State v. Shreves

• Decision Date: 22 January 1891
• Citation: 81 Iowa 615,47 N.W. 899
• Parties: STATE v. SHREVES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

81 Iowa 615

47 N.W. 899

STATE

v.SHREVES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 22, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Adair county; A. W. WILKINSON, Judge.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in the second degree. He was tried and convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment for the term of three years, and he appeals.Grass & Storey and Gow & Hager, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., C. W. Neal, Co. Atty., and Chas. S. Fogg, for the State.

ROTHROCK, J.

The indictment charges that the defendant killed one Louis Miars, and that the act was done under such circumstances as to constitute the crime of murder in the second degree. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The evidence shows without dispute that Miars came to his death by reason of wounds inflicted upon his person by the defendant, with a knife. The defendant was a witness in his own behalf, and he testified that he inflicted the wounds which caused the death of Miars. But it was strenuously contended all through the trial, and counsel for defendant earnestly contend in their argument in this court, that the killing was excusable, on the ground of self-defense. And it is insisted that, under all the evidence in the case, the jury should have found the defendant not guilty. In other words, it is claimed that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. When the state had completed the introduction of the evidence in behalf of the prosecution, a motion was made to dismiss the case, on the ground that there was no evidence authorizing a conviction. The same ground was embodied in the motion for a new trial. We are required, first, to determine whether the court erred in overruling these motions on the grounds stated; and, as they present in effect the same questions, we will consider them together. It appears from the record that the tragedy occurred at the village of Orient, in Adair county, at about 8 o'clock P. M. on the 2d day of June, 1888. Orient is a place of about 150 or 200 inhabitants. Miars was a married man, and resided about a mile and a half from the village. But he had been for some time in business in the village. At one time he kept a meat market, and at the time of the homicide he was engaged in selling fresh fish. Shreves had been engaged in assisting his brother in a hardware store in the village. He quit his employment some time before the year 1888, and went elsewhere. He returned to the village but a few hours before he killed Miars. He arrived there on a train on his way to the home of his father, who resides at Greenfield, and was induced by his brother to stop off and remain until the next day. It appears that both Miars and Shreves were well known to the people of the village and the surrounding neighborhood. A large number of witness testified to the character and reputation of Miars. He was addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor, and was frequently very much intoxicated. When sober, he was of a peaceable and orderly disposition; when drunk, he was quarrelsome, garrulous, and insulting. This trait of his character seems to have been confined to mere quarreling. It does not appear that he had the reputation of being a dangerous man. No witness testified that he was a dangerous character. It is true that it was shown in evidence that at times he carried a revolver and a knife, and that he frequently carried in his pockets metallic knuckles. He had a young unmarried sister, who resided with her father in or near the village, and it appears that he had taken offense at Shreves, because of some report that came to him that Shreves had insulted his sister. He stated to others that he intended to whip Shreves the first time he met him, because Shreves wanted his sister to meet him at a hotel in St. Louis or Kansas City, and register as Mrs. Shreves. Shortly after Shreves arrived in Orient, he called on the young woman and remained a short time, and then went to his brother's store with a brother of Miars. Louis Miars was very much intoxicated on that day and evening; so much so that it was plainly noticeable. All the witnesses concur in this. He was able to walk, but it was in a staggering way. He was in this condition when he approached Shreves on the street, and said he wanted to speak to him. Shreves answered, “Very well,” or words to that effect, and stepped aside to hear what he had to say. The two men walked off together. Only part of their conversation was heard by others. The import of it was that Miars was charging Shreves with having been guilty of some reprehensible conduct, and Shreves was denying it. They continued their walk in the direction of the home of Miars' father, and some of their conversation appeared to convey the idea that they were going there to settle the matter of which Miars was complaining. Miars was insisting on a fight, and Shreves was refusing to fight. After going some distance, they could not be seen distinctly, and only occasional expressions could be heard from them. As one witness expressed it: “Miars seemed to be charging him with something, and he was denying it.” The same witness heard Miars say: “I will whip you, [with an oath,] or, God damn you, you have got to fight.” The next that was heard Miars said: “I will take it back, I will take it back.” Miars was then on the ground, and Shreves was leaning over him. Shreves said to Miars: “What can I do for you. I will do anything in the world for you. I will go up town and see and get some one to keep you.” He started for town and met Dr. Monette, who had heard the conversation above set out, who asked him: “What are you doing down there?” Shreves replied: “That man jumped onto me, and I am afraid I have hurt him. I wish you would go down and see him. I will go up town and get some one, too, or send some one back.” Dr. Monette went down to where Miars was lying, and found him unable to speak, and in a dying condition. He was carried to his father's home, and expired in a very short time. When Miars was found, he had no weapon on his person, and none was found at the place of conflict. He had removed his coat and vest before the fight. These garments and a pint bottle of whisky, nearly full, were found on the ground near where the fight took place. There is no evidence that the defendant received any injury whatever in the fight. His clothing was neither soiled, torn, nor disarranged. Six wounds were found upon the person of Miars. The evidence shows that they were made by the defendant with his knife. One wound was in the back, another on the shoulder-blade, another on the right arm, another just above the left eyebrow, another on the nose, and another on the left side of the breast-bone. All of these wounds except those on the nose and eyebrow were severe cuts. That on the back was 5 inches long, and from 1 to 1 1/2 inches deep. The one on the shoulder-blade was 2 inches deep and 2 inches long. The wound on the arm was a stab not over three-quarters of an inch wide, and something less than an inch deep. The wound near the breastbone was about two inches deep, and was necessarily fatal. It is impracticable to set out in detail all of the minute facts in a case like this in an opinion. The jury were fully warranted in finding the leading facts to be as we have stated them above. In view of the drunken, staggering condition of the deceased, the removal of his coat and vest for a fist-fight, and the six gaping wounds inflicted upon him by the defendant, and taking into account the further fact that the clothing of the defendant was not disarranged, and that he received no injury in the conflict, it would be amazing departure from all judicial precedent for this court to determine that the jury were not warranted in finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The rulings of the court in this respect were correct.

2. Upon the impaneling of the jury to try the case, the defendant demanded the right to 20 peremptory challenges. The claim was denied, to which ruling the defendant excepted, and it is urged that this ruling was erroneous. Sections 4413 and 4414 of the Code provide that, if the offense charged in the indictment is or may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, the state is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges, and the defendant 20, and that the state shall be entitled to the first challenge, and shall challenge one juror, and the defendant shall be entitled to the second challenge, and shall challenge two jurors, and so on alternately until all the challenges are exhausted. These...