State v. Shoppers World, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 May 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. A-9930,A-9930 |
| Citation | 380 S.W.2d 107 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. SHOPPERS WORLD, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Sam L. Jones, Jr., Dist. Atty., Corpus Christi, James M. Williamson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, for petitioner.
Oscar Spitz, Corpus Christi, for respondent.
The State of Texas filed this suit to obtain a permanent injunction restraining Shoppers World, Inc., from violating Article 286a, Vernon's Ann.Penal Code, by selling or offering for sale certain merchandise on the consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday. Shoppers World defended on the ground that the sales and offers for sale strictly complied with the emergency purchase exemption contained in Section 4a of that article. The trial court granted the injunction, but its judgment was reversed and the injunction was dissolved by the Court of Civil Appeals, 373 S.W.2d 374.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
The applicable sections of Art. 286a, Vernon's Ann.Penal Code provide:
An agreed statement of facts was submitted to the trial court in accordance with Rule 263, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Only those facts material to our decision will be noted. Respondent's store, located in Corpus Christi, is open for business on both Saturday and Sunday. The store sells and offers for sale one or more of the items enumerated in Art. 286a on the consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday, but on Sunday these items are sold and offered of sale only to those purchasers who will sign a form labeled 'Certificate of Necessity.' The certificate is prepared in the language of Sec. 4a:
'I hereby certify that the following item(s) of personal property are needed by me as an emergency for the welfare (_____) of human (_____) life;
(here follows a space for listing the items purchased)
and that the purchase of each such item is an emergency purchase to protect the welfare (_____) of human (_____) life, and I have so advised Shoppers World, from whom I have purchased such item(s).
________
Signature'
At the check-out stand the purchaser lists the items on the certificate, and the cashier employee of the respondent reads this statement to the purchaser:
'If this purchase is an emergency purchase for the health, welfare or safety of human or animal life, please sign this certificate.'
If the purchaser signs the certificate without hesitancy, the sale is made without further explanation or inquiry. If the purchaser refuses to sign, the sale is not made. If the customer is hesitant about signing, the store manager explains that the store is prohibited by law from selling particular items on the consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday unless the purchaser certifies in writing that the item is needed by the purchaser as an emergency for the welfare, health or safety of human or animal life and the purchase is an emergency purchase to protect the health, welfare or safety of human or animal life. The store manager then questions the purchaser about the existence and nature of the emergency. If after the explanation and inquiry the purchaser remains uncertain about signing the certificate, the item or items are not sold but are returned to the store shelves. These certificates are retained at the respondent's store for inspection.
No evidence other than the agreed statement of facts was heard or introduced in the trial court, yet the trial judge found additional facts which, presumably, entered into the judgment. In brief, he found that the certificates of necessity were used as a device for evading the prohibitions of Art. 286a, and that respondent acted in bad faith in having the purchasers sign the certificates. Based upon such findings, the trial court entered judgment permanently enjoining Shoppers World from selling or offering for sale the items enumerated in Art. 286a on the consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday, but the injunction further provided:
'This injunction does not prevent a sale of any of such enumerated items on the second of two consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday when the purchaser initiates the sale by offering to purchase without a prior offer on the part of the Defendant, Shoppers World, Inc., to sell and the purchaser will certify in writing that a purchase of such items of personal property is needed as an emergency for the welfare, health or safety of human or animal life, which said certification signed by the purchaser is retained by Defendant Shoppers World, Inc., for proper inspection for a period of one year, and such purchase is, in fact, an emergency purchase to protect the health, welfare or safety of human or animal life believed by Defendant Shoppers World, Inc., after inquiry, on reasonable grounds, in the exercise of good faith, to be such emergency purchase.' 1
The Court of Civil Appeals dissolved the injunction on the ground that by including the emphasized portion in the judgment the trial court had added more onerous conditions to the exemption of Sec. 4a than those imposed by the Legislature.
The disposition of this case turns on the proper interpretation of the provision in Sec. 4a which we repeat:
'When a purchaser will certify in writing that a purchase of an item of personal property is needed as an emergency for the welfare, health or safety of human or animal life and such purchase is an emergency purchase to protect the health, welfare or safety of human or animal life, then this Act shall not apply; * * *.'
In Crouch v. Craik, Tex., 369 S.W.2d 311, 315, we stated: 'The power and authority to interpret Articles 286, 286a and 287 (Vernon's Penal Code) rests solely with the courts of this state exercising criminal jurisdiction.' We must confess that the statement is much too broad. It is to be related to the context in which we were writing. The statement was intended to explain our adherence to the rule that courts of equity will take jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of penal laws only in exceptional situations, thus leaving those laws to be interpreted through the criminal trial process whenever possible. The procedure by which this case reaches us does not permit us to relegate the parties to the criminal trial process for interpretation of Art. 286a. Sec. 4 of the Article declares a business operating contrary to its provisions to be a public nuisance, and provides that 'any person may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction for and may obtain an injunction restraining such violation of this Act.' That legislative direction requires the civil courts to interpret Art. 286a. 2
The respondent contends that the provision in clear and unambiguous terms imposes one requirement only-that the purchaser certify in writing (1) that the item is needed as an emergency, and (2) that the purchse is an emergency purchase. The position of respondent thus is that once the purchaser has certified that both conditions exist, the seller is free to complete the sale without regard to the existence of an actual emergency. The premise of this argument is that both clauses of the provision follow the words 'certify in writing that,' and nothing indicates that the clauses should be considered to be making separate, distinct requirements. Alternatively, the respondent argues that if the clause is regarded as ambiguous, the State's interpretation cannot be accepted because that interpretation would render the section unconstitutional.
We hold that the quoted provision is ambiguous and that it must be given the interpretation placed on it by respondent.
The guiding rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent. 53 Tex.Jur.2d 180, Statutes, § 125. When the intent is clear it will be given effect by the courts even to the extent of adding words to the language used by the Legislature. See Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, Tex.Sup., 378 S.W.2d 40. Sometimes, however, legislative intent is elusive and unclear; and in such instances the courts must resort to rules of construction to give meaning to legislative enactments. That is the situation here.
If we could say that the interpretation placed on the quoted language of Sec. 4a by either of the parties was the only reasonable interpretation, we would regard our judicial obligation as at an end and would give the language that meaning. By interpolating the word 'that' between the words 'and' and 'such purchase' in the second clause, the provision could be made to say clearly what respondent contends it now says. By interpolating the word 'when' between the words 'and' and ...
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