State v. Senick, No. CR-04-223818S (Conn. Super. 8/15/2006)

• Decision Date: 15 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. CR-04-223818S,CR-04-223818S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: State of Connecticut v. Gregory K. Senick Opinion No.: 94880

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Unpublished Opinion

State of Connecticut v. Gregory K. Senick

Opinion No.: 94880

No. CR-04-223818S

Connecticut Superior Court

Judicial District of New Haven

Geographic Area 7 at Meriden

August 15, 2006

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

NICOLA E. RUBINOW, JUDGE.

This memorandum of decision addresses the defendant's Motion for Judgments of Acquittal (Motion for Acquittal) as to each allegation of criminal conduct with which he is charged. The defendant seeks this relief sought pursuant to application of Practice Book §42-40 et seq., the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, §8 of the Connecticut constitution.

Under the substitute information filed July 28, 2006, the defendant, Gregory K. Senick, has been charged with: one count of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §53a-123(a)(2); one count of larceny in the first degree by defrauding a public community in violation of General Statutes §53a-122(a)(4); one count of conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §53a-123(a)(2) by way of §53a-48(a); and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree by defrauding a public community in violation of General Statutes §53a-122(a)(4) by way of §53a-48(a).¹ These charges are based upon the state's allegations that the defendant wrongfully took and obtained property in the form of material, labor and services for the repair and maintenance of premises he leased from the state of Connecticut located at 7 Undercliff Road in Meriden, Connecticut (7 Undercliff). The state has specifically alleged that the defendant wrongfully took and obtained this property without paying therefor, although he was obligated to pay for such material, labor and services pursuant to a lease into which the parties had entered. The defendant submitted his pleas of not guilty, and elected trial to a jury. Presentation of evidence to the jury commenced on May 25, 2006; the state rested its case on July 26, 2006.

On July 28, 2006, after the close of the state's case in chief, the defendant filed his written Motion for Acquittal with an incorporated supporting memorandum of law and factual arguments.² On July 28, 2006, at the court's request, the prosecution submitted a detailed "Proposed Findings of Facts from Record" cataloging the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at trial. On August 1, 2006, the state submitted a written response to the defendant's Motion for Acquittal, incorporating counter statements of law and fact (State's Response). Hearing on the Motion for Acquittal commenced on August 1 and continued on August 2, 2006. Through his written and oral arguments, the defendant in sum maintains that the state has failed to carry its burden of proving any of the crimes with which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The state counters that the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty on each count as alleged. For the reasons discussed herein, the court finds inadequate basis for the granting the Motion for Acquittal, which is accordingly DENIED.

I. STANDARDS GOVERNNG MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

In reaching its conclusions with regard to the issues of law and fact raised in the defendant's Motion for Acquittal and in the state's response, the court has adhered to the following legal principles.

A. STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE

Practice Book §42-40 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]fter the close of the prosecution's case in chief or at the close of all the evidence, upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the judicial authority shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal as to any principal offense for which the evidence would not reasonably permit a finding of guilty. Such judgment of acquittal shall not apply to any lesser included offense for which the evidence would reasonably permit a finding of guilty." Practice Book §42-41 provides that if, as in the present matter, "the motion is made after the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the judicial authority shall either grant or deny the motion before calling upon the defendant to present the defendant's case in chief. If the motion is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so."

In addressing the defendant's Motion for Acquittal, the question before the court is thus whether "the evidence would not reasonably permit a finding of guilty." Practice Book §42-40. According, the trial court necessarily applies the standard utilized for evaluating the sufficiency of the state's evidence insofar as it may, if credited in full, lawfully support a guilty verdict as to each count charged. In deciding a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a two-part test is used. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 252 Conn. 714, 747, 751 A.2.d 372 (2000) (reviewing trial court's denial of defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal submitted at the close of the state's case in chief and again following conviction). "First we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining [a guilty] verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, supra, 252 Conn. 747-48; State v. Caracoglia, 95 Conn.App. 95, 127-28, 895 A.2d 810, cert. denied 278 Conn. 922 (2006).

"[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The rule is that the jury's function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 801, 877 A.2d 739 (2005); see also State v. Caracoglia, supra, 95 Conn.App. 127-28; State v. Leggett, 94 Conn.App. 392, 402, 920 A.2d 1000, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 911 (2006).

In other words, while "the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [In] determining whether the evidence supports a particular inference, we ask whether that inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable . . . [A]n inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference. Equally well established is our holding that a jury may draw factual inferences on the basis of already inferred facts . . . Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal . . . [W]e do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty." (Internal and external quotation marks omitted; external citation omitted.) State v. Higgins, 74 Conn.App. 473, 482-83, 811 A.2d 765 (2003).

Thus, for purposes of considering the Motion for Acquittal, the rule of evidentiary sufficiency "does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . because [our Supreme Court] has held that a [trier's] factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable. State v. Farnum, 275 Conn. 26, 32, 878 A.2d 1095 (2005)." (Internal and external quotation marks omitted.) State v. Caracoglia, supra, 95 Conn.App. 128.

B. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES AS CHARGED

In addressing the Motion for Acquittal, the court has considered the each of the charges pending against the defendant, and the fact which may be seen as permitting conviction on any or all of these charges, using the applicable legal standards outlined above. The court has thus considered the evidence which might support a conviction under the first count of the substitute information, wherein it is specifically alleged "[t]hat on diverse dates between July 2001 and March of 2004, the defendant, GREGORY SENICK, committed the crime of LARCENY IN THE SECOND DEGREE, in violation of General Statutes §53a-123(a)(2), in that acting with the intent to deprive another, the State of Connecticut, of property and to appropriate the same to himself, he wrongfully took and obtained property in the form of material, labor and services for the repair and maintenance of premises he leased from the state of Connecticut located at 7 Undercliff Road in Meriden,...