State v. Shantell Newman, I.D. # 1705021865
| Decision Date | 26 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | I.D. # 1705021865 |
| Parties | STATE OF DELAWARE v. SHANTELL NEWMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal: DENIED
This 26th day of September, 2018, upon consideration of the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (the "Motion") filed on behalf of Shantell Newman, the record in this case, and the applicable legal authorities, including Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 29"), it appears to the Court that:
1. Newman's Motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the Court's ruling during trial that, in order to sustain a charge for possessing a firearm with a removed, obliterated, or altered serial number, the State is not required to establish the year the firearm was manufactured. The statute defining the offense contains three subsections; pertinently for this case, the first subsection defines the crime of knowingly possessing a firearm with a removed or obliterated serial number, and the second subsection provides that the statute does not apply to firearms manufactured before 1973. Given the statute's unambiguous language and structure, as well as the fact that it criminalizes removal of a serial number, without which the State is unlikely to be able to prove the date of manufacture, I conclude the manufacture date is an affirmative defense for which a defendant bears the burden of proof. Accordingly, and because the evidence otherwise was sufficient to sustain the conviction, Newman's Motion is denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. At trial, the State presented evidence that New Castle County police executed a search warrant at a house believed to be Newman's residence. Police believed Newman resided there with Josiah Woody, who was indicted as Newman's co-defendant. Although neither Newman nor Woody was present when the search was conducted, Newman's children were there, and the State presented evidence that during the search police found recent mail addressed to each defendant.
3. The house had two main stories and a basement. Detective Domenic Phillips of the New Castle County Police Department testified he found a handgun during the search of the house. The weapon was located on top of an air duct in the basement. Detective Phillips testified the firearm was within arm's reach and plainly visible when he walked three steps down the basement stairs. Pictures admitted into evidence showed, and Detective Phillips' testimony confirmed, that the air duct was covered in dust, but the firearm was not dusty.
4. The firearm Detective Phillips found had tape around the handle and a filed-off serial number. Detective Phillips testified the filed-off serial number, which was located on the side of the gun, easily was noticeable to anyone who handled the firearm because there were several visible tool marks where the number was carved away. Photographs of the handgun confirmed the visible tool marks.
5. Detective Phillips testified he was able to restore the serial number on the handgun by using an acid wash. He then ran the restored number through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives' ("ATF") national database, but that search did not yield any information about the firearm. Detective Phillips testified that, in his experience, information about older guns, such as those manufactured in the 1960s, often is not contained in the ATF database.
6. New Castle County Police's evidence detection unit processed the handgun for DNA and fingerprints. Although no fingerprints were found on the gun, the State's DNA analyst testified that DNA mixtures were obtained from the handgun's trigger/trigger guard, cylinder, barrel, and grip, and those mixtures matched Newman's DNA sample, which was obtained from a buccal swab. The analyst testified there was a 1 in 7 trillion probability that an unrelated individual in the general population would have the same DNA as that found on those areas of the gun. A DNA mixture also was obtained from the firearm's hammer and matched Newman's sample, although with a higher random match probability. The analyst explained that the DNA mixtures had at least two contributors, and Woody's DNA also matched the mixtures obtained from the trigger/trigger guard and hammer.
7. Newman and Woody were indicted on one count of Possession of a Weapon with a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial Number, and Woody also was indicted for Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited. The defendants were tried together on February 27-28, 2017. At the conclusion of the State's case, Newman's counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal. Newman argued 11 Del. C. § 1459 - the section of the Delaware Code defining the offense of Possession of a Weapon with a Removed, Obliterated, or Altered Serial Number - provides that the section does not apply to a firearm manufactured before 1973, and the State therefore was required to prove the firearm's manufacture date as an element of the offense. The Court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding the date of manufacture was an affirmative defense. On February 28, 2017, the jury convicted Newman and Woody on all the indicted charges. At the conclusion of trial, the Court granted Newman's counsel's request to extend by thirty days the deadline for post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal.
8. Newman now seeks judgment of acquittal on several alternative theories, namely that the State failed to adduce evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the firearm was manufactured in 1973 or later; (2) the firearm's serial number was defaced when Newman handled the gun; (3) the crime occurred within the five year statute of limitations; (4) Newman knew the serial number was obliterated; and (5) the firearm was altered in a manner that disguised or concealed its identity or origin.1 The State asserts each of Newman's arguments fails on its merits, either because the State presented sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or because the contested element was not one on which the State carried the burden of proof.
ANALYSIS
9. Under Rule 29, a defendant may move for judgment of acquittal to set aside a guilty verdict. In considering such a motion, all evidence and the legitimate inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.2 If a rational jury could conclude from the evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for acquittal shall be denied.3
10. The statute under which the State charged Newman, 11 Del. C. § 1459, provides in its entirety as follows:
In the indictment and at trial, the State alleged that on or about February 8, 2017, Newman and her co-defendant possessed a handgun with knowledge that the importer's or manufacturer's serial number had been removed, obliterated, or altered in a manner that disguised or concealed the identity or origin of the firearm. Newman concedes the DNA evidence presented by the State permitted the jury to conclude she knowingly possessed the firearm at some point before its seizure. Newman argues, however, that the State's evidence was insufficient in every other regard.
11. Although sequentially last in the Motion, the focus of Newman's argument is a renewal of her contention at trial that the State was required by Section 1459 to prove the firearm was manufactured in or after 1973. Newman's argument relies on Section 1459(b), which exempts from the statute any firearm manufactured before 1973. In denying Newman's motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, the Court reasoned that Section 1459(b) exempted from the statute's scope firearms manufactured before 1973, and the manufacture date therefore was an affirmative defense under 11 Del. C. § 305. Under Section 305, if a statute "specifically exempts" a person or activity from the statute's scope, and a defendant contends she falls within that exemption, the exemption is an affirmative defense. Applying Section 305, the Court concluded Section 1459(b) exempted the activity of possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number if the firearm was manufactured before 1973, and the defendant therefore bore the burden of proving she fell within that exemption.
12. Newman contends this ruling was in error, arguing Section 305 does not apply because Section 1459(b) does not exempt a class of persons or activities from the statute's application, but rather negates an element of the charge.4 Newman argues affirmative defenses historically are confined to facts that "lie immediately within the knowledge of the defendant," and it would be unfair to classify a firearm's date of manufacture as an affirmative defense because "requiring a private citizen to prove a distantly remote date of manufacture by a preponderance of the evidence is neither practical nor fair."5
13. Newman does not explain how the date of a firearm's manufacture "negates an element of the charge" of Possession of a Weapon with a Removed, Obliterated, or Altered Serial Number.6 The argument runs contrary to logic, Section 305, and Delaware law regarding the interpretation of statutory burdens of proof. First, Section 1459 criminalizes possession of a firearm whose serial number has been...
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