State v. Schafer

• Decision Date: 05 September 1888
• Citation: 39 N.W. 89,74 Iowa 704
• Parties: STATE v. SCHAFER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

74 Iowa 704

39 N.W. 89

STATE

v.SCHAFER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

September 5, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Wapello county; CHARLES D. LEGGETT, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of keeping a house of ill fame, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary.E. L. Burton, for defendant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

REED, J.

1. The district court instructed the jury that the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal, unless the evidence established the fact of his guilt to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt; also that, as the evidence relied on to establish the charge was circumstantial, they would not be warranted in finding the defendant guilty, unless the circumstances proven were wholly inconsistent with every other reasonable or probable theory except that of his guilt. The following instruction was also given: “A reasonable doubt is one which fairly and naturally arises in the mind after considering all of the evidence and carefully examining the whole case. If you are then not so satisfied and convinced of the defendant's guilt that you would act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest importance to yourselves, you should give the defendant the benefit of your doubt, and acquit. If you are so satisfied, you should convict him.” Exception was taken to the last two sentences of this instruction. In State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347, and State v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 437, however, instructions to the same effect were approved by this court, and the doctrine of the instruction has been the accepted rule on the subject in this state since the latter case was decided. But it was contended that the instruction was disapproved in State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 85, 21 N. W. Rep. 195. But the language of that opinion relied on was used merely by way of concession, for the purposes of the case. The effect of what is there said is that if the true rule is as was contended by counsel, it was sufficiently expressed by the instruction under consideration when all of its language was considered. But we had no intention of overruling the former case, and, when all of the instructions in the present case are considered, they are quite as favorable to defendant as was the charge in that case.

2. It was charged in the indictment that defendant kept a house of ill fame, to which he permitted persons to resort for purposes of prostitution and lewdness; also that, at his solicitation and request, prostitution and lewdness were practiced in said house. Counsel for defendant requested the district court to instruct the jury that he could not be convicted unless this latter averment was proven, which the court refused to do, but told the jury that the proof would warrant a conviction if it showed that defendant's house was resorted to for the unlawful purposes alleged, with his knowledge and consent. This ruling is clearly correct. The offense consists in keeping a house...