State v. Seablom
| Decision Date | 03 July 1918 |
| Docket Number | 14808. |
| Citation | 173 P. 721,103 Wash. 53 |
| Parties | STATE v. SEABLOM. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; Guy C Alston, Judge.
Henry Seablom was convicted of having in his possession intoxicating liquors with intent to barter, sell, or exchange it in the course of trade, and he appeals. Affirmed.
J. Y Kennedy, of Everett, for appellant.
Lloyd Black and Jesse H. Davis, both of Everett, for the State.
Accepting a statement made by appellant to the officers after his arrest, and to which we shall hereafter refer, and other testimony, the competency of which is not challenged, it is made to appear that one J. L. Randles was at and prior to the 11th day of April, 1917, engaged in the drug business at Granite Falls in Snohomish county. He had in his employ one Harry Wallin. Appellant had met up with Wallin in Seattle some days before, and it was arranged that Wallin would sell to defendant 35 gallons of whisky at $5.50 per gallon. The time fixed for the delivery was on the night of April 11th Wallin agreeing that he would have the whisky packed in containers for shipment by automobile and that he would so arrange the store and its interior as to make it appear that a burglary had been committed to deceive the proprietor, Mr. Randles, who was out of town at the time, and the officers. Appellant employed one Johnson, a driver of an 'auto for hire,' to take him to Granite Falls. They found Wallin. The containers with their contents were loaded in the machine and carried to Woodland Park, Seattle, and there concealed. Appellant was thereafter arrested, tried, and convicted of the crime of having in his possession intoxicating liquor with intent to barter, sell, exchange, etc., in the course of trade.
Before taking up other assignments of error, it will be proper to refer to the confession of appellant. It is contended that it was obtained under the coercion of 'numbers, superior talent and ability, and legal knowledge.' Appellant when arrested was brought into the presence of the mayor of Granite Falls, who was at the same time a justice of the peace and an attorney at law, the chief deputy sheriff also a lawyer, the prosecuting attorney, and others, who took his confession and reduced it to writing. It was then signed by appellant. We find nothing in this circumstance to taint the transaction with duress or coercion. The confession, so far as the testimony of the state is concerned, was made voluntarily and deliberately signed. While we hardly think the question is in issue, if it were, the court instructed the jury to reject the confession as evidence if it found that it 'was made under the influence of fear induced by threats.' It being at best a disputed question of fact, the verdict of the jury concluded appellant to pursue the question further.
Appellant complains that the state has failed in its proofs, in that it is not shown that the goods transported was in fact whisky. This contention rests entirely upon the testimony of appellant and his codefendant. He says that after reaching Woodland Park he investigated the contents of the containers and found them to contain colored water. It was indeed incumbent upon the state to prove the charge as made, but we think there is enough competent evidence to sustain the verdict. Mr. Randles testified that he had on hand on April 11th approximately 36 gallons of whisky in a barrel; that when he examined the barrel on the 12th only about 2 gallons remained. It is not denied that appellant got whatever he hauled away at the drug store; that he paid the agreed price for whisky, and in his confession he says that he got whisky. It is true that he now says that what he said was that he 'supposed' or 'thought' he was getting whisky, but manifestly these were questions for the jury, and it no doubt weighed appellant's testimony against all of the other facts and circumstances and found it wanting.
J. E Johnson, who was accused of the same crime, was a witness for appellant. When...
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State v. Miller, 6633
... ... to see anything prejudicial in the remark of the court that ... "the defendant was not in Justice Court. " ... (State v. Freitag, 53 Idaho 726, 734, 27 P.2d 68; ... State v. Neil, 58 Idaho 359, 74 P.2d 586; State ... v. Roland, 11 Idaho 490, 83 P. 337; State v ... Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 173 P. 721; State v ... Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841.) The record in that ... respect is incomplete and we are not informed as to what ... circumstances lead up to the court's making the remark ... It is a recognized rule of this court that the trial court ... should ... ...
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State v. Ludvik
...mere presence in the home did not constitute coercion so as to negate the voluntary nature of the statements. State v. Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 55, 173 P. 721 (1918). Therefore, the statements were not subject to The conviction is affirmed. GREEN, C.J., and McINTURFF, J., concur. 1 In address......
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State v. Van Brunt
...are admitted which as a matter of law constituted threats or inducements, it is a question of law for the court. See State v. Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 173 P. 721, 722, which the court said: 'Before taking up other assignments of error, it will be proper to refer to the confession of appellant......
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...was coerced, or the admitted facts are such as to establish coercion, in which case it is a question of law for the Court. State v. Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 173 P. 721; State v. Van Brunt, 22 Wash.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606; State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d 759, 226 P.2d 2 Lisenba v. People of State of C......