State v. Searles

Decision Date01 June 1931
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. SEARLES.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield county; Alfred E. Baldwin, Judge.

Information against Carleton Searles in three counts, each charging the accused with assault with intent to commit murder; brought to the superior court for Fairfield county and tried to the jury, Baldwin, J. Verdict and judgment of guilty on each count, and appeal by the accused.

No error.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

Harry Silverstone, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

William H. Comley, State's Atty., and Lorin W. Willis, both of Bridgeport, for the State.

AVERY J.

The information in three counts charges assault with intent to commit murder. In the first count, the accused was charged with shooting a police officer, Wilbur Simpson, at Danbury September 19, 1930. In the second, he was charged with shooting Police Officer Healey at Greenwich, November 22 1930. In the third, he was charged with shooting Police Officer Teufel also at Greenwich a little later on the same day.

At the trial, the state claimed to have proved, as to the first count, these facts: About 3:30 in the morning, September 19 1930, Officer Simpson, while on patrol duty in Danbury, heard a noise in a yard at the rear of a store. Accompanied by Officer Schulze, he entered the yard and found there a Ford sedan. Turning a searchlight upon the automobile, he saw the accused seated behind the driving wheel, who, on being asked his name, where he was from, and what he was doing, said he was from Stamford. The officer stepped to the front of the car to observe the registration numbers, and, seeing they were not numbers issued in Stamford, returned to the door and engaged the accused in further conversation. Meanwhile Officer Schulze noticed, in the automobile leaning against the seat, a shotgun and rifle, and ordered the accused to hand them out to him, which was done. The shotgun was a Remington 12-gauge automatic with four or five fully loaded shells therein. The rifle was a 38-caliber repeater with five or six shells loaded with ball therein. Officer Simpson stepped around the rear of the car to the right-hand door, which was open, reached in and placed a handcuff on the right wrist of the accused, and ordered him to get out of the car, the officer holding in his left hand the other part of the handcuff. When partly out, while one foot was on the running board, the accused, with a revolver held in his left hand, fired a shot at the officer. The latter, having the flashlight in his right hand, and observing the quick motion of the accused, struck with the flashlight at his left hand holding the revolver. The shot hit the end of the finger of the officer's left hand holding the handcuff attached to the right wrist of the accused. The latter immediately pulled away and ran out of the alley leading from the yard; and, when five or six feet distant, fired another shot which took effect in the door of the automobile near which the officer was standing, and then made his escape. A companion of the accused was nearby the automobile while these incidents occurred. The two had just burglarized the building; and in the rear of the automobile, covered with a blanket, was a large quantity of merchandise taken from the store, including, among other things, a number of shotguns, rifles, revolvers, and automatic pistols, with about 1,500 rounds of ammunition therefor. The accused, at the trial, took the witness stand on his own behalf and admitted shooting Officer Simpson, but claimed the latter not did strike the revolver with his searchlight when the first shot was fired, and that it was fired at the officer's hand to enable the accused to get away, and with no intention of indicting serious injury. He further claimed that the second shot was fired into the ground, and was not intended to, and did not, hit any one.

