State v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1915
• Docket Number: 241.
• Citation: 84 S.E. 283,169 N.C. 295
• Parties: STATE v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

84 S.E. 283

169 N.C. 295

STATE v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY.

No. 241.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 10, 1915

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Bond, Judge.

The Seaboard Air Line Railway was indicted for an offense. From a judgment in defendant's favor on a special verdict, the State appeals, and, to secure a review of certain rulings defendant also appeals. Judgment reversed on the State's appeal. Defendant's appeal dismissed.

The intent to violate state laws within Webb-Kenyon Law, is an intent on the part of the consignee or other person interested in the liquor transported.

Indictment for refusing to allow an inspection of certain books containing a record of shipments and deliveries to consignees of intoxicating liquors, in violation of Public Laws 1913, c 44, § 5. It appeared that the defendant had such a book as the statute requires it to keep, and the relevant facts embodied in a special verdict and the proceedings thereon are as follows:

"We, the jurors sworn and impaneled in this case, return the following special verdict in this case; the defendant having agreed that a special verdict might be found: We find that R. L. Davis, on a date prior to the starting of this prosecution, he being at that time a citizen of the county of Wake, state of North Carolina, went to the office of the defendant company during its business hours, and while said office was open, and demanded of the agent that he be allowed to inspect the book kept by the defendant showing shipments of liquor from points outside of the state of North Carolina to the city of Raleigh. We further find that the said Davis was not an officer. We further find that the agent of the defendant stated that he was instructed to and did refuse to allow the said Davis to make the inspection which he had requested and demanded. We further find that the said Davis had no legal process and did not make any demand under any legal process, and at the time of the alleged demand he was neither a state nor federal officer of any kind of any state or territory. We further find that, at the time the said Davis made such demand, he was seeking information from said book for the purpose of prosecuting persons suspected of violating the law of North Carolina. We further find that, at the time said demand was made, said Davis was seeking general information as to shipments of whisky into the city of Raleigh from points in another state, and that he had in his mind specially an effort to see what evidence could be procured against one or more specific parties in the city of Raleigh, meaning by the words 'general information' that he was seeking to ascertain who were the consignees of liquor and the quantities they were receiving, for the purpose of prosecuting such parties as may be charged or suspected with the violation of the prohibition laws of the state. We further find that the witness R. L. Davis, at the time he made a demand for an inspection of the book, had no authority, except that which existed, if any, by virtue of the fact that he was at that time a citizen of the state. If, upon the foregoing facts, the court is of the opinion that the defendant is guilty, then we say for our verdict that the defendant is guilty; if, upon said facts, the court is of the opinion that the defendant is not guilty, then we find that the defendant is not guilty."

Upon the rendering of the foregoing special verdict, the defendant Seaboard Air Line Railway moved for judgment of not guilty upon the special verdict because the facts stated therein do not constitute a violation of the law, and upon the ground that the statute upon which the action is based is an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, in violation of article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States, and is unconstitutional and void, and for the reasons fully set out in a written motion to dismiss the action and for judgment of nonsuit. Upon the foregoing special verdict the court adjudged that the defendant is not guilty. The state excepted. And thereupon the jury for their verdict said the defendant Seaboard Air Line Railway was not guilty. Motion by the state to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Motion overruled, and the state excepted. Whereupon it was considered and adjudged by the court that the defendant, the said Seaboard Air Line Railway, be discharged. To the foregoing judgment the state again excepted and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Defendant also appealed in the case and assigned for errors the refusal of the court to quash the bill of indictment and to dismiss the action; these motions having been duly made in apt time and for reasons stated in the record.

The Attorney General, T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Manning & Kitchin, of Raleigh, for the State.

Murray Allen, of Raleigh, for defendant.

HOKE J.

It has now for some years been the settled "public policy of this state, approved by popular vote and * * * enforced by general and many local statutes, that, except in" certain specified and "very restricted instances, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall not be allowed." Smith v. Express Co., 166 N.C. 155, 82 S.E. 15.

Acting, no doubt, under the conviction that, where such a policy has been established as necessary to the peace and well-ordered progress of communities, the people are entitled to have the same upheld, and recognizing that its successful maintenance and efficient enforcement is seriously hindered and at times obstructed by reason of interstate shipments of whisky, and because such shipments were withdrawn to a great extent from state regulation by the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, Congress has, from time to time, enacted statutes designed to bring this subject (the sale, disposition, and use of intoxicating liquors) more and more under the police power of the states. Thus, in 1890, not long after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128, in which it was held that, notwithstanding the prohibition statutes of a state to the contrary, an importer could ship whisky into the state and sell same in original packages, Congress passed a statute, known as the "Wilson Law," to the effect that all fermented, distilled, or intoxicating liquors or liquids, transported into any state or territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, or storage, shall, on arrival in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state, etc., etc., and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages. This statute was upheld as a valid enactment in Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572, and in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 18 S.Ct. 664, 42 L.Ed. 1088, the terms "on arrival in such state or territory" were construed to mean "when delivered to consignee in said state in continuous shipment from another state or territory"; the court being of opinion that, on perusal of the entire statute, its purpose and meaning was to enable the states to prohibit sales in original packages after delivery to consignee.

In these and other cases on the subject, clear intimation is given that Congress might, by additional legislation, further extend the police power of the state over the subject. Thus, in Rahrer's Case, Chief Justice Fuller, delivering the opinion, said:

"No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so."

And in Leisy v. Hardin, the court, in referring to the case of Bowman v. Railway, 125 U.S. 507, 8 S.Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L.Ed. 700, in which it had been held that, under the laws then existent, interstate shipments of whisky were excluded from state regulation by the commerce clause of the federal Constitution until delivery in continuous transit to the consignee, said:

"Up to that * * * time, we hold that, in the absence of congressional permission to do so, the state had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in prohibition of importation and sale by the foreigner or nonresident importer"

--a statement given with approval in Rhodes v. Iowa, supra, 170 U.S. 417, 18 S.Ct. 666, 42 L.Ed. 1088.

In accord with these intimations, Congress on March 1, 1913 (chapter 90, Federal Statutes, Anno. Supp. 1914, p. 208) passed the act known as the "Webb-Kenyon Law." It is entitled "An act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases," and provides, in general terms, that the shipment or transportation in any manner or by any means whatsoever of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or any intoxicating liquor of any kind from one state or territory into another, etc., etc., which said intoxicating liquor is intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state or territory, etc., is hereby prohibited. We are not aware that the validity or interpretation of this statute has been directly presented for decision to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the question, in different phases, has been before several of our state courts and the lower federal courts of recognized ability and learning, and there is a very general consensus of opinion, in which we fully concur, that the act is constitutional; that it classifies interstate shipments of intoxicating liquors into legal and illegal, withdrawing from the effect and operation of the commerce clause of the ...