State v. Sephus
| Decision Date | 25 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-98-338-CR,10-98-338-CR |
| Citation | 32 S.W.3d 369 |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Waco 2000) THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. JULIUS SEPHUS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 278th District Court Leon County, Texas Trial Court # 7994-B Before Chief Justice Davis, Justice Vance, and Justice Gray.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge dismissed an indictment for capital murder, with prejudice. The State appealed. Because we find that the dismissal was required by the plain meaning and mandate of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the "Detainers Act"), we affirm.1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (Vernon 1979).
The pertinent facts established by the record are:
* Sephus was charged with capital murder in Leon County, alleged to have occurred on August 24, 1994;
* Sephus was charged with capital murder in Harris County, alleged to have been committed on a date prior to the Leon County offense;
* Sephus was convicted in April of 1995 of a federal offense arising out of the Leon County event in the United States District Court in Waco, for which he was confined to the U.S. Penitentiary, Allenwood in the State of Pennsylvania for a term of "life without parole";
* In October of 1995, the District Attorney having authority for prosecutions in Leon County placed a "detainer" against Sephus with the Allenwood penitentiary;
* On November 27, 1995, the warden of the Allenwood penitentiary notified the District Attorney that Harris County had requested disposition of pending charges in Harris County; the warden's letter was received in the District Attorney's office on December 14, 1995;
* In November of 1996, Sephus was tried in Harris County and convicted of capital murder and assessed life in the penitentiary;
* No earlier than December 1996, but no later than May 1997 and most likely no later than January 31, 1997, Sephus was returned to the federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania to resume serving his federal sentence;
* In January of 1997, a new District Attorney with responsibility for prosecutions in Leon County took office;
* In May of 1997, the District Attorney began attempts to have Sephus brought to Texas for trial on the Leon County charge of capital murder;
* After several communications with the Allenwood federal penitentiary, the District Attorney on July 7, 1997, requested that the detainer be released;
* The Allenwood facility released the detainer on July 8, 1997;
* Seven "Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum" were issued by the Leon County District Clerk, dated July 2, 1997 (2), July 10, 1997, July 14, 1997, June 20, 1997, and October 22, 1997 (2);
* On November 7, 1997, Sephus was arraigned in the District Court in Leon County;
* On April 27, 1998, Sephus filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act";
* On September 14, 1998, several months after the hearing on Sephus' motion, the District Attorney filed a response.
In the order dismissing the indictment, the trial court made five factual findings:
1. Defendant was tried and convicted, in April, 1995, in the Federal District Court, Waco, Texas, for several offenses arising out of the Normangee bank robbery, which is also the basis for this prosecution. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, without eligibility for parole. He began serving his Federal prison sentence in Pennsylvania. Leon County, Texas, maintained a detainer on Defendant for the pending capital murder charge.
2. In 1995, Harris County, Texas, through the use of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, obtained temporary custody of Defendant from the United States prison officials in Pennsylvania. While in the temporary custody of the authorities of Harris County, Texas, Defendant was tried and convicted of capital murder, receiving a life sentence in November, 1996.
3. In 1997, Defendant was returned by the State of Texas to the Federal Prison Authorities, in Pennsylvania, without disposing of the criminal charges pending in Leon County, Texas.
4. On November 7, 1997, Defendant was brought to Leon County, Texas, from Pennsylvania, pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum and Leon County's request for temporary custody.
5. No trial date has been scheduled within 120 days of Defendant's return to Leon County, Texas.
The court concluded that prosecution of the Leon County offense was barred under the Detainers Act.
The trial court decided this case under Article IV of the Detainers Act. Article IV provides:
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Paragraph (a) of Article V hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information, or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in Paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in Paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executing authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Paragraph (e) of Article V hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Id. Article IV. Subparagraph (e) of Article V provides: "(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state." Id. Article V(e).
On appeal, the State asserts three issues:
1. The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment in this cause as appellee did not follow proper procedures to trigger the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
2. The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment in this cause as appellee waived any rights he had under Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
3. The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment in this cause as appellee waived any rights he had under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
We review the decision to dismiss de novo but review the findings supporting that decision under the "clearly erroneous" standard. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1992); Espinoza v. State, 949 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd).
The court's conclusion under Article IV is sustained by the first, second, and third findings, which are not contested by the State. Findings four and five are immaterial.
Significantly, the State's brief does not assert that Article IV is inapplicable; its argument is limited to "waiver of the rights [Sephus] had under Article IV." The first issue presented by the State raises the question of whether Sephus followed the proper procedures to "trigger the Interstate Agreement on Detainers." The argument under this issue is limited to a discussion of the prisoner's duties under Article III to make a request and to provide the notices required under that article so as to invoke the "anti-shuttling" provisions of the act. No mention of Article IV is made. The State's second and third issues are limited to an argument that Sephus waived the provisions of Articles III and IV of the act after he was returned to Texas the second time. As we will discuss, those issues are immaterial to the question of whether he was entitled to a dismissal with prejudice when he was returned to Pennsylvania after his first trip to Texas to stand trial in Harris County. By failing to address its applicability, the State effectively concedes that Article IV applies.
The State's first issue questions whether Sephus took steps necessary to invoke the Detainers Act and provided the notices required by Article III. However, the court's second finding that Harris County used the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Walker v. State
...(Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet); Lindley v. State, 33 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. ref'd); State v. Sephus, 32 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd). We review any factual findings underlying the issue of compliance with the IAD under a clearly erroneous standard......
-
In re Ryan, No. 10-04-00128-CR (TX 10/20/2004)
...York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); see State v. Williams, 938 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Sephus, 32 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref'd). The majority's application of the law to the facts of this case, in its entirety, is as follows: The IAD requires......
-
Bland v. State, No. 08-02-00437-CR (TX 5/20/2004)
...review de novo; the factual findings underlying that decision are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Sephus, 32 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref'd), citing United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1992). The provisions of Article III apply only wh......
-
Commonwealth v. Wilson, SJC-08323 (MA 12/22/2004)
...standard. In April, 1977, the defendant was brought to Middlesex County for trial on the Tewksbury murders. Relying on State v. Sephus, 32 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), he argues that, under Article IV(e) of the IAD, the defendant had to be brought to trial on the murders in this case wi......