State v. Schmit, 39079
| Citation | 273 Minn. 78,139 N.W.2d 800 |
| Decision Date | 21 January 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 39079,39079 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Adrian B. SCHMIT, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. An order excluding all spectators during the trial of a criminal case except members of the bar and press, upon the sole ground of the obscene nature of the offense charged and the anticipated testimony, exceeds the power of the trial court and constitutes a violation of defendant's right to a public trial as guaranteed by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6.
2. The crime of indecent assault is not a lesser and included offense of the crime of sodomy.
Ray Flader, Louise Miller O'Neil, St. Paul, for appellant.
Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, William B. Randall, County Atty., Phyllis G. Jones, and Henry W. Pickett, Jr., Asst. County Attys., for respondent.
Appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new trial.
Defendant was brought to trial in the District Court of Ramsey County upon an information charging him with the crime of sodomy as follows:
'That on the 8th day of November, in the year 1962, at said county, Adrian Benedict Schmit (sic), then and there being, did wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously and carnally know a female person, to wit: one Carole Ann Bergeron, by the mouth and tongue of him, the said Adrian Benedict Schmit, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, * * *.' 1
The jury found defendant guilty of indecent assault, submitted as a lesser and included offense over his objection.
After the jury was sworn and the state concluded its opening statement, a motion was made on behalf of the state to exclude witnesses and spectators from the courtroom. Over defendant's objection, the following order was made:
At a later point in the proceedings, the court clarified its order:
'* * * (L)et the record show that the Court granted the State's motion to exclude the public because of the nature of the testimony, * * * but the record should show that in excluding the public the Court has made an exception of all members of the bar and makes an exception of any representative of the press.'
Two questions raised by the assignment of errors are decisive of the appeal, namely: Did the order excluding the pubic violate defendant's constitutional right to a public trial, and was it error to submit the offense of indecent assault as a lesser and included offense of the crime of sodomy? We are constrained to answer both in the affirmative.
and public trial.' 2 The pertinent language and apparent scope of U.S.Const. Amend. VI are identical. 3 The right to a public trial can scarcely be regarded as less fundamental and essential to a fair trial than the right to assistance of counsel, also granted by the Sixth Amendment. Despite the absence of a specific holding, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court tend to erase any lingering doubts that the right to a public trial, no less than the right to counsel, is entitled to protection from state invasion by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This likelihood, together with the identity of language, bestows special significance upon Federal cases as we seek to interpret and apply our constitutional provision.
Based upon consideration of the history and development of the concept as one rooted in the common law, the right to a public trial, whether guaranteed by constitutional or statutory provision, is universally regarded by state and Federal courts as basic and substantial and the language declaring it as mandatory. Although so regarded, the term 'public' is relative and not defined in either constitution. Hence, courts uniformly refuse to view the right to a public trial as absolute in the sense that everyone who wishes to attend may do so. Rather, (for the purposes of this kind of case) it is generally viewed as a limited privilege accorded to an accused, subject to the inherent power of the court to restrict attendance as the conditions and circumstances reasonably require for the preservation of order and decorum in the courtroom and to protect the rights of parties and witnesses. 5 Accordingly, it has been held that restrictions on attendance may be imposed because of the limited seating capacity of the courtroom, 6 to prevent overcrowding, 7 or in the interests of health or for sanitary reasons. 8 Order and decorum of the court must be preserved and a judge may exclude anyone guilty of misconduct, 9 provided no more are excluded than necessary to maintain order. 10 It is everywhere conceded that minors deserve special consideration and may be excluded from the courtroom in trials of a salacious nature. 11 Where it appears that minors are unable to testify competently and coherently before an audience because of embarrassment or fright, temporary exclusion of the public is permissible. 12 Our prior decisions hold that an adult witness may also be protected by temporary exclusion of the public when it appears that embarrassment prevents a full recital of the facts. 13
In discussing the extent to which the court may go in excluding spectators, in State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 149, 21 N.W.2d 328, 331, it was observed:
The question squarely presented on this appeal is whether all spectators may be indiscriminately excluded during the entire trial, solely because of the obscene nature of the crime and of the testimony likely to be presented, without infringing on defendant's fundamental rights. In considering the question, we are mindful that the court below, in deference to consideration of public decency and morality, was activated by the highest motives, for the record before us indeed reveals the sordid details of the most extreme type of vulgar, scandalous, and revolting conduct. However, we must be equally mindful that our answer necessarily transcends the disposition of this particular case.
The question is one on which courts are not agreed, both with respect to what constitutes a public trial and the permissible extent of exclusion.
Of the two opposing views, a minority interprets the guarantee of a public trial less rigorously. They define 'public trial' as one that is 'not secret.' 14 Some courts have held valid a statutory exclusion of the public in all trials of an indecent nature. 15
A majority of the courts protect an accused's rights more scrupulously, interpreting 'public trial' broadly in its ordinary commonsense meaning as being a trial which the general public is free to attend. The doors of the courtroom are expected to be kept open. 16 'The public includes persons of all classes.' 17 These cases have reversed convictions obtained at trials where the public was excluded solely on account of the salacious nature of the crime or testimony likely to be given. 18 In these cases the exclusionary orders varied in scope, some excepting members of the bar and friends and relatives of the defendant, 19 while some excepted members of the press but refused to admit friends. 20 Regardless of the exceptions to the order, the action in excluding the public has been condemned. 21
The arguments advanced by the proponents of spectator exclusion appear to be based upon these considerations:
'* * * (T)he undesirable effect on public morals of an open trial of a salacious case; the unnecessary embarrassment to witnesses caused by the presence of an audience; and the influence the presence of the public has on both attorneys and jury, encouraging histrionics in the one and undermining the impartiality of the other.' 22
Each of these reasons alone or in combination, it is urged, justifies excluding all who are not directly interested, and no infringement of defendant's rights results where his friends, relatives, and members of the press and bar are permitted to remain in the courtroom.
In our opinion, these arguments tend to dilute the force of the plain meaning of the words 'public trial' It must be acknowledged that there is a vast difference between a trial from which everyone but a special class of persons is excluded and one which everyone except a designated few is free to attend. 23
Excluding adult spectators is a dubious protection of public morality in light of the morbid and debased curiosity which beckons many, particularly in light of the details and probable innuendoes included in extensive and prominent coverage by news media.
'* * * Moreover whatevery may have been the view in an earlier and more formally modest age, we think that the franker and more...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gannett Co Inc v. Pasquale
...v. Beaudoin, 386 A.2d 731, 733 (Me.1978); Cox v. State, 3 Md.App. 136, 139-140, 238 A.2d 157, 158-159 (1968); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 86-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806-807 (1966); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 218-219, 156 P. 1080, 1083-1084 (1916); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene District......
-
State v. Lawrence
...universally regarded by state and federal courts as basic and substantial, and the language declaring it as mandatory. State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800, 803. Accordingly, it is protected by constitution, statute, or decision in almost every state. Amendment 6, United States Con......
-
U.S. v. Powers
...v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, dismis......
-
State v. Garrett
... ... excluded from hearing and witnessing the evidences of human ... depravity' "). See also State v. Schmit, ... 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806 (1966); Marshall v ... State, 254 Ind. 156, 159, 258 N.E.2d 628 (1970) ... {¶ ... ...