State v. Shultz

• Decision Date: 29 June 1916
• Docket Number: 30622
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. JOHN SHULTZ, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

158 N.W. 539

177 Iowa 321

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. JOHN SHULTZ, Appellant

No. 30622

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 29, 1916

Appeal from Poweshiek District Court.--HENRY SILWOLD, Judge.

CONVICTION on indictment charging incest. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Reversed.

Bray Shifflett & Wilkie, for appellant.

George Cosson, Attorney General, John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, and H. G. Lyman, County Attorney, for appellee.

SALINGER J. EVANS, C. J., LADD and GAYNOR, JJ., concur.

OPINION

SALINGER, J.

I.

The serious question in the case arises on the exclusion of testimony on part of witnesses McNalley, Bigler, Ryan, Fiser Walker and Swatchue. The record is substantially alike on all these exclusions. McNalley testified that he knew what the defendant's general moral character was in the vicinity in which he resided up until the time he was arrested, on January 30, 1915. He was then asked to state whether it was good or bad, and answer was excluded, on the objection that the defendant was not entitled to "general reputation except as to characteristics in the case in bar." This is substantially the record as to all the exclusions. The ruling cannot be defended. If we assume a rule which limits evidence of general reputation to characteristics involved in the charge being tried, even then this testimony should have been received. It is manifest that the general moral character of a man has logical relation to the question of whether he is, in reason, likely to be guilty of incest. Evidence that the general moral character is good has a definite place in the law of evidence. In State v. Rodman, 62 Iowa 456 at 459, the defendant introduced evidence tending to show that he had a good character. He asked an instruction applicable to this testimony, to the effect that proof of good character avails only when circumstances are relied upon to establish guilt, and that if they are "in doubt," a presumption is raised that defendant would not have committed the crime. We say that, on the authority of State v. Kinley, 43 Iowa 294, the instruction was properly refused; that it was really unfavorable to defendant; and that:

"Good character avails, whether the evidence be direct or circumstantial. . . . If the circumstances relied upon are 'in doubt,' a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt existing, the jury should acquit without evidence of defendant's good character."

In State v. Birkey, 122 Iowa 102 at 103, there was an instruction that:

"Where good character is shown, it is proper to be considered in determining whether a person bearing such a character would be likely to commit the crime in question, and might be sufficient in a doubtful case to turn the scale in favor of the defendant."

We disapprove the instruction on the authority of State v. Gustafson, 50 Iowa 194, saying that the true rule is:

"That in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, proof of good character constitutes an ingredient to be considered by the jury, without reference to the apparently conclusive or inconclusive character of the other evidence, and it is for the jury to determine what weight such evidence of character shall have with them."

In State v. Beede, 151 Iowa 701 at 703, the defendant was convicted of the crime of procuring intoxicating liquors for one who was in the habit of becoming intoxicated. He complains that he was not permitted to show good character in his defense, and we said:

"Of course, it is always permissible for the accused to show his general good character; but there was no attempt made in this case to do so. The questions asked the witnesses on character were as follows: 'You may state what his (the defendant's) habits are as to intoxicating liquors, industry, etc.' 'You may state what you know of Mr. Beede in regard to being sober, industrious.' Neither of these questions tended to show general good character, nor did they relate to any trait involved in this investigation. Beede was not on trial for being intoxicated or using intoxicating liquors."

We say, in State v. Jones, 145 Iowa 176 at 178, that evidence of good character "tends merely to negative the evidence for the prosecution tending to show defendant's guilt."

In State v. Wolf, 112 Iowa 458, 84 N.W. 536, the court charged:

"If you find from all the evidence, facts and circumstances in the case, that defendants were of good moral character, and were of good reputation for chastity in the community where they resided, before the alleged commission of the offense, then you have a right to consider such fact, if you find it to be a fact, in determining whether the witnesses who have testified to facts tending to criminate them have been mistaken, or have testified falsely or truthfully."

And we say that:

"This instruction cannot be approved upon any theory to which our attention has been directed, and clearly disregarded the rules laid down in the case we have cited, supra. The leading thought expressed therein is that evidence of character can be considered only as affecting the testimony of other witnesses. This is not its purpose, and it cannot be so limited."

In State v. Wolf, at page 464, we said:

"It has been the repeated holding of this and other courts that, while good character is not a complete defense to a criminal charge, it is a defensive circumstance which may be shown for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of guilt arising from circumstantial evidence (State v. Turner, 19 Iowa 144), and that it should be considered by the jury, in connection with all the other evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Donovan, 61 Iowa 278, 16 N.W. 130. It may be considered as tending to show 'that men of such character would not be likely to commit the crime charged.' State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143, 23 N.W. 370. It should be considered 'irrespective of whether the other evidence is conclusive or inconclusive, and it is for the jury to determine what weight such evidence shall have.' State v. Gustafson, 50 Iowa 194; State v. Northrup, 48 Iowa 583; State v. Clemons, 51 Iowa 274, 1 N.W. 546."

II. It was a theory of the defense that the prosecution was the creature of the defendant's landlord, who was inspired by very great intimacy with the wife of the defendant, and many attempts were made to show more or less remotely that testimony might be colored by this intimacy, and by resulting ill feeling between husband and wife and father and children. One of the assignments is that the court erred in refusing to permit the witnesses Imo Shultz, Maude Shultz and John Shultz to answer questions asked on behalf of the defendant, tending to show cause for the dispute between defendant and his wife immediately before she caused his arrest, and tending to show the motive on part of the defendant's wife, or others, for the prosecution. We think the defense was unduly restricted by the rulings excluding testimony along these lines, and to that extent it was prevented from presenting one theory of its defense to the jury.

III. In passing upon a claim that there was misconduct in argument we do not proceed to decision by determining how either of the members of this court might have presented the case to a jury, but limit ourselves to...