State v. Schutte
| Decision Date | 03 June 1922 |
| Citation | 117 A. 508,97 Conn. 462 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. SCHUTTE. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; William M. Maltbie Judge.
Emil Schutte was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals from alleged errors in instruction and refusal of new trial. No error.
Gustaf B. Carlson and Daniel J. Donahoe, both of Middletown, for appellant.
Ernest A. Inglis, State's Atty., and Bertrand E. Spencer, both of Middletown, for the State.
The appellant was indicted and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, in that he willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly killed one Joseph Ball in the town of Haddam on December 10, 1915.
The principal claim made on this appeal is that the verdict of the jury, that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree, does not find sufficient support in the evidence to justify its return, and therefore that the court erred in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict. The grounds alleged in the motion may be grouped as follows:
(1) The state failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree a crime punishable by death, without the testimony of at Ieast two witnesses or that which is equivalent thereto.
The law regulating the granting of new trials by setting aside verdicts is the same in civil and criminal proceedings.
" A verdict will be set aside only when manifest injustice has been done by the verdict, and the wrong is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they, or some of them, were influenced by corruption, prejudice, or partiality." State v. Buxton, 79 Conn. 480, 65 A. 958.
State v. Washelesky, 81 Conn. 25, 70 A. 62.
The claim that the defendant's guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt is based for the most part on the contention that the jury must have given greater weight to the testimony of the son of the accused, who testified that he was an eyewitness of the killing of Ball by the accused, than was justified in view of certain facts and circumstances in evidence. The credit to be given to a witness is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury. If the jury were so grossly misled by the testimony of one witness that the facts in evidence made this manifest, it is not reasonably probable that a trial court would have failed to become aware of the fact, and would not upon opportunity have corrected the wrong done, especially in a capital case.
We have carefully examined the record and are satisfied that the jury could reasonably have found that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant's remaining claim under his motion to set aside the verdict is that the jury could not reasonably have found that the statute (Gen. St. 1918), section 6633, which provides that " no person shall be convicted of any crime punishable by death without the testimony of at least two witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto," had been satisfied by the evidence presented. It is apparent from the record that the court and counsel for the accused took radically different views as to the true construction of this statute. The action of the trial court in denying the motion is therefore to be weighed in the light of that situation.
The interesting history of the origin of this statute, which is unique in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, may be found in State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 60 A. 690.
The accused claims that the court erred in its charge in relation to this statute, and also erred in denying a motion to set aside the verdict on the ground " that the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, a crime punishable by death, without the testimony of at least two witneses or that which is equivalent thereto."
As to this statute, the court charged, in part, as follows:
It says, you see, ‘ no person shall be convicted of any crime punishable by death.’ The charge here is first degree murder, and it means, therefore, that before you could bring in a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, you must be satisfied that there has been offered to you the testimony of at least two witnesses or that which is equivalent thereto. It does not mean, however, that you could not, if you are satisfied beyond doubt of the presence of the necessary elements, bring in a verdict of second degree murder, or of manslaughter, even though you could not find that there were two witnesses or the equivalent thereto. In other words, this provision applies only to proving a verdict of first degree murder, and not to proving one of second degree murder or manslaughter.
As to its meaning, a word or two is, I think, necessary. It says, ‘ the testimony of at least two witnesses.’ That does not mean that there shall be two witnesses to the actual commission of the crime; it does not mean that there shall be two witnesses as to any single fact, both testifying to the same fact. All it means in its requirement as to two witnesses is that there shall be two witnesses testifying to material and relevant circumstances or facts tending to show the guilt of the accused, perhaps to the same fact but not necessarily, perhaps to other facts and circumstances; but there must be at least two witnesses, or the equivalent thereto, testifying to the same or different facts or circumstances material and relevant to show the guilt of the accused.
Now, ‘ equivalent thereto’ means that there may not be two witnesses giving direct testimony as to certain facts or circumstances tending to prove the guilt of the accused. There may be one witness, and then there may be circumstances and facts in the case shown indirectly, as to which no person can say, ‘ I saw,’ ‘ I heard,’ and the combination of those two-of the one direct witness and of the facts and circumstances-may be sufficient in your judgment to amount to testimony equivalent to that of two witnesses."
It is essential, in discussing the proper construction of this statutory requirement, to bear in mind that it has no bearing upon the trial of a capital offense unless the jury finds that the essential elements of the capital crime charged have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury must be charged that, even if they so find, they must not find the accused guilty of murder in the first degree, unless the case is proved by the testimony of at least two witnesses or that which is equivalent thereto.
The purpose of this statute was to prevent a person being put to death by the unsupported testimony of one witness. The construction of the statute from the earliest times has been in accord with that purpose. In Swift's Evidence published in 1810, we find the earliest discussion of this statute in our legal writings. On page 142, the author says:
In Swift's Digest published in 1823, on page 406, the above statement is repeated in substance; also in Dutton's Revision of Swift's Digest published in 1853 and reprinted in 1874, the same statement is repeated, on page 431.
We are satisfied that the construction of this statute as thus stated by Swift is correct.
By " different parts of the same transaction or different circumstances attending it," the author refers to relevant facts tending to prove an essential element of the capital crime charged. All that the statute...
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