State v. Sheldon
| Decision Date | 21 March 1907 |
| Citation | 111 N.W. 372,78 Neb. 552 |
| Parties | STATE v. SHELDON. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
When the Legislature has construed a provision of the Constitution in an administrative matter in one of two equally reasonable ways, the court will not take the opposite view, but will adopt and follow the legislative construction.
The occupancy by the Governor during his term of office of the executive mansion provided by the state, in which he is required by law to maintain his residence, is not a “perquisite of office or other compensation,” and is not prohibited by the Constitution.
Action by the state against George L. Sheldon. Action dismissed.W. T. Thompson, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Norris Brown and Jesse L. Root, for defendant.
This is an original action in this court. The petition alleges that the suit is brought by the Attorney General in behalf of the state by the direction and at the request of the Governor. The purpose of the action is to recover the sum of $100 for one month's use by the defendant of the dwelling house in Lincoln known as the “Executive Mansion.” A general demurrer has been filed to the petition, and the cause submitted.
The house known as the “Executive Mansion” was purchased by the Board of Public Lands and Buildings in 1899 by the direction of the Legislature, and the act authorizing and directing the purchase provides that, “after said property has been purchased and paid for, the Board of Public Lands and Buildings shall furnish said premises suitable for an executive mansion and the same shall be occupied by the Governor.” Since its purchase it has been continuously occupied as an official residence by the several chief executives of the state up to this time, and is now occupied by the defendant, Hon. George L. Sheldon, in his official capacity as Governor of the state of Nebraska.
By the provisions of section 19, art. 5, of the Constitution, the general supervision and control of all buildings and grounds belonging to the state, except for educational purposes, is vested in the Board of Public Lands and Buildings, and the Legislature, by the provisions of article 7, c. 83, Comp. St. 1903, has more fully defined the powers and duties of that body, and given the entire control of the sale or lease of the public grounds or buildings to the board, or, by its warrant, to the Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings. By section 3 of this article the board is given general custody and charge of all buildings and institutions, and the grounds thereto, and are made responsible for their proper keeping in repair, and the Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings is made the direct custodian of the same. Under these constitutional and statutory provisions the entire responsibility for the use of the buildings of the state is vested in the Board of Public Lands and Buildings, and since that board has not authorized this action it may be doubted whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient capacity to sue, or whether the court is justified in passing upon the question submitted. However, this objection has not been raised by the defendant, and we will waive it and proceed to determine the case upon its merits. The occupancy of the premises being admitted, the Attorney General bases the state's right to recover rent upon section 24 of article 5 of the Constitution, relating to the salaries of state officers: His argument is that, since the Governor may not receive to his own use any “perquisites of office or other compensation,” he is bound to pay rent for his occupancy of the executive mansion as an official residence. If his occupancy is not a “perquisite of office or other compensation,” he concedes that the state is not entitled to recover. The Standard Dictionary defines a perquisite as “any profit or pecuniary gain from services beyond...
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