State v. Shattuck
| Decision Date | 20 October 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,458 - (17) |
| Citation | 104 N.W. 719,96 Minn. 45 |
| Parties | STATE v. IRA H. SHATTUCK and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendants from a judgment of the municipal court of Minneapolis, C. L. Smith, J. Affirmed.
Sale of Game.
Section 45, c. 336, p. 606, Laws 1903, which provides that "no person shall * * * sell to any one * * * at any time any * * * ruffed grouse," construed, and held, that the statute applies to all ruffed grouse, whether captured within or without this state, and, further, that, so construed, it is not in conflict with the constitution of this state or of the United States.
Koon Whelan & Bennett, for appellants.
Douglas & Griggs, for the State.
The defendants on April 4, 1905, were convicted in the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis of the alleged offense of selling on December 5, 1904, a certain game bird, known as "ruffed grouse." They appealed from the judgment and here urge two reasons why it should be reversed.
The here material provisions of the statute upon which the conviction is based are as follows:
No person shall * * * sell to any one, have in possession with intent to sell or have in possession or under control, at any time any * * * ruffed grouse, * * * except that any * * * ruffed grouse or pheasant may be killed and had in possession between the 15th day of October and the 15th day of December following, * * * and when any of the birds mentioned in this section have been lawfully caught, taken, killed or had in possession during the time herein allowed they may be had in possession for the five days after the time herein allowed. Laws 1903, p. 606, c. 336, § 45.
It appears from the record that on December 5, 1904, Samuel F. Fullerton, with some other gentlemen, went to the Nicollet Hotel Cafe in Minneapolis, of which the defendants were the proprietors, and upon their request they were served by the servants of the defendants with a ruffed grouse. This particular bird was killed in the state of Wisconsin, brought into the state of Minnesota, thereafter came to the possession of the defendants, and was kept in the storeroom of their cafe until sold as stated.
1. The first reason urged why the judgment should be reversed is that the statute in question does not apply to wild game brought into this state from another state.
The manifest purpose of the statute is to protect the game of this state, and not that of any other state; but the legislature, in the exercise of its police powers, might well conclude that a reasonable and effective method of protecting the ruffed grouse of this state would be to prohibit within the state the sale of such game, without reference to the state wherein it was captured. Or, in other words, the intention of this statute was to absolutely prohibit trafficking in such game within the state, leaving those who desire it for their pleasure or personal use free to go and capture it, at such times and subject to such reasonable limitations as the legislature might prescribe. It is not to be doubted that, if commercialism be eliminated by prohibiting the sale of game within the state, all motive would be removed for hunters for revenue only to engage in the business of killing game in such quantities as to extinguish the species in the course of a few years. Such a prohibition, therefore, is a potent protection to the game of our state. If, however, such protection be limited to game captured in this state, its purpose would be in a large measure defeated; for, when commingled, game of the same kind captured in this and other states cannot be readily, if at all, distinguished. Hence, to make the closing of the market for game an efficient method of protecting game of our own state, the prohibition must extend to all game; for, if the market be closed to the game of this state and left open to the game of other states, it would not be difficult to defeat the purpose of the statute by evasion, fraud, and lying. This statute, then, unless the language in which it is expressed forbids, must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose for which it was enacted and not so as to defeat it. The language is this: "No person shall * * * sell to any one * * * at any time any * * * ruffed grouse." This clear and precise prohibition extends to all ruffed grouse, and we cannot construe the statute so as to exclude from its operation game killed in other states and brought into this state and here sold, without disregarding, not only the manifest purpose of the statute, but also its unequivocal language. The statute means just what it says.
Counsel for the defendants cite and rely upon the following cases: People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325, 39 N.W. 1; Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 139 Pa. St. 298, 21 A. 14; Commonwealth v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410. The statute of Michigan construed in the first case cited prohibited the sale of "any of the kinds or species of birds protected by this act." It was the game of the state of Michigan which was protected by the act; hence it was necessarily held that the prohibition extended only to such game. The Pennsylvania statute provided that no person shall "kill or expose for sale or have in his or her possession after the same has been killed any quail," etc., and it was held in the second case cited that the prohibition against killing game was necessarily limited to game of the state, because the statute could not, and was not intended to have, any extraterritorial effect, and, further, that the clause, "after the same has been killed," referred to the same game that it was unlawful to kill; that is, the game of the state. The statute of Massachusetts provided that
Whoever in this commonwealth takes or kills any * * *...
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