State v. Savorelli
| Decision Date | 13 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-01993,95-01993 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Dino SAVORELLI, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Claudia R. Isom, Judge.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Erica M. Raffel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Wayne S. Timmerman of Wayne S. Timmerman, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
The state challenges the trial court's dismissal on speedy trial grounds of count II, charging Dino Savorelli with conspiring to traffic in cocaine. We agree with the state that Savorelli's waiver of speedy trial for count I, charging trafficking in cocaine, applies as well to count II because the trial court specifically found that the two charges arose from the same set of facts. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
The state arrested Savorelli in November 1993 for possession of cocaine, trafficking, and conspiracy, but initially charged him only with one count of trafficking in cocaine during October 1993. Ten months after the initial charge, the state added count II, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine during February 1993. Before the state added count II, Savorelli twice moved to continue, specifically waiving speedy trial. After the state added count II, Savorelli filed a third motion to continue. Subsequently, Savorelli moved to dismiss or alternatively to sever counts I and II, alleging that the crimes charged in the two counts occurred on different dates at different places and were not based on the same act or transaction, and that the state violated Savorelli's speedy trial rights by failing to add count II until ten months after the initial trafficking charge. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss count II, holding that although Savorelli "had waived speedy trial several times during the prudency [sic] of this cause, ... that Defendant could not be held to have waived speedy trial as to Count II prior to the time the charge came to legally exist." We disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion.
The trial court's order contains the specific factual finding that the crimes charged in the two counts "arose out of the same set of facts." The record contains support for that factual finding. When more than one charge arises from the same criminal episode, a defendant who waives speedy trial for one of those charges thereby waives his right to...
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State v. Gibson, 5D00-702.
...as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode); Morris v. State, 715 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Savorelli, 669 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). With respect to the crimes charged in Counts I and III, the trial court found that those offenses arose out of the sam......
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Morris v. State, 97-0035
..."defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode."); State v. Savorelli, 669 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Albanez, 448 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Conner v. State, 398 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Defendant argues that ap......