Aguilar–raygoza v. State

• Decision Date: 02 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 54667.,54667.
• Citation: 255 P.3d 262,127 Nev. Adv. Op. 27
• Parties: Pedro AGUILAR–RAYGOZA, Appellant,v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

255 P.3d 262

127 Nev. Adv. Op. 27

Pedro AGUILAR–RAYGOZA, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 54667.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

June 2, 2011.

Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and Cheryl Bond, Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant.Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Joseph R. Plater, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.Before CHERRY, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether it is unconstitutional to deny to defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial eligibility for the alcohol treatment diversion program set forth in NRS 484C.340.¹ Appellant Pedro Aguilar–Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 is patently unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that constitutional right in violation of due process and equal protection. We conclude that the provisions of NRS 484C.340 are constitutional and that, as the law is written, Aguilar–Raygoza is not eligible for the diversion program.

FACTS

The State charged Aguilar–Raygoza, by way of information, with his third offense of driving under the influence, a felony. See NRS 484C.110; NRS 484C.400(1)(c). Aguilar–Raygoza pleaded not guilty and went to trial, where a jury convicted him. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Aguilar–Raygoza requested to enter an alcohol treatment program as set forth in NRS 484C.340. The district court subsequently held a hearing to determine his eligibility for the program. At that hearing, Aguilar–Raygoza argued that he was a suitable candidate for the program and that the statute's requirement that he must enter a guilty plea to be eligible for treatment was unconstitutional because it penalized him for exercising his fundamental right to a jury trial and deprived him of the equal protection of the law.

The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in the alcohol treatment diversion program provided in NRS 484C.340. See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–43, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (drawing a distinction between “petty” and “serious” offenses with respect to whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial). The district court analyzed NRS 484C.340 under a rational basis review and found that the statute is constitutional because it does not significantly interfere with a defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial. The district court then concluded that Aguilar–Raygoza was ineligible for the alcohol treatment program because he had elected to go to trial rather than plead guilty or nolo contendere. The district court sentenced Aguilar–Raygoza to 30 months in prison and ordered him to pay a $2,000 fine. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Collins v. State, 125 Nev. 60, 62, 203 P.3d 90, 91 (2009). Because statutes are presumed to be valid, Aguilar–Raygoza bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that NRS 484C.340 is unconstitutional. Douglas Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul, LLC, 123 Nev. 552, 557, 170 P.3d 508, 512 (2007).

Under NRS 484C.340, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to his first felony DUI that is punishable under NRS 484C.400(1)(c) may apply to the court to undergo a program of treatment for alcoholism or drug abuse. ² The State may “request a hearing on the matter” and “present the court with any relevant evidence.” NRS 484C.340(2), (3). The court has discretion to deny the application and sentence the defendant pursuant to NRS 484C.400(1)(c). See NRS 484C.340(1), (4). If the court decides to grant the application,

the court shall: ... [i]immediately, without entering a judgment of conviction ... suspend further proceedings and place the offender on probation for not more than 5 years upon the condition that the offender be accepted for treatment by a treatment facility, that the offender complete the treatment satisfactorily and that the offender comply with any other condition ordered by the court.NRS 484C.340(4)(a). If a defendant completes the treatment satisfactorily, the district court will enter a judgment of conviction for a second-offense DUI, a misdemeanor, under NRS 484C.400. NRS 484C.340(4)(b)(3); NRS 484C.400(1)(b). But if a defendant is not accepted for treatment, fails to satisfactorily complete treatment, or violates a court-imposed condition, the court will enter a judgment of conviction and sentence the defendant to prison time consistent with NRS 484C.400(1)(c) for a felony DUI. NRS 484C.340(4)(b)(2), (5)(b).

Aguilar–Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 places an unconstitutional burden on his right to a trial by conditioning his eligibility for a diversion program upon the waiver of that right and violates due process and equal protection by treating defendants differently based on their exercise or waiver of that right. We disagree.

Burden on exercise of constitutional rights

Relying primarily on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), Aguilar–Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 penalizes defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial by withholding eligibility for a treatment program. The State argues that the statutory scheme provides a benefit for a guilty or nolo contendere plea that does not unconstitutionally burden a defendant's constitutional rights, similar to the statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). We agree with the State.

In Jackson, the Court was asked to decide whether the United States Constitution permits the establishment of a death penalty that is applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury, given that such a scheme discourages defendants from exercising their right to a trial. 390 U.S. at 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209. Under the federal statute challenged in Jackson, a death sentence could be imposed for kidnapping only upon a jury recommendation, whereas the maximum penalty for defendants who pleaded guilty or executed a jury waiver was life imprisonment. Id. at 572–81, 88 S.Ct. 1209. The Court explained that “[i]f the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional.” Id. at 581, 88 S.Ct. 1209. In evaluating the provision's purpose, the Court acknowledged that it could “be viewed as ameliorating the severity of the more extreme punishment” by limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends that penalty and that such a goal “is an entirely legitimate one.” Id. at 582, 88 S.Ct. 1209. But the Court explained that Congress could not achieve that goal “by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights” and therefore “the question is whether that [chilling] effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” Id. The Court then concluded that the challenged provision achieved its goal in a manner that needlessly penalized the assertion of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 582–83, 88 S.Ct. 1209. The Court thus invalidated the death-penalty provision in the statute. Id. at 583, 591, 88 S.Ct. 1209.

The Supreme Court later went on to distinguish Jackson in Corbitt. There, the Court rejected a claim that a New Jersey statute placed an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the rights to a trial and against self-incrimination by allowing a judge to choose between a mandatory life sentence and a lesser sentence for a defendant who pleaded non vult ( i.e., nolo contendere) to a murder indictment, whereas a defendant who proceeded to trial would be sentenced based on the degree of murder found by the jury, with a first-degree murder verdict carrying a mandatory life sentence. 439 U.S. at 214–15, 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. Relying on Jackson, the defendant complained that the statute burdened his constitutional rights by providing more flexibility in the sentencing of a defendant who chose to forgo a trial. Id. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. In distinguishing Jackson, the Court noted that “the pressures to forgo trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not what they were in Jackson ” for two reasons. Id. at 217, 99 S.Ct. 492. First, unlike in Jackson, the death penalty was not involved, and second, unlike in Jackson, pleading non vult would not avoid any risk of suffering the maximum penalty because the judge accepting the non vult plea still had authority to impose a life sentence. Id. The Court further explained that based on the tolerance for and encouragement of plea negotiations that offer substantial benefits in exchange for a plea, id. at 218–21, 99 S.Ct. 492, its cases since Jackson “clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.” Id. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 492. The Court also noted that there was “no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to trial” and that “withholding the possibility of leniency from [those who choose to go to trial] cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed.” Id. at 223–24, 99 S.Ct. 492. The Court in Corbitt thus recognized that defendants are often put to difficult choices because the criminal justice system offers opportunities to minimize risks by waiving constitutional rights but that those difficult choices are permissible so long as the encouragement does not unnecessarily burden the exercise of the right.

In summarizing Corbitt and the other relevant cases in this line of authority...