State v. Searcy

• Decision Date: 05 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17835,17835
• Parties: , 59 USLW 2174, 1 NDLR P 82 STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Barryngton Eugene SEARCY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 914

798 P.2d 914

118 Idaho 632, 59 USLW 2174, 1 NDLR P 82

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Barryngton Eugene SEARCY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17835.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 5, 1990.

William R. Forsberg, St. Anthony, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

Barryngton Eugene Searcy appeals from convictions for first degree murder, robbery and an enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony and from the following sentence:

1. First degree murder--determinate life sentence without possibility of parole;

2. Robbery--indeterminate life sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence pronounced for murder, with a minimum of ten years to be served;

3. Use of a firearm in the commission of murder and robbery--an enhancement of ten years;

Searcy raised several issues on appeal, including the argument that I.C. § 18-207 ¹ unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to due process by forbidding him to plead an independent defense of insanity (mental nonresponsibility).

I

Barry Searcy was convicted of killing Teresa Rice while robbing Jack's Grocery Store in Ashton, Idaho, July 15, 1987. Rice, the mother of two children, owned and operated the store with her husband Michael. Searcy robbed the store in order to get money to buy cocaine. Searcy had staked out the store during its operating hours and hid on top of some coolers in the back room where he waited to either burglarize or rob as the situation dictated. From this hiding spot Searcy could see Rice enter the back room and count out money for storage in the store's safe. Rice then left the back room. As Searcy was leaving his hiding spot Rice returned to the back room and discovered Searcy. A confrontation ensued and Rice was shot in the stomach by Searcy, apparently during a struggle. Searcy testified that he then told Rice that if she opened the safe he would call an ambulance. She did so. Searcy then removed the money from the safe and placed it into his backpack. Searcy did not call an ambulance. Rather, he put his rifle to Rice's head and shot her, killing her instantly.

After leaving the store, Searcy testified that he hid the rifle and money under a rock at a target shooting location near Rexburg, Idaho. The next day Searcy took some of the money and bought a used car with it in order to drive to Salt Lake City, Utah, to purchase more cocaine. On September 13, 1987, some boys discovered the gun, money and Searcy's gloves. The boys showed the items to their fathers who were target shooting nearby. Discovery of these items lead to the arrest of Searcy.

Searcy was 20 years old at the time he killed Rice. He apparently is chemically dependant on alcohol and cocaine. Searcy's parents were divorced when he was eight. Searcy suffers from a physical condition known as delayed growth syndrome. This condition stunted Searcy's growth, allegedly making him the target of harassment from children in grade school. By the time he reached 15 years of age Searcy had the physical development of a 9 year old. Searcy began hormone treatments, but his growth was limited to 5 feet, 6 inches. Allegedly, the hormone treatments had a bad side effect and Searcy became mean and abusive. This ill effect was worsened by Searcy's introduction and addiction to chemicals: alcohol, marijuana and cocaine.

Searcy increasingly got into trouble as his chemical dependency continued while repeated efforts to treat it were not successful. Searcy committed burglaries, armed robberies, and sold illegal drugs in order to support his addiction to cocaine. Searcy had ambitions of becoming a major drug dealer but he personally used most of the cocaine he purchased. After using up a significant portion of the cocaine he bought from the money he stole from Jack's Grocery, Searcy began to contemplate robbing a bigger store in order to get more money. Instead of committing another robbery, Searcy entered treatment once again. While in treatment, Searcy confessed to a counselor that he had killed Rice.

At trial a jury found Searcy guilty of murder in the first degree by finding both premeditation and by finding that Searcy killed while committing a robbery. Searcy was also found guilty of robbery and of using a firearm while committing a felony.

Over objection, the trial judge at sentencing admitted a victim impact statement from Rice's family. Michael Rice, the victim's husband, indicated in the statement that he favored imposition of the death penalty for Searcy and that he felt it should be swiftly carried out. Nevertheless, the trial judge did not impose the death penalty on Searcy. Instead, the trial judge entered the following sentences on the various counts:

1. First degree murder--determinate life sentence without possibility of parole;

2. Robbery--indeterminate life sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence pronounced for murder, with a minimum of ten years to be served;

3. Use of a firearm in the commission of murder and robbery--an enhancement of ten years;

Searcy appeals from the conviction and sentences raising the following issues.

II

First Searcy argues that I.C. § 18-207 unconstitutionally denies him due process of law because it prevented him from pleading insanity as a defense. ² Neither the federal nor the state Constitutions contains any language setting forth any such right. Searcy argues, nevertheless, that the disallowance of the insanity defense deprived him of one of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions," Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 47 S.Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270 (1926), and thus denied him due process of law. Searcy argues the insanity defense is so deeply rooted in our legal traditions as to be considered fundamental and thus embedded in due process.

The insanity defense has had a long and varied history during its development in the common law. As the understanding of the mental processes changed over the centuries, the implications of a criminal defendant's insanity have changed. In more recent times legislatures have enacted statutes regulating and defining the effect of a defendant's claim of mental nonresponsibility. Not surprisingly, there has resulted a wide disparity in the positions taken on this issue both by legislatures and courts in the various states. ³

Three states, Idaho, Montana and Utah, have legislatively chosen to reject mental condition as a separate specific defense to a criminal charge. The statutes in these three states, however, expressly permit evidence of mental illness or disability to be presented at trial, not in support of an independent insanity defense, but rather in order to permit the accused to rebut the state's evidence offered to prove that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent or mens rea required by I.C. §§ 18-114 and 18-115 to commit the crime charged. I.C. § 18-207; ⁴ M.C.A. § 46-14-102; U.C. § 76-2-305. In State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 621, 710 P.2d 526, 531 (1985) we upheld I.C. § 18-207 against a related challenge, stating:

We hold that the three statutes are not in conflict since I.C. §§ 18-114 and 18-115 do not mandate the existence of a defense based upon insanity, but rather I.C. § 18-207 reduces the question of mental condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary question. Section 18-207(c), Idaho Code, continues to recognize the basic common law premise that only responsible defendants may be convicted.

It is Beam's second argument that I.C. § 18-207 violates the doctrine established by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process of law requires that the prosecution prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It is asserted that I.C. § 18-207 impermissibly relieves the State of that burden since it operates as a presumption that no defendant can possess such lack of mental capacity as to be unable to formulate the criminal intent. We disagree. I.C. § 18-207(c) specifically provides that a defendant is not prohibited from presenting evidence of mental disease or defect which would negate intent.

While the issue facing us today has never been directly decided by the United States Supreme Court, the language from several opinions of that Court suggests rather convincingly that that Court would conclude that the due process of the fifth amendment does not require the states to provide a criminal defendant with an independent defense of insanity. First, in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that due process required the use of any particular insanity test and upheld an Oregon statute which placed on the criminal defendant the burden of proving his insanity defense, and then by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), the Supreme Court stated:

[T]his court has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea.

We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States. ^{[ 5}

392 U.S. at 535-536, 88 S.Ct. at 2156, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1269 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall, in his Powell opinion, stated that "nothing could be less fruitful than for ...