State v. Scott

• Decision Date: 02 December 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-1583
• Citation: 2022 Ohio 4277
• Parties: The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Scott, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

2022-Ohio-4277

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Scott, Appellant.

No. 2020-1583

Supreme Court of Ohio

December 2, 2022

Submitted December 8, 2021

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, Nos CA2020-01-007, 2020-Ohio-5302.

Martin P. Votel, Preble County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D Bogdanoff, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Ohio Innocence Project, Donald R. Caster, Jennifer Paschen Bergeron, and Samantha M. Kovacevic, for appellant.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, L.L.P, Jeetander T. Dulani, Emily Huang, and Chloe J. Stepney; Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender and Joanna Sanchez, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae the Innocence Network.

O'Connor, C.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Guy Billy Lee Scott, is serving a prison term of 15 years to life for his 1992 convictions for the assault, rape, and murder of Lesa Buckley. Scott petitioned the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for postconviction DNA testing, which appellee, the state of Ohio, opposed. The trial court denied the petition, and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. In this appeal, we determine whether the postconviction DNA testing that Scott seeks is outcome determinative as required by R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5). Because we find that it is, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background

{¶ 2} Following a jury trial in 1992, Scott was convicted of the assault, rape, and murder of Buckley. Buckley's body was found on July 8, 1990, in Cedar Lake near New Paris, Ohio. The lake was in a disused gravel quarry where Buckley and Scott, along with 60 to 120 other people, attended a party the previous night.

{¶ 3} A summary of the testimony from Scott's trial may be found in the Twelfth District's decision affirming his convictions. State v. Scott, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA92-03-052, 1994 WL 394976 (Aug. 1, 1994). This court declined review of Scott's direct appeal. State v. Scott, 71 Ohio St.3d 1428, 642 N.E.2d 635 (1994).

{¶ 4} In 2019, Scott petitioned the trial court under R.C. 2953.73 for postconviction DNA testing. The trial court denied the application, concluding that it did not satisfy the "outcome determinative" standard set forth in R.C. 2953.74(D). The Twelfth District affirmed the trial court's judgment. 2020-Ohio-5302, ¶ 52, 59.

{¶ 5} We accepted jurisdiction over Scott's discretionary appeal and his single proposition of law in which he asserts that a trial court should consider the possibility that a DNA profile developed from crime-scene evidence could match a profile contained in the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") database when considering whether to grant an application for postconviction DNA testing. See 161 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2021-Ohio-717, 164 N.E.3d 482.

Analysis

{¶ 6} Ohio law provides eligible offenders the opportunity to apply for postconviction DNA testing as described in R.C. 2953.71 through 2953.81. See R.C. 2953.73. The circumstances under which a trial court may accept an application for postconviction DNA testing are described in R.C. 2953.74. When Scott was tried for the assault, rape, and murder of Buckley in the early 1990s, DNA testing was not conducted on the biological samples obtained from Buckley. Consequently, Scott's application for postconviction DNA testing falls under R.C. 2953.74(B)(1), which provides that the court may accept the application only if

[t]he offender did not have a DNA test taken at the trial stage in the case in which the offender was convicted of the offense for which the offender is an eligible offender and is requesting the DNA testing regarding the same biological evidence that the offender seeks to have tested, the offender shows that DNA exclusion when analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the subject offender's case as described in division (D) of [R.C. 2953.74] would have been outcome determinative at that trial stage in that case, and, at the time of the trial stage in that case, DNA testing was * * * not yet available.

R.C. 2953.74(C) describes additional conditions the offender must satisfy before the trial court may accept the offender's application for postconviction DNA testing. Relevant here is the requirement that an exclusion result would be outcome determinative regarding the offender. See R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5).

{¶ 7} An "exclusion result" is a DNA test result "that scientifically precludes or forecloses the subject offender as a contributor of biological material recovered from the crime scene or victim in question." R.C. 2953.71(G). "Outcome determinative" means that "there is a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the offender guilty of [the] offense" for which he or she was convicted if the DNA results had been presented and found relevant and admissible at trial and "had those results been analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the offender's case." R.C. 2953.71(L). The statute that sets forth the grounds for accepting an application for postconviction DNA testing makes clear that "the court, in determining whether the 'outcome determinative' criterion described in divisions (B)(1) and (2) of [R.C. 2953.74] has been satisfied, shall consider all available admissible evidence related to the subject offender's case." R.C. 2953.74(D).

Whether the trial court should consider the possibility that a comparison of postconviction DNA test results with CODIS will identify a person other than the offender as "available admissible evidence" when considering an application for postconviction DNA testing

{¶ 8} Scott argues that when the trial court was considering whether postconviction DNA testing in his case was "outcome determinative," it should have considered the possibility that the test results could match another person's profile in CODIS. R.C. 2953.74(E) provides that if the court accepts an application for DNA testing,

the eligible offender may request the court to order, or the court on its own initiative may order, the bureau of criminal identification and investigation to compare the results of DNA testing of biological material from an unidentified person other than the offender that was obtained from the crime scene or from a victim of the offense for which the offender has been approved for DNA testing to the combined DNA index system maintained by the federal bureau of investigation.

If there is a match in the database, "[t]he offender or the state may use [that] information for any lawful purpose." Id.

{¶ 9} R.C. 2953.74(E) clearly provides that a CODIS search may be ordered if a trial court accepts an application for DNA testing. But we are not persuaded that the court must consider the possibility of postconviction DNA test results returning a CODIS match that identifies someone other than the petitioner as "available admissible evidence" when determining whether to accept an application for testing. To put it quite simply, a petitioner first needs a DNA test and its result before a CODIS search can be performed.^[1] And the court must first accept an application for DNA testing before ordering a CODIS search. Thus, it is impossible for a CODIS match to be available evidence when the trial court is considering a petitioner's application for testing.

{¶ 10} Additionally, a court's decision to accept an application for postconviction DNA testing or to order a comparison of DNA test results with CODIS is within the court's discretion. See R.C. 2953.74(B) (the court "may accept the application only if one of the enumerated conditions applies); R.C. 2953.74(C) (the court "may accept the application only if all of the enumerated conditions apply); R.C. 2953.74(E) (the court "may order" a CODIS search using the DNA test results). That discretion is to be exercised on a case-by-case basis, based on the unique facts of each case. See State v. Ayers, 185 Ohio App.3d 168, 2009-Ohio-6096, 923 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 43 (8th Dist). It would be illogical to presume that for every case a CODIS match would be necessary or relevant in every application for postconviction DNA testing. Therefore, we reject any invitation to create a bright-line rule that every offender who submits an application for postconviction DNA testing is entitled to a presumption that his or her test result will return a CODIS match identifying someone other than the petitioner.

{¶ 11} Nonetheless, the statutory scheme requires the trial court reviewing an application for postconviction DNA testing to presume that an "exclusion result"-that is, a result that "scientifically precludes or forecloses" the offender as a contributor, R.C 2953.71(G)-will be obtained by the offender. R.C. 2953.74(C)(4). With that presumed result in mind, the trial court must determine whether such a result would be outcome determinative for the offender. R.C. 2953.74(C)(5). To determine whether postconviction DNA testing would be outcome determinative, the presumed exclusion result must be analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of "all available admissible evidence related to the subject offender's case." R.C. 2953.74(D). Given that the trial court must presume that postconviction DNA testing may exclude the offender as a contributor, the existence of evidence that also supports a defense theory involving an alternative suspect who could be the contributor is highly relevant to the...