State v. Sheldon, Docket No. 31782 (Idaho App. 3/9/2007)
| Decision Date | 09 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31782. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN SHELDON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Dennis E. Goff; Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judges.
Judgment of conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance and misdemeanor concealing a dangerous weapon, affirmed.
Westberg, McCabe & Collins, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
This appeal requires that we decide whether evidence of a large amount of cash found in the defendant's automobile and evidence of his prior drug dealing was admissible in his trial for trafficking in methamphetamine.
John Sheldon was pulled over by a Boise police officer for failing to stop his vehicle as he emerged from an alley, and he subsequently consented to a search of the car for weapons. Officers found several concealed weapons (including brass knuckles and a nylon and fiberglass knife) giving them cause to arrest Sheldon. Searching his vehicle incident to the arrest the police further found nearly $7,000 in cash contained in Sheldon's wallet and in a day planner, and more than a pound of methamphetamine concealed under the backseat. Sheldon was later interviewed by a detective and admitted he knew what methamphetamine was, but claimed "he had no idea there was a pound of methamphetamine in his car." Sheldon further admitted that he had been involved in dealing methamphetamine in the past, but in smaller quantities than that found in his vehicle. He was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine by possession of more than 400 grams, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(4), and concealing a dangerous weapon, I.C. § 18-3302(9). At trial, over Sheldon's objection, the district court admitted an officer's testimony about the quantity of cash found in Sheldon's car and the detective's testimony that Sheldon had admitted to prior methamphetamine dealing. The jury found him guilty of both charges. This appeal followed.
Sheldon contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the cash found in his vehicle and his acknowledgement of past methamphetamine dealing. He argues that both were inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) because they are evidence of his other bad acts used only to show criminal propensity and because the State did not provide notice of its intent to use this evidence at trial as required by that rule. Rule 404(b) disallows the admission of evidence of other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" to prove a person's character in order to show that he acted in conformity with that character.1 Thus, evidence of an accused's other crimes or misconduct may not be introduced just to show criminal propensity. See State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 892, 591 P.2d 130, 139 (1979); State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 736 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Ct. App. 1987). Such evidence may be admissible, however, for a purpose other than that prohibited by the rule. See State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 412, 49 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Ct. App. 2002). In order for such evidence to be introduced, Rule 404(b) requires the prosecution to notify the defendant before trial, or during trial if the lack of prior notice is excused by the trial court, of the general nature of the evidence that the State intends to use.
We first address the evidence of the large amount of cash found in Sheldon's vehicle the night of his arrest. We do not accept Sheldon's characterization of the challenged evidence as "other acts" evidence governed by 404(b). The presence of cash in Sheldon's vehicle, discovered contemporaneously with the methamphetamine, is not evidence of another crime, wrong or act of Sheldon. The cash is circumstantial, physical evidence implicating Sheldon in the crime he was charged with committing. As the State points out, evidence that Sheldon had contemporaneously possessed a scale, baggies, or ledgers (items normally associated with illegal drug transactions) would have been evidence of his knowing possession of the hidden methamphetamine, for which he was charged in this case, and a large amount of cash falls into the same category. The cash was relevant to show that Sheldon had the financial resources to purchase a large quantity of methamphetamine, like that found in his car. The district court did not err in overruling Sheldon's Rule 404(b) objection to this evidence.
If and to the extent that Sheldon argues that the evidence, even if not excluded by Rule 404(b), should have been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403, we again disagree. Rule 403 authorizes trial courts to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, unfair prejudice. Notably, I.R.E. 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 397, 3 P.3d 67, 75 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994). Rather, it protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial because it tends to suggest decision on an improper basis. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244-45, 880 P.2d 771, 774-75 (Ct. App. 1994). In Sheldon's case, we see nothing unfairly prejudicial about the evidence that officers found thousands of dollars in cash in the same vehicle where a large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden. This was significant evidence that Sheldon had access to large amounts of money that would have made it possible for him to acquire significant quantities of drugs. It is probative to show that the methamphetamine in the vehicle was his, and it does not imply a decision on an improper basis.
Sheldon also argues the district court erred in allowing the interrogating officer to testify about Sheldon's statement that he had dealt methamphetamine previously, but in smaller quantities. He asserts the district court erred in not analyzing this statement as 404(b) evidence and that the statement should have been excluded because it was impermissible character evidence and also because the State did not notify Sheldon that the statement would be offered at trial, as required by Rule 404(b).
The district court overruled Sheldon's Rule 404(b) objection, and referred to the evidence as simply an admission by Sheldon. Later in the proceedings, the district court appears to have acknowledged that some Rule 404(b) other acts evidence had been introduced, for the court gave a limiting jury instruction which said that such evidence may have been introduced and should not be considered to prove the defendant's character or to prove that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. The instruction concluded by admonishing that the evidence should only be utilized as it relates to the defendant's intent and knowledge.
We conclude the district court erred in initially failing to recognize the statement as 404(b) evidence. Evidence that Sheldon had previously sold methamphetamine is other crime evidence governed by I.R.E. 404(b).2 See State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 252-53, 76 P.3d 990, 996-97 (Ct. App. 2003) (); State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950, 801 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ct. App. 1990) (); State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 783-84, 735 P.2d 1089, 1094-95 (Ct. App 1987) ().
To be admissible, evidence of prior bad acts must first be relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged. State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 745, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1991); State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 24, 909 P.2d 634, 642 (Ct. App. 1996). When evidence of an individual's other bad acts is proffered for any purpose other than to show bad character or propensity, such as to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident," it is not prohibited. I.R.E. 404(b). Whether evidence is relevant for a permissible purpose is an issue of law subject to our free review. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Second, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Id. The trial court's application of this balancing test is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. Where, as in this case, the record does not reflect that the district court engaged in the requisite balancing analysis concerning 404(b) evidence, we must examine the record independently, without the benefit of the trial judge's reasoning. Garza, 112 Idaho at 784, 735 P.2d at 1095.
Although we agree with Sheldon's assertion that his admission of past drug dealing was subject to Rule 404(b) restrictions, we do not agree with his conclusion that it should have been excluded as impermissible character evidence. Sheldon's theory of defense was that he did not know that the methamphetamine was in his vehicle, just as he had asserted to officers at the time of his arrest. To prove Sheldon's guilt, the State bore the burden to show that he knew of the presence of the methamphetamine in his vehicle and that he had physical control of it, or had the power and intent to control it. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999); State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 360, 900 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1995). Sheldon's admission that ...
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