State v. Savidge
| Decision Date | 05 April 1920 |
| Docket Number | 15626. |
| Citation | 110 Wash. 618,188 P. 923 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. STETSON v. SAVIDGE, Commissioner of Public Lands. |
Department 2.
Mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of Warren Stetson, against C. V. Savidge, Commissioner of Public Lands. Writ denied.
Norwood W. Brockett, of Seattle, for relator.
L. L Thompson, Atty. Gen., and Jno. A. Homer, Asst. Atty. Gen for respondent.
This is an application for a writ of mandamus to require the commissioner of public lands to execute a lease to the relator for mining and extracting petroleum and natural gas from certain tidelands belonging to the state of Washington. It is conceded that the relator has fully complied with the provisions of the statute relating to leasing of state lands for the purpose of mining and extraction of petroleum and natural gas. The state land commissioner refused to execute the lease on the ground that tidelands are not lands within the meaning of the statute which provides as follows:
So the question in the case is whether these lands are lands belonging to the state. Section 6641, Rem. Code, classifies state lands as follows:
Section 6642 provides:
'All lands described in the last section are 'public lands' and the terms 'public lands' and 'state lands' shall be defined and deemed to be synonymous whenever either is used in this chapter.'
We think it is apparent from these provisions that tidelands are public lands belonging to the state.
In Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, at page 133, 94 P. 922, at page 924 (16 Ann. Cas. 196), we said:
The last section above quoted is now section 6764, Rem. Code, which provides as follows:
'Tide and shore lands which have not been sold, and for which application to purchase have not been theretofore filed and are pending, may be leased in the same manner as provided for the lease of school and granted lands. * * *
Counsel for respondent argue that the terms 'state lands' or 'public lands' used in the statute do not include tidelands, and cite Baer v. Moran Bros. Co., 2 Wash. 608, 27 P. 470, and Seattle & Montana Ry. Co. v. State, 7 Wash. 150, 34 P. 551, 22 L. R. A. 217, 38 Am. St. Rep. 866. In the first of these cases the land involved was below the line of extreme low tide. Such land was not tideland. In the other case the court held that the tideland was not land within the meaning of the statute giving railroad companies the right to condemn land; but since that time the Legislature passed the act of 1897, which delegated to a board of state land commissioners authority over granted, school, tide, oyster and other lands, and declared that all such lands are public lands. Laws of 1897, c. 89, p. 229. So those decisions are no longer authority upon the question now under consideration.
Respondent also argues that, because these tidelands have not been surveyed, and because the act limits the leasing of such land to an amount not to exceed one section, therefore the Legislature did not intend to include unsurveyed tidelands.
Section 6792, Rem. Code, provides that the application for lease may include 'any amount of such land not to exceed one section.' The application here is in the following language:
'All the tidelands belonging to the state of Washington lying contiguous and adjacent to and abutting upon sections 1, 12, 13, 23, 26, and 35, all in township 31 north, range 16 west, W. M., also sections 1, 12, 13, 24, 25, and 36 in township 30 north, range 16 west, W. M., also sections 18, 19, and 31 in township 30 north, range 15...
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