State v. Hedgecock
| Decision Date | 14 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 33950.,33950. |
| Citation | 212 P.3d 1010,147 Idaho 580 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Troy HEDGECOCK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Elizabeth A. Allred argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
William Troy Hedgecock appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of forged bank bills. Specifically, he contests the court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, the denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, and the length of the sentence imposed. We affirm.
In June 2005, Hedgecock was placed on probation for five years after pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine and attempted forgery. He signed a document containing the conditions of his probation, including the following relevant sections:
10. Submit to Searches: The defendant shall submit to a search of his/her person, residence or vehicle at the request of any Probation Officer or a police officer.
. . . .
1. LAWS AND COOPERATION: I shall respect and obey all laws and comply with any lawful request of my supervising officer, any agent of the Division of Community Corrections, or any police officer.
. . . .
6. SEARCH: I agree and consent to the search of my person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any time at any place by any Agent of the Division of Community Corrections or any police officer and waive my constitutional right to be free from searches.
(Emphasis added).
In November 2005, Hedgecock's probation officer, Officer Neumeyer, arrived at Hedgecock's apartment to "see what was going on with the house." Hedgecock was not at home, but his roommate allowed the officers to enter. While inside, Officer Neumeyer found some items of "concern" including a scanner used to scan pictures and documents and inside the scanner, a piece of manila file folder cut in the size and shape of a dollar bill. The officer also found illegal drugs on the person with whom Hedgecock was residing.
At some point in the search, Officer Waugh, a Wendell police officer, arrived to assist Officer Neumeyer. The two were standing on the balcony of the apartment when they saw a vehicle pull up to a stop sign about fifty yards away. Officer Waugh indicated it was the same vehicle he had stopped more than a week prior and found Hedgecock inside. The vehicle paused briefly, the occupants looked toward the officers, and then it accelerated quickly away from the stop sign. Officer Neumeyer directed two county police officers to stop the vehicle to determine if Hedgecock was inside, "check the vehicle" and "detain" Hedgecock until Neumeyer arrived on the scene. Officer Neumeyer testified at the suppression hearing that he had wanted Hedgecock detained to question him about the scanner and to inform him the officers had found illegal drugs on his roommate's person, making it inappropriate for Hedgecock to continue living there.
The officers instigated the stop solely on the grounds that Officer Neumeyer had requested it and then notified Neumeyer that Hedgecock was, in fact, a passenger in the vehicle. Before Officer Neumeyer arrived at the scene of the stop, Deputy Jeromy Smith, one of the officers who stopped the vehicle, conducted a search of the passenger seat area where Hedgecock had been sitting. The search revealed what Deputy Smith believed to be counterfeit one-hundred-dollar bills.
After being read his Miranda1 rights, Hedgecock admitted that the bills were counterfeited from a one-hundred-dollar bill that he had in his wallet. Officer Neumeyer, who arrived about five minutes after Hedgecock was first detained, testified that Hedgecock also admitted that he had been using methamphetamine and that he was intending to use the counterfeit bills to buy and sell drugs in a money laundering scheme. After the genuine bill was found in Hedgecock's wallet, he was arrested.
Hedgecock was charged with possession of forged bank bills, Idaho Code § 18-3605. He filed a motion to suppress, claiming the seizure of the vehicle was unreasonable and thus, the subsequent search was unlawful and the evidence recovered and his statements made should be suppressed. The court denied the motion, and Hedgecock subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court entered judgment and imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with seven years determinate. Hedgecock filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. He now appeals.
Hedgecock argues that discovery of the forged bank bills should be suppressed because his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated when officers illegally detained him without the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion—of criminal activity or that Hedgecock was in the vehicle—to make the stop. He also contends that he did not waive his right to be free from unreasonable seizure as a condition of his probation. The state counters that Hedgecock's Fourth Amendment probation waiver includes a waiver of his constitutional rights to be free from searches and seizures. Alternatively, the state argues that even assuming for the sake of argument, Hedgecock only waived his right to be free from searches, not seizures, the district court correctly concluded there was reasonable articulable suspicion justifying Hedgecock's seizure.
When reviewing the decision on a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, while exercising free review over the application of constitutional standards to those facts. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct.App.1998). Deference is also given to the trial court's decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to conflicting evidence and the factual inferences to be drawn. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits government agents from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. When a private vehicle is stopped by the police, all of its occupants are "seized" and may seek suppression of evidence if the seizure did not comply with Fourth Amendment standards. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); State v. Nevarez et. al., ___ Idaho ___, 210 P.3d 578 (Ct.App.2009); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct.App.1994). Normally, to pass constitutional muster, a detention to investigate possible criminal activity must be based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 (1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767 (Ct.App.2001). The quantity and quality of information necessary to create reasonable suspicion for such a "Terry stop" is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308-09 (1990); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210, but must be more than a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909.
When a defendant challenges the validity of a vehicle stop, the burden is on the state to prove that the stop was justified. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238 (1983); State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 614-15, 930 P.2d 1358, 1359-60 (Ct.App.1997). The reasonableness of a stop is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 526, 826 P.2d 481, 487 (Ct.App.1991). Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that a law enforcement officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909.
Hedgecock first contends the officers did not possess reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle because they had only a "hunch" that he was even inside the vehicle. Here, Officer Neumeyer knew that Hedgecock was under supervision stemming from his convictions for drug possession and attempted forgery and had found incriminating evidence in both regards after searching his residence and speaking with his roommate. Thus, Officer Neumeyer had reasonable suspicion that Hedgecock was still engaged in criminal activity—a fact that became more significant when the officers watched a vehicle in which Hedgecock had been a passenger more than a week earlier, pull to the stop sign approximately fifty yards from the residence. The officers observed the vehicle occupants look up toward the officers and then accelerate away from the scene at a high rate of speed. Thus, while at the time of the stop, the officers had not yet definitively determined that Hedgecock was a passenger, they did have reasonable suspicion, given the totality of the circumstances, that he was inside. Under Fourth Amendment strictures, the officers lawfully detained the vehicle in which Hedgecock was a passenger.
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