As to the second and third counts, the state claimed to have shown that early in the forenoon of November 22, 1930, the accused with a companion named Morgan, was traveling towards New York on the Boston Post road in a Cadillac automobile, which he had stolen in New Haven the preceding evening. Previously, he had stolen another Cadillac which bore Louisiana registration numbers; and, after leaving New Haven and before reaching Milford, had removed the registration numbers issued by the state of Ohio, and placed upon the automobile numbers issued by the State of Louisiana removed from the other car. While driving in the town of Darien, the accused was seen by two police officers patrolling the road. Observing the Louisiana numbers upon the car, and having been advised to be on the lookout for a Cadillac bearing such registration, these Darien police officers pursued him, but he succeeded in escaping. In the town of Greenwich. William F. Pyne, a motorcycle officer of the Greenwich police department, patrolling the road, who had been advised to be on the lookout for a Cadillac bearing Louisiana markers, met the accused and turned and pursued him. The latter, while being so pursued, drove the car upwards of seventy miles an hour, attaining the highest rate of speed with which he was able to operate it. Officer Pyne, while pursuing the accused, twice came alongside and ordered him to stop, but he did not obey the officer's command, continuing on. Officer Pyne then fired four shots at the rear of the car, endeavoring to puncture the gasoline tank. These shots, however, took effect in a spare tire mounted on the rear, and in the rear fender. While the officer was pursuing and was behind approximately 100 feet, through the window in the rear of the car he saw the accused discharge a revolver in his left hand over his right shoulder in an endeavor to shoot the officer through the window. This shot, however, took effect in a cushion in the back of the rear seat. While being pursued, the accused inquired of his companion, Morgan, also armed, if he knew how to use his gun, and told Morgan to " Use it if you have to." Succeeding in escaping from Officer Pyne, the accused continued on, until required to stop at an intersecting street where traffic was crossing. James Healey, a traffic officer of Greenwich, was doing duty at this point. An automobile had come to a stop at this intersection and the accused stopped behind and close to it, and endeavored to get into such a position as to hide his car, or its registration markers, from the observation of Officer Healey. The latter, who was on the lookout for a Cadillac bearing Louisiana registration numbers, and seeing that they were the numbers for which he was looking, drew his revolver and stepped to the side of the car, close to the door opposite the driver's seat. The window was down. Holding his revolver in his right hand in front and fairly close to his chest, the officer laid the barrel over the window sill in the door at the driver's seat, and order the accused to move over to the side of the street. The latter said, " All right; I will move over" ; but with his right hand immediately whipped around a revolver and fired point blank at the officer who was only about two feet distant. The bullet wounded the fore and middle fingers and thumb of Officer Healey's right hand, where they came together in gripping his revolver, and knocked it out of his hand and into the street. Another automobile, just coming up, passed over the revolver, rendering it impossible to regain it. The officer, thus disarmed, moved somewhat towards the rear of the car and bent down to shield himself. The accused immediately fired two more shots at the officer, one of which took effect in the casing of a window of a bank about eighteen feet distant. At this time, the officer was about twelve feet from the accused, who thereupon started his car in motion and escaped. After driving some nine or ten blocks, he and his companion abandoned the car and proceeded through a side street on foot, and took shelter in a piece of woods. They were pursued by three officers, two of whom were wearing police uniforms with badges thereon, one being dressed in citizen's clothes. When the officers approached and were about 75 feet distant, the accused placed his revolver to the right side of his head, feigning suicide, as he afterwards testified. Officer Teufel, who was in citizen's clothes, said to the other officers. " Let's take him before he commits suicide," which was heard by the accused, and, as the officers approached nearer, he immediately began shooting at them, and they returned the fire, both sides taking shelter behind trees. Several shots were exchanged and Officer Teufel was wounded in the right leg about eight inches above the knee by one of the shots fired by the accused. This exchange of shots was heard by two other police officers who had come into the woods from another direction, and who immediately hurried to the location from which the noise proceeded. The accused, observing their approach, hurried over a stone wall, and crouched behind it, and placing his left forearm upon the top, with his right hand resting his revolver upon his left forearm, took aim at the head of Officer Burke (one of the two officers who had come into the woods from the opposite direction). Officer Burke at this time was taking shelter behind a rock, and fired his revolver at the accused, the shot taking effect in the left forearm of...

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27 cases
  • State v. Anderson, AC 35432
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 2015
    ...be left undisturbed. This result is also consistent with Connecticut law. 16. The state also relies heavily on State v. Searles, 113 Conn. 247, 255, 155 A. 213 (1931), in which our Supreme Court stated: "When there is uncertainty as to the actual intent of the jury, the power of the court i......
  • State v. Lymon
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • May 27, 2021
    ...authority to refuse to accept the preliminary verdict and seek to clarify the jury's intent. See id. ¶ 21 (citing State v. Searles , 113 Conn. 247, 155 A. 213, 216 (1931). "[T]he trial court is under a nondiscretionary duty to clarify any ambiguity in the jurors’ responses and obtain a clea......
  • State v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 2015
    ...should be left undisturbed. This result is also consistent with Connecticut law.16 The state also relies heavily on State v. Searles, 113 Conn. 247, 255, 155 A. 213 (1931), in which our Supreme Court stated: “When there is uncertainty as to the actual intent of the jury, the power of the co......
  • State v. Roy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 26, 1977
    ...when it expressed the opinion that the state had produced evidence of a very strong nature in support of the charge. State v. Searles, 113 Conn. 247, 257-58, 155 A. 213; see State v. Mullings, supra, 166 Conn. 274, 348 A.2d 645. The court charged the jury that the state had the burden of pr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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