyone else knew at the time that she was affected with that or any other dangerous disease.

The presiding judge instructed the jury, in his charge, as follows:

" If a husband should, by his control, refuse and prevent the proper measures being taken to restore his wife to health, and through that gross carelessness or wickedness on his part in depriving her of the necessaries of life, death was brought about, he would be just as guilty as though it was a positive act of violence."

To the ruling of the presiding judge in admitting the testimony, and instructions to the jury quoted, the respondent excepted.

E. F. Webb, county attorney, for the state.

E. F. Pillsbury, for the defendant.

WALTON J.

The defendant has been tried and convicted of manslaughter, and the case is before the law court on exceptions to the admission of evidence, and to a portion of the judge's charge to the jury.

The evidence, to the admission of which exception is taken, was a conversation between the prisoner and his wife a few days before her death. The evidence tended to show that the husband was then considerably intoxicated, and that he compelled his wife to go to Augusta with him, at a time when she was sick and unable to go. It is contended that the evidence was inadmissible, because it had no tendency to prove the offense set forth in the indictment, and because it tended to prove a cause of death other than that alleged. We think these objections are not open to the defendant. Objections to evidence should be stated at the time it is offered, and with sufficient definiteness to apprise the court and the opposite party of the precise grounds of the objection; and all...