State v. Sevy

• Decision Date: 21 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 22195,22195
• Citation: 129 Idaho 613,930 P.2d 1358
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael SEVY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1358

930 P.2d 1358

129 Idaho 613

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael SEVY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22195.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Jan. 21, 1997.

Randolph E. Farber, Nampa, for Defendant-Appellant.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Catherine O. Derden, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for Plaintiff-Respondent. Catherine O. Derden argued.

LANSING, Judge.

In the magistrate division of the district court, Michael Sevy entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. Sevy reserved the right to appeal the magistrate's denial of a motion to suppress incriminating evidence obtained by a police officer following his stop of Sevy's vehicle. The district court, in its appellate capacity, affirmed the denial of Sevy's suppression motion. On Sevy's further appeal to this Court, we conclude that the officer's stop of Sevy's vehicle was unjustified and that the derivative evidence therefore must be suppressed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 1994, at approximately 10 p.m., Officer Kingsbury of the Nampa Police Department received a dispatch report informing him that a black pickup believed to have been involved in a possible theft at a construction site was moving toward his location. The dispatch report included the suspect vehicle's license number. Officer Kingsbury then drove near the area where the pickup was reported to be traveling and spotted the vehicle. He signalled the vehicle to stop, and the driver, Michael Sevy, complied. Kingsbury questioned Sevy about his activities at the construction site and accepted Sevy's explanation that he had been considering buying a lot in the subdivision. However, Kingsbury also noticed the smell of alcohol and asked Sevy if he had been drinking. Sevy admitted to recent alcohol consumption, and he failed several field sobriety tests. Because Officer Kingsbury was outside the Nampa city limits, he radioed for assistance from the Canyon County sheriff's department to effectuate Sevy's arrest. A deputy sheriff responded and arrested Sevy for driving under the influence of alcohol. A breathalyzer test administered at the jail revealed a blood alcohol content in excess of the legal limit.

Sevy filed a motion to dismiss the charge and to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test as well as the observations of Sevy's intoxication made by the two officers at the scene. The motion was denied by the magistrate. Sevy then pleaded guilty to the DUI charge, reserving the right to appeal the magistrate's ruling on the suppression motion. The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision.

ANALYSIS

On an appeal from an appellate decision of the district court which has reviewed a magistrate's findings and conclusions, we examine the record made in the magistrate's division independently of, but with regard for, the district court's decision. State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 101, 813 P.2d 910, 912 (Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, we will affirm or reverse the district court's decision based on our independent review of the magistrate's findings and conclusions. Id.; Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct.App.1989). The case before us does not involve disputed questions of fact but, rather, turns upon the proper application of law to uncontroverted facts. Consequently, we exercise free review. State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.App.1986).

At issue is whether the stop of Sevy's motor vehicle violated the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. There is no doubt that Sevy was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he stopped in response to the flashing overhead lights on Officer Kingsbury's patrol car. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406, 679 P.2d 1123, 1124 (1984). It is therefore incumbent upon the State to prove a proper justification for the seizure. Id. In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670 (Ct.App.1995); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct.App.1992). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. The "whole picture" must yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Fry, supra: State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1009, 783 P.2d 874, 876 (Ct.App.1989).

In this case, the stop was not based upon any observations made by Officer Kingsbury but upon the message he received from police dispatch. In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that an officer may effectuate a seizure in reliance upon a police bulletin if the bulletin was based upon facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion:

[I]f a [police] flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin...