State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 73475,73475 |
| Parties | The STATE of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF WASHOE; and the Honorable Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge, Respondents, and Matthew Glenn Hearn, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
NRS 176A.290 (2014) authorizes district courts to assign certain eligible defendants to a veterans court program.1 However, if the offense charged or the defendant's prior convictions involved the use or threatened use of force or violence, the district court is not allowed to assign the defendant to the veterans court program, "unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment." NRS 176A.290(2).
The district court found that NRS 176A.290(2) was in effect a prosecutorial veto over a judge's sentencing decision, in violation of the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Nev. Const. art. 3, § (1)(1). The district court further held that the veto provision was severable. We agree on both points. Accordingly, we deny the State's petition.
Matthew Glenn Hearn was charged with and pleaded guilty to battery by a prisoner, a category B felony, in violation of NRS 200.481(2)(f). A specialty courts officer deemed Hearn eligible for the veterans court program because he was a veteran who "appears to have a mental illness, substance abuse, or posttraumatic stress disorder which appears to be related to military service."
At sentencing, the State refused to stipulate to Hearn's assignment to veterans court pursuant to NRS 176A.290(2), which prompted Hearn to ask the court to find the statute unconstitutional. The district court obliged, finding that " NRS 176A.290(2) violates the separation of powers doctrine by conditioning the judicial department's discretion to place certain offenders into a treatment program on the prosecutor's (discretionary) stipulation." It further found that the statute was severable and struck the unconstitutional language from the statute. The State challenges that decision in the present writ petition.
Propriety of writ relief
The decision to consider a writ of mandamus lies within the sole discretion of this court. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). As an extraordinary remedy, writ relief is generally available only when no "plain, speedy and adequate" legal remedy exists. Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court has exercised its discretion to intervene to clarify "important legal issue[s] in need of clarification" or "in the interest of judicial economy and to provide guidance to Nevada's lower courts." State, Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court (Escalante), 133 Nev. 78, 80, 392 P.3d 170, 172 (2017). And a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy "to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." State v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931, 267 P.3d 777, 779 (2011).
Both parties agree that the constitutionality of NRS 176A.290(2) is an "important legal issue in need of clarification." Escalante, 133 Nev. at 80, 392 P.3d at 172. They also contend that Nevada's district courts are resolving this issue inconsistently, so our intervention is necessary "to provide guidance to Nevada's lower courts." Id. Finally, the State argues that it has no adequate remedy in law to challenge the district court's decision. We agree on all points and exercise our discretion to consider the State's petition for a writ of mandamus.2
Statutory background
NRS 176A.280 et seq. authorized the establishment of specialty courts for veterans and military members who have been charged with probation-eligible offenses. When certain criteria are met, a district court has discretion to assign eligible defendants to a specialty court program. NRS 176A.290.3 The program benefits defendants like Hearn by suspending further criminal proceedings and placing them on probation. Id. Upon successful completion of the program, the charges are dismissed. NRS 176A.290(4).
Not all veterans or service members, however, are eligible for assignment to veterans court. NRS 176A.287(1). For example, a defendant who "[h]as previously been assigned to such a program" is not eligible for assignment. NRS 176A.287(1)(a). At issue in this case is NRS 176A.290(2), which provides that a district court may not assign a defendant to such a program without the prosecutor's agreement when an offense charged or the defendant's prior convictions involved the use or threatened use of force or violence:
If the offense committed by the defendant involved the use or threatened use of force or violence or if the defendant was previously convicted in this State or in any other jurisdiction of a felony that involved the use or threatened use of force or violence, the court may not assign the defendant to the program unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment.
(Emphasis added.) The district court believed that the emphasized language requiring the prosecutor's agreement amounted to an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto over the judiciary's sentencing decision. It struck that language, leaving the rest of the statute intact.
Constitutionality of the prosecutorial consent element
The first issue is whether NRS 176A.290(2) violates Nevada's separation of powers doctrine. "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo." Aguilar-Raygoza v. State, 127 Nev. 349, 352, 255 P.3d 262, 264 (2011).
As with the United States Constitution, the structure of our state constitution gives rise to the separation of powers doctrine through its "discrete treatment of the three branches of government." Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009). But "Nevada's Constitution goes one step further; it contains an express provision prohibiting any one branch of government from impinging on the functions of another." Id. at 292, 212 P.3d at 1103-04 ; see Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (1).
In Stromberg v. Second Judicial District Court , this court analyzed Nevada's separation of powers doctrine within the context of sentencing decisions. 125 Nev. 1, 2-3, 200 P.3d 509, 510 (2009). Stromberg concerned a statute that allowed a district court to treat a defendant's third DUI offense as if it were the defendant's second DUI offense "if the offender successfully completes a treatment program." Id. at 3, 200 P.3d at 510. The State contended that this statute violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the prosecutor's power to determine how to charge a DUI offender. Id. at 6, 200 P.3d at 512. This court rejected that argument by distinguishing "between the prosecutor's decision in how to charge and prosecute a case and the court's authority to dispose of a case after its jurisdiction has been invoked." Id. at 7, 200 P.3d at 512. That is, the prosecutor retained the power to charge an offender for a third DUI offense; the statute merely gave district courts the option to sentence such offenders to a treatment program. Id. at 8, 200 P.3d at 513. Such sentencing decisions, we concluded, "properly fall[ ] within the discretion of the judiciary." Id. Thus, Stromberg indicates that charging decisions are within the executive realm and sentencing decisions are inherently judicial functions.
We recognize that a district court's sentencing decision is necessarily limited by the Legislature's power to define the parameters of punishments, "within constitutional limits." Goudge v. State, 128 Nev. 548, 554, 287 P.3d 301, 304 (2012). And we reiterate that the Legislature can "completely remove any judicial discretion to determine a criminal penalty by creating mandatory sentencing schemes." Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 640, 218 P.3d 501, 505 (2009). However, we agree with other jurisdictions that a court's sentencing discretion, once granted, cannot be conditioned upon the prosecution's approval without running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481, 489 (1972) (); State v. Olson , 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982) (). To be certain, statutory schemes vary from state to state. But the principle gleaned is that once a defendant's guilt has been determined, the prosecutor's charging discretion is complete and the judiciary's sentencing discretion, if any, is all that remains. See State v. Ramsey, 171 Ariz. 409, 831 P.2d 408, 412 (App. 1992) ().4
Returning to the case at hand, a court's decision to assign a defendant to the veterans court program is a sentencing decision—it is a statutorily approved alternative to entering a judgment of conviction and imposing a term of incarceration. And as we indicated in Stromberg , sentencing decisions are "within the discretion of the judiciary." 125 Nev. at 8, 200 P.3d at 513...
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Hager v. State, 72613
...the defendant to the program [unless the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the assignment]"), with State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Hearn) , 134 Nev. ––––, 432 P.3d 154, 160-61 (2018) (severing the bracketed language from NRS 176A.290(2) (2017), the then-analogous veteran’s court stat......