State v. Seymore

• Decision Date: 22 May 1895
• Parties: STATE v. SEYMORE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

94 Iowa 699

63 N.W. 661

STATE

v.SEYMORE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 22, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Jones county, J. H. Preston, Judge.

December 17, 1890, defendant was indicted for the crime of murdering his father–in–law, one G. P. Fifield. In June, 1894, he was tried, and convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He appeals. Affirmed.Sheean & McCarn and Remley & Ercanbrack, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., E. H. Hicks, Co. Atty., and F. O. Ellison, for the State.

DEEMER, J.

The body of George P. Fifield was found lying on the Northwestern Railway track, in the suburbs of the city of Anamosa, at about 8:20 o'clock in the evening of the 9th of September, 1890. It was lying within a few feet of a small culvert; the feet in the center of the track, the body diagonally across it, the head resting on a tie on the north side of the track. The body was inclined to the left, with the face turned up. His hands were in the pockets of his trousers. He was bleeding freely, as the nostrils and his mouth were filled with blood. The skull was crushed and fractured on the right side of the head, and a small hole was noticed in the right temple. The left side was somewhat bruised, but there was no fracture or abrasion of the skin on this side. When discovered, he was breathing very hard, and was unconscious. Almost immediately upon his discovery, he was removed to his home, where he died within a short time. The deceased was defendant's fatherin–law, and, prior to his death, lived with defendant and his daughter upon a farm not far from Anamosa. The son and father–in–law did not get along pleasantly together. They frequently quarreled and bickered over matters of more or less importance, and a feeling of antipathy gradually grew up between them. Before the death of Fifield, the defendant had been concerned in various larcenies in the town of Anamosa, and at that time had quite an amount of stolen property in and around the house upon the farm where he resided. It is claimed by the state that Fifield was murdered by being struck with a club, on the right side of the head, where the fracture was located, and that defendant is the person who committed the murder; that defendant naturally disliked the deceased, and had threatened to take his life, but that the immediate motive for the murder was the fact that defendant was in dread of the discovery of the stolen property by the deceased, and of his delivery to the authorities, to meet retribution for the crimes he had committed. The defendant's counsel insist that no crime was committed; that the death of Fifield was due to his accidentally falling upon the iron railway track; or if this be not true, and it should appear that some one was guilty of a homicide, that defendant is not the guilty party. The case is before us on certain errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, as well as upon the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.

Deceased left his home about 7 o'clock in the evening of the day on which he met his death, to go to that of another son–in–law, who lived in the outskirts of the town of Anamosa. He went, as was his custom, part of the way along the railway track. He reached his destination in a few minutes, and, after attending to the errand which called him, started to return about 8 o'clock in the evening, and within a few minutes met with the injuries which caused his death. The defendant left his home within a few minutes after Fifield's departure, riding a dark–colored horse. He was next seen, excepting as hereinafter noted, at or near the post office in Anamosa, about 8:15 p. m. He rode up to near the post office at this time at quite a lively pace, and when he reached there his horse was breathing hard, and was perspiring quite freely. The state sought to prove that defendant knew deceased was going to visit his son–in–law during the evening, and that he took advantage of the opportunity to waylay and murder him. To establish the defendant's knowledge of the proposed visit of the deceased, the state was permitted to show that on the day of the homicide the deceased received a letter from a son, asking for $50, which fact was known to defendant; and that defendant also knew that deceased was going to the house of his other son–in–law, Judson, regarding the matter. We extract the following from the record, showing the questions propounded to a witness, Mrs. Winslow, to establish these matters: “Q. Now state, Mrs. Winslow, when and by whom you heard the contents of this letter discussed. (Objected to by counsel for defendant as being immaterial, irrelevant, and for the reason she says she did not hear it discussed till after the murder, and it calls for incompetent testimony unless it is shown that it was discussed by the defendant. Objection overruled, and defendant excepts.) A. It was discussed in the family, but I can't state as to anyone in particular. It was talked there; we talked it over. The defendant was present some of the time when it was discussed, I think. I could not tell how soon after the murder. Things were so mixed up in my mind at that time that I can't say exactly. It was a few days. Q. Now, will you state, Mrs. Winslow, all that was said, as near as you can recollect, at that time, in the presence of this defendant, concerning the contents of that letter? (Objection by counsel for defendant as being immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent; that the witness says she does not know when he was present and when he was not. Objection overruled, and defendant excepts.) A. It was merely that the letter was from the son Henry, asking for fifty dollars.” Claim is made that these rulings are erroneous because it was not shown that defendant was present and heard these conversations. The claim is based upon a misapprehension. The witness testified that defendant was present some of the time when the matter was discussed. It was also shown by another witness that defendant was present when the letter was read, and that he discussed the advisability of sendingthe money to the son of deceased. The same witness was interrogated as to a quarrel between deceased and defendant over a certain note, and was asked this question: “Q. State whether or not Mr. Seymore threw this note into the fire. (Objection was made to the question as leading, which objection was overruled, and witness answered.) A. Well, I cannot positively say which one of them did throw it into the stove, but, whoever did throw it, I remember very distinctly they set the lid of the stove down very solid.” We do not think the objection was good. It may be the answer was not responsive, but no such attack was made upon it. This witness was also asked whether deceased and defendant would get angry in some of the discussions, to which she answered that they did. Another witness was permitted to state that these parties were not on friendly or speaking terms on a certain day. Objection was made to such testimony, and overruled. We think the rulings were correct. State v. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 333, 20 N. W. 459;State v. Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa, 746, 31 N. W. 865. The state was permitted to show by several witnesses that the defendant had committed a number of larcenies in the town of Anamosa prior to the death of Fifield, and that he, defendant, had much of the stolen property in and upon the premises where they both resided. We think this testimony was proper, for it tended to show a motive for the killing. The claim is made that these parties were hostile to each other, that defendant had stated he intended to take the life of Fifield, and that one of the motives which prompted the murder was the fact that deceased knew that some of the property concealed about the place was stolen, and that defendant was in constant fear that deceased would disclose this matter to the authorities. As bearing upon this question that the testimony last above referred to was admissible, see State v. Kline, 54 Iowa, 183, 6 N. W. 184. The case is quite different from State v. Rainsbarger, supra. No claim was made in that case that proof of the commission of the other crimes tended to show a motive for the commission of the offense there charged.

A physician who attended the deceased after his injuries, and who probed the wound, and dissected the scalp and skull of the deceased, was asked to give his opinion regarding the nature of the instrument which was used in inflicting the wound, and as to whether a certain club produced upon the trial could have been the instrument used. He was also asked for his opinion as to whether the wound was due to a fall, or was inflicted with a club in the hands of some person. Objections to each and all of these questions were overruled, and witness was permitted to answer that the wound could have been made by a club like the one in evidence, and that, in his judgment, it was made by something of that character, and that the injuries were not, in his judgment, due to a fall, but were inflicted by a club. These rulings were each and all correct. State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270;State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131. Witness was also asked as to whether it was the identical club which produced the wound. And to this he answered he did not know; that it could be. The questions were improper, but...