State v. Sigg

• Decision Date: 15 October 1892
• Citation: 53 N.W. 261,86 Iowa 746
• Parties: STATE v. SIGG.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

86 Iowa 746

53 N.W. 261

STATE

v.SIGG.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 15, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Clayton county; W. A. HOYT, Judge.

Indictment for rape. Verdict and judgment for the state, and the defendant appealed.J. Larkin, for appellant.

D. D. Murphy, Co. Atty., Thos. A. Cheshire, and John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GRANGER, J.

1. The indictment charges the defendant with having committed a rape on the person of one Fredericka Putzin on or about the 25th day of May, 1891. The conviction was for an assault with intent to commit a rape. It is urged that the testimony is not sufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence of the prosecuting witness shows substantially the following facts: That in May, 1891, she resided in Garnavillo, Clayton county, Iowa, and worked in the family of William Kregel; that on the 24th day of May, 1891, she came with her brother from her sister's at Elkport, and was left by her brother about one half mile from Kregel's, at about half past 8 o'clock in the evening; that in going to Kregel's she passed through the village of Garnavillo, and saw defendant at the hotel; that she was going to the post office to mail a letter, but did not mail it, because she saw the defendant was following her, and she was afraid, because he had followed her before; that she turned at Schunacker's, and went directly home; that defendