State v. Schneider, 14–1113.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1113.,14–1113. |
| Citation | 870 N.W.2d 274 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Steve Thomas SCHNEIDER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Alfredo Parrish and Andrew Dunn of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Tyler Buller, Assistant Attorneys General, and John Werden, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by TABOR, P.J., and BOWER and McDONALD, JJ.
Steve Schneider was convicted of six counts of sexual abuse in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4 (2009), and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Schneider raises numerous challenges to his convictions, raining constitutional and procedural arrows on the trial court and the trial as if he were raiding a slow-moving wagon train. We conclude his numerous shots miss the mark or are otherwise better raised in postconviction-relief proceedings. We pluck the missives from the sides of the circled Conestogas and address them seriatim.
In 2006, C.N. and her sister moved from Florida to Iowa to live with their maternal grandparents while their mother, June, was deployed overseas for military service. At the time, C.N. was eleven years old and in fifth grade.
In 2008, Schneider, June's brother, moved to another house on the grandparents' farm property. A fair interpretation of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, is Schneider began grooming C.N. as a victim after moving to the property. C.N., her sister, and their cousins spent a great deal of time at Schneider's house hanging out and playing videogames. The children frequently stayed overnight with Schneider, sleeping in the same bed with him. At some point, Schneider started to have “wandering hands.” Schneider bought gifts for C.N., including a cell phone and bras. In January 2009 Schneider and C.N. had sexual intercourse for the first time. They had sex frequently during the period February through June 2009. Schneider told C.N. to keep their “relationship” a secret because “nobody would understand.” The relationship ended in 2011 when C.N. and her sister moved back to Florida to live with their mother. C.N. was sixteen at the time the relationship ended.
In 2012, C.N. told her mother, June, that she had had a sexual relationship with Schneider, but C.N. asked June not to do anything about it. June contacted law enforcement in Florida, and they referred her to the authorities in Iowa. June did not see Schneider in person until August 2013. At that time, she confronted her brother about his relationship with C.N. Schneider hung his head, slumped his shoulders, and said, “yeah, she's right.” When June's other brother, Dean, learned of the relationship, he also confronted Schneider, asking if Schneider had slept with C.N. Schneider replied, “yes.”
In December 2013 Schneider was charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and four counts of sexual abuse in the third-degree. In April 2014, Schneider filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The State filed its amended and substituted trial information, charging Schneider with six counts of sexual abuse in the third-degree, each count corresponding to one month for the time period January through June 2009. The case was tried to a jury, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on each count. After unsuccessfully moving for new trial on various grounds, Schneider timely filed this appeal.
Schneider first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. See State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 431 (Iowa 2014). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, courts consider all of the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We will uphold a verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. See id. “Evidence is considered substantial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Schneider first contends there was not sufficient evidence he performed a “sex act” during the months of February through June 2009, corresponding to counts II–VI of the amended trial information. Jury Instruction No. 15 defined a “sex act” as C.N. testified as follows:
As we understand Schneider's challenge, he does not contend that inserting his penis into C.N.'s vagina is not a “sex act.” Instead he contends C.N. did not explicitly testify that a “sex act” occurred every month. In other words, he challenges the form of the questions; for example, whether the question “And in May 2009?” and the corresponding answer, “Yes, sir,” is sufficient to establish a “sex act” occurred during that month.
We conclude the argument is without merit. It is clear C.N.'s testimony regarding each of the challenged months, when viewed in context of the sequenced questions, related back to her definition of sexual contact. The specificity of C.N.'s testimony distinguishes this case from State v. Topete–Duenas, No. 08–1381, 2009 WL 4114154, at *1 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 25, 2009), upon which Schneider relies. In that case, the alleged victim was unable to express with any specificity the contact between herself and the defendant. See id. at *6. She did not know what the term “genital area” meant. See id. Neither the alleged victim nor her mother elaborated on their meaning of the term “inappropriate part.” See id. The jury was thus left to speculate whether a “sex act” occurred. In contrast, in this case, C.N. explicitly testified that “sexual contact” meant “his penis would go into my vagina.” Such contact is a “sex act” within the meaning of the instruction given. She clearly testified that “sexual contact” occurred in each of the months corresponding to the different counts in the amended trial information. The jury was not left to speculate here.
Schneider next contends there was no direct testimony that he and C.N. were not living together as husband and wife, an element of the offense. We conclude this challenge is without merit. There is no requirement that there be “direct testimony” to establish each of the elements of the offenses. On the contrary, the State may offer both direct and circumstantial evidence. The evidence showed that Schneider and C.N. were not living together at all on the offense dates: she resided in her grandparents' home, and he resided in a separate home on the same farm property. The evidence also established that Schneider was legally married to another, although they were separated and in the process of divorcing. See Iowa Code § 595.19(2) (). On the offense dates, C.N. was under fourteen years of age. See Iowa Code § 595.2(2), (3) (). Schneider and the victim were also blood relatives—uncle and niece. See Iowa Code § 595.19(1)(b) (). Jurors are not asked to check their common sense at the courthouse doors. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, there was sufficient evidence to establish Schneider and C.N. were not living together as husband and wife on the offense dates. See Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 615.
In his final shot at the sufficiency of the evidence, Schneider contends C.N.'s testimony is not credible and cannot support the verdicts. “Generally, the credibility of witnesses is left to the jury.” State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Iowa 1997). In State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa Ct.App.1993), the court recognized an exception to the general rule where “[t]he testimony of a witness may be so impossible and absurd and self-contradictory that it should be deemed a ity by the court.” Relying on that principle, the Smith court reversed the defendant's convictions for sexual abuse and assault where “the accounts of alleged abuse [were] inconsistent, self-contradictory, lacking in experiential detail, and, at times, border[ed] on the absurd.” 508 N.W.2d at 103. We have great faith in the competency of juries; the instances in which a court should consider testimony a ity due to credibility determinations are “limited.” State v. Hobbs, No. 12–0730, 2013 WL 988860, at *3 (Iowa Ct.App. Mar. 13, 2013). In review of the record as a whole, we cannot conclude C.N.'s accounts of abuse were inconsistent, contradictory, or absurd. C.N.'s accounts and testimony regarding the sex abuse were largely consistent. Her testimony was corroborated by Schneider's admissions to June, his sister, and Dean, his brother. “The jury was free to believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and to give weight to the...
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