State v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1902
• Citation: 28 Wash. 488,70 P. 114
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. SEATTLE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

70 P. 114

28 Wash. 488

STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. SEATTLE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 16, 1902

On petition for rehearing. Petition denied.

For former opinion, see 68 P. 946.

WHITE J.

The opinion in this case is reported in 68 P. 946. The appellant petititons for a review as to the common-law powers of the attorney general, and as to the proposition that the respondent has waived the right to object either to the form of the action or as to the capacity of the relator. We are satisfied with the views expressed in the original opinion as to the common-law powers of the attorney general. At least, in this class of cases the attorney general has no common-law powers, because the legislature has seen fit to confer the power or duty ordinarily exercised at common law by the attorney general upon the prosecuting attorney of the county where the wrong is alleged to have been committed. Before preparing the opinion in this case, we examined the case of Hunt v. Railroad Co., 20 Ill.App. 282 relied upon by the appellant. It is true, in discussing the constitution of Illinois and the statutes of that state which did not undertake to confer the power or duty on any other officer, the court came to the conclusion that the attorney general of Illinois could exercise the power that the attorney general of England might exercise at common law but the court in its opinion said: 'There is nothing in our present constitution or statutes which necessitates, in our opinion, a construction which would exclude the attorney general from the exercise of common-law powers in addition to those conferred by the statute.' Further on the court says: 'It must be admitted that there is no statute imposing upon the attorney general the duty of instituting or becoming a party to any legal proceedings for the protection or preservation of funds held in trust for a public charity. Whence, then, arises such duty? Manifestly from the principles of the common law, which make the attorney general the proper representative of the people of the state in all courts of justice, and charge him with the official duty of interposing for the protection and preservation of the rights of the public whenever those rights are invaded; and there is no other adequate or available means of redress.' The prosecuting attorney, by statutory enactment in this state, is a representative of the people of the state in all courts of justice, and is charged with the official duty of protecting the rights of the public. Here the statute of the state, through the prosecuting attorney furnishes an adequate and available means of redress, and, by imposing on the prosecuting attorney the duty sought to be exercised by the attorney general, necessitates a construction excluding the attorney general from instituting this action in the first instance. The fact that the statute of the state had conferred...