State v. Sheridan

• Decision Date: 09 October 1903
• Citation: State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903)
• Parties: THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. THOMAS SHERIDAN, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 N.W. 730

121 Iowa 164

THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. THOMAS SHERIDAN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 9, 1903

Appeal from Lyon District Court.--HON. GEO. W. WAKEFIELD, Judge.

INDICTMENT for malicious mischief. Verdict and judgment of guilty, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

E. C Roach and E. Y. Greenleaf for appellant.

C. W Mullan, Attorney General, and C. A. Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

The defendant, an ice dealer, was charged with having maliciously injured or destroyed a quantity of ice belonging to a competitor in business by putting upon it a large quantity of salt. The prosecuting witness claiming that his ice had been maliciously destroyed, and, having been informed that appellant bought a barrel of salt from a local merchant a day or two before that date, filed a preliminary information before a justice of the peace, and caused a warrant to issue for the appellant's arrest. At the same time the prosecuting witness filed an affidavit alleging the purchase of salt by appellant, and stating his belief that said salt was used in perpetrating the act of malicious mischief above mentioned, and that "said salt, or the barrel in which it was contained," was in the possession of appellant at his residence in Rock Rapids. On these allegations he asked for a warrant to search the appellant's residence and seize the described articles if found. A search warrant was thereupon issued, and the officer, in executing it, claimed to have found in the cellar of appellant's residence an empty salt barrel. On the trial in the district court the officer, as a witness for the state, identified the barrel so found, and said article was then offered and admitted in evidence over appellant's objection. The correctness of this ruling is the principal question discussed by counsel. Our state Constitution (article 1, section 8) guarantees the security of the people in their right to be exempt in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 9 of the same article provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Under these provisions we have lately held that the admission of evidence procured by wrongful and forcible examination, by the officers of the state, of the person of one accused of crime, was reversible error. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935. The principle involved was there very thoroughly discussed, and the authorities carefully reviewed, and, so far as the same are applicable here it is unnecessary to again present them. We shall therefore confine our inquiry upon this branch of the case to the point whether the question now before us falls within the scope of the doctrine announced in that decision.

It is conceded by the Attorney General that the search warrant was issued without the authority of law, and that the search and seizure made thereunder were wrongful. It was also shown by the evidence upon the trial, and without dispute, that the search warrant was asked for, procured, and served for the sole "purpose of obtaining testimony" against the appellant. For the purposes of this appeal we may admit it has often been held that the mere fact that evidence has been developed by the wrongful act or trespass of an officer or any other person will not necessarily render it inadmissible but we are confronted by the further fact that the evidence objected to was obtained by a palpable abuse of judicial process. In the Height Case, we said that, while an officer may properly testify to criminating facts discovered by him in the execution of a warrant lawfully issued, yet "a party to a suit can gain nothing by virtue of violence under the pretense of process, nor will a fraudulent or unlawful use of process be sanctioned by the courts. In such cases parties will be restored to the rights and positions they possessed before they were deprived thereof by the fraud, violence, or abuse of legal process, * * *. The search was for the mere purpose of securing evidence by an invasion of the private person of the defendant, and we think there is no consideration...