State v. Shutts

• Decision Date: 24 February 1903
• Parties: STATE v. SHUTTS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

54 A. 235

69 N.J.L. 206

STATE

v. SHUTTS.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 24, 1903.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of quarter sessions, Monmouth county.

Frank Shutts was convicted of larceny, and brings error. Reversed.

Argued before GUMMERE, C. J., and VAN SYCKEL, GARRISON, and GARRETSON, JJ.

Wesley B. Stout, for plaintiff in error.

John E. Foster, for defendant in error.

GARRETSON, J. This case is before the court upon writ of error, and it seems to be assumed by the plaintiff in error that it is so under section 136 of the criminal procedure act of 1898 (P. L. 1898, p. 915), which provides that "the entire record of the proceedings had upon the trial of any criminal cause may be returned by the plaintiff in error therein with the writ of error," etc.; but an examination of the printed book fails to disclose any return by the judge other than the ordinary and formal return to the writ of error.

The proper practice upon a return made in accordance with section 136 is indicated by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of State v. Young (N.J.Err. & App.) 51 Atl. 940.

By section 137 of the same act it is provided that, "where a plaintiff in error shall elect to take up the entire record with his writ of error as herein provided, he shall specify the causes in the record relied upon for relief or reversal and shall not be confined to his bill of exceptions or required to assign error thereon and he shall serve a copy of the causes so relied upon for relief or reversal" upon the representative of the state within a specified time. And the case of State v. Young, supra, holds: "The clear implication is that the review is to be confined to matters of which the state is apprised, either by assignment of error or specification of causes." In the present case no specification of causes of reversal has been served.

It is further provided by section 140 of the criminal procedure act that "it shall be lawful to take a general exception to the charge of the court to the jury without specifying any particular ground or grounds for such exception and without specifying what portions of said charge are excepted to and it shall be the duty of the judge to settle a bill of such exception and to sign and seal the same to the end that the same may be returned with the writ of error to the court having cognizance thereof." And section 141 provides: "it shall be lawful where such general exception has been taken to assign any error or errors of law upon any portion of the charge so excepted to." The case before us does not disclose any general exception to the charge upon which the judge settled a bill of exception or signed and sealed the same.

Under the criminal procedure act (Gen. St. p. 1154, § 170 [Laws 1894, p. 240]) the return to the writ is to be of the indictment, with all things touching the same, including the entire proceedings had upon the trial, and is so certified by the trial court; and the court, on hearing, was required by this statute to look at the entire record of the proceedings, including the testimony and the weight thereof, and was authorized to reverse the judgment and grant a new trial where it appeared from the entire record of the proceedings that the plaintiff in error sustained manifest wrong or injury. Roesel v. State, 62 N.J.Law, 240, 41 Atl. 408.

The criminal procedure act of 1898, in section 136, supra, omits the words "or upon the evidence adduced upon the trial," so that since that act the court upon review does not pass upon the weight of the evidence, and only upon its admission or rejection, or upon the direction of the judge as to its legality, and that only when brought before the reviewing court in the manner indicated above.

We are therefore confined in this case to a consideration of the record of the judgment, and to such bills of exception as were duly signed and sealed at the trial.

There were 13 assignments of error, as follows: (1) Because the judgment was given for the state, and against the said Frank Shutts, when by law of the land the judgment aforesaid should have been given to the said Frank Shutts. (2) Because the trial judge refused to quash the indictment. (3) Because the said court admitted the testimony against said defendant, which was illegal and contrary to law. (4) Because the said court refused to admit testimony on the part of the defendant, which in law he should have done. (5) Because the testimony was such that it showed that the defendant was not guilty, and the verdict should have been accordingly. (6) Because the judge charged the jury contrary to law. (7) Because the judge charged the jury contrary to the proof in the case. (8) Because the court refused to charge the jury as requested. (9) Because the jury found the defendant guilty of grand larceny, to wit: "The defendant is guilty of grand larceny as he stands charged in the indictment." (10) Because the said indictment is not signed by the foreman of the grand jury. (11) Because the verdict or finding is against the clear weight of evidence. (12) Because the verdict or finding is contrary to the evidence and the law. (13) Because, for divers other reasons, the said judgment is erroneous and contrary to law.

The fifth and eleventh assignments of error are upon the findings of the" evidence, and cannot be considered. The eighth is not founded on any request to charge with respect to any matter whatever. The tenth exception is not well taken; the indictment need not be signed by the foreman of the grand jury. State v. Magrath, 44 N.J.Law, 227. The sixth, seventh, and twelfth have no exceptions or specifications to sustain them, and are not in themselves specifications of causes for reversal. The third and fourth are to the admission and rejection of testimony, and an examination of all the exceptions to such admission and rejection fails to disclose any error in the rulings of the trial court. The first, second, ninth, and thirteenth exceptions are such as will raise any questions appearing on the face of the indictment and the record of the judgment.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for that he "seven bags of chickens of the value of twenty dollars of the goods and chattels of J. A. S. then and there being found unlawfully did steal, take and carry away." The indictment also contained a count for receiving stolen goods. The verdict of the jury was "that they find the defendant guilty of grand larceny as he stands charged in the indictment." The judgment was "that the defendant be confined in the state's prison at hard labor for the term of two years."

Section 158 of the crimes act (P. L. 1898, p. 837) provides: "Any person who shall steal of the money or personal goods and chattels of another * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if the price or value of the article, property or thing be under twenty dollars; and if the...