State v. Shelton
| Decision Date | 17 August 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 39333,39333 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Robert Earl SHELTON, Appellant. |
Fred Floch, Omak, for appellant.
Rodney Young, Pros. Atty., James R. Thomas, Deputy Pros. Atty., Okanogan, for respondent.
*
Appellant Robert Earl Shelton appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to a verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the crime of assault in the first degree. Appellant, while sitting in a tavern in Oroville, was requested to move so that Edwin F. Nelson could secure his pool cue which was kept in a closet, the door to which was immediately behind where appellant was sitting. Appellant did not respond to the request and his chair was moved from in front of the door by a companion. Mr. Nelson secured his cue to play a game of pool with a friend. When about to commence play, appellant brushed against Mr. Nelson stating, 'You can't push me around.' Appellant pushed Mr. Nelson and then pointed a revolver at him and after backing away to a distance of 5 or 6 feet, took aim and shot Mr. Nelson in the shoulder, inflicting painful but not fatal injuries. Appellant testified that he had been drinking heavily for two days at the time of the offense and remembered nothing of the shooting or what led up to it.
Appellant first contends that the evidence of intent to kill was insufficient to warrant submission of that issue to the jury. Appellant expressed ill will toward Mr. Nelson for a fancied wrong, pushed against him, and immediately drew a revolver, took aim for 5 to 10 seconds and shot at close range toward Mr. Nelson's shoulder and neck. Intent is to be gathered from all the circumstances of the case. The evidence was ample to permit the jury to conclude that the assault was made with an intent to kill. State v. Mitchell, 65 Wash.2d 373, 397 P.2d 417 (1964); State v. Hart, 118 Wash. 114, 203 P. 4 (1921); State v. Autio, 78 Wash. 326, 139 P. 31 (1914).
Shortly before the trial, and again after the jury had been selected, appellant informed the trial court that he had asked his court-appointed attorney to resign because 'I couldn't put my confidence in * * * (him).' Appellant gave no reason for his lack of confidence in his counsel; pointed to no area of disagreement between them; and failed to point out wherein counsel had in any way failed or refused to adequately advise or aid him in his defense. Furthermore, the request came after court-appointed counsel had prepared the case for trial. It is inferable that delay may have been appellant's motive in making the request. The determination of whether or not the dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel by an indigent accused person is justified and warrants appointment of another attorney rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lytle, 71 Wash.Dec.2d 81, 426 P.2d 502 (1967). We find no abuse of discretion here.
There is no suggestion that counsel did not discharge his duty toward appellant in an efficient manner. We find that appellant was well represented by counsel who did everything which the best traditions of his profession demanded. Appellant's right to a fair trial was protected in every essential particular. State v. Lei, 59 Wash.2d 1, 365 P.2d 609 (1961); State v. Stockman, 70 Wash.Dec.2d 912, 425 P.2d 898 (1967).
Appellant's defense was that he was so intoxicated that he could not form the requisite criminal intent. The trial court sustained objections of the prosecuting attorney to questions relative to details of episodes of intoxication during the life of appellant. It is contended that this was error. Appellant was permitted to testify that he commenced drinking intoxicants to excess when 12 or 13 years of age and had continued to do so at every opportunity to the time of trial when he was 24 years of age. On some occasions he drank to the extent of passing out and being unable to remember what had transpired. He was further permitted to testify that he commenced drinking on the day before the shooting and continued to do so the next day; that he had nothing to eat on the night before and the day of the offense; and that he was so intoxicated he could remember nothing regarding the shooting. We find no error in refusing to allow recital of further details of drinking sprees over a period of years. Appellant was allowed to develop every fact which had any bearing upon whether or not he was so intoxicated as to be unable to formulate an intent to kill and whether or not he was in an alcoholic blackout at the time of the offense. While evidence of the details of his alcoholic past might be admissible if insanity or mental irresponsibility were issues in the case, such were not alleged as defenses.
Appellant's desire to introduce the excluded testimony of his propensity to drink was apparently an attempt to raise an additional defense to be based on a showing that he was an alcoholic. This same theory was the basis of an instruction proposed to the court by appellant and rejected by it. Our discussion of the proposed instruction applies to both the propriety of its refusal and the exclusion of the proffered testimony.
The requested instruction which the trial court refused to give stated:
You are instructed that a person who is an alcoholic cannot be punished for a crime he commits which is a direct result of his being an alcoholic, therefore, if you find that the defendant is an alcoholic and committed the alleged crime as a direct result of his being an alcoholic, you must find the defendant not guilty. (Proposed Instruction No. 2.)
Appellant cites no authority for his request. It proposes the novel doctrine that one who commits a crime as a result of being an alcoholic cannot be punished. An alcoholic may at different times be in varying degrees of intoxication, and may at times be sober. As a defense to an accusation of crime (in the absence of insanity or mental irresponsibility), the issue is not whether or not the perpetrator is an alcoholic, but whether or not the person is intoxicated to the extent of being unable to form the intent which is an element of the crime charged.
No attempt was made to show that the fact that one is an alcoholic can preclude him from forming a criminal intent. The requested instruction is not consistent with the statute dealing with intoxication as a defense to an accusation of crime, RCW 9.01.114, which reads as follows:
Intoxication no defense. No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such purpose, motive or intent.
The same test should be applied to a defendant who is addicted to the intemperate use of intoxicating liquor to the extent that he may be classified an alcoholic as to another defendant who is not so addicted. The jury was properly instructed, in the terms of the statute, on the proper consideration to be given to intoxication in determining whether or not appellant was guilty of assault in the first degree.
Appellant also contends that making an alcoholic responsible for his acts constitutes cruel punishment which is forbidden by art. 1, § 14 of the Washington State Constitution and amendments 8 and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Wood
...mental state which is an element of the offense." Nor is it a defense to a crime that a defendant is an alcoholic. State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967). An alcoholic may at different times be intoxicated to varying degrees, and may at times be sober. Evidence of intoxicatio......
-
State v. Caliguri
...While there is no direct evidence that death was intended, intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 839, 431 P.2d 201 (1967). Here, intent may be inferred from Caliguri's knowledge, since a trier of fact may infer that a defendant intends the na......
-
State v. White
...Robinson, 75 Wash.2d 230, 234, 450 P.2d 180 (1969); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash.2d 92, 107, 436 P.2d 774 (1968); State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 840, 431 P.2d 201 (1967); and State v. Piche, 71 Wash.2d 583, 430 P.2d 522 (1967), the court concluded on the basis of the appellate record t......
-
State v. Bea, 28540–5–III.
...of the actor's intended objective or purpose, intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 839, 431 P.2d 201 (1967)). A jury may infer criminal intent from a defendant's conduct where it is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probab......
-
Table of Cases
...11.7(2)(e), 11.7(9)(a), 11.7(9)(b), 11.7(9)(d), 18.5 State v. Sengxay, 80 Wn. App. 11, 906 P.2d 368 (1995): 11.7(9)(b) State v. Shelton, 71 Wn.2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967): 23.7 State v. Sims, 171 Wn.2d 436, 256 P.3d 285 (2011): 5.6(6), 11.3(5) State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 290 P.3d 942......
-
§ 23.7 Assistance of Counsel
...and appointment of other counsel at the request of the indigent are within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Shelton, 71 Wn.2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967); State v. Stark, 48 Wn. App. 245, 738 P.2d 684, review denied, 109 Wn.2d 1003 A criminal defendant has no federal constitut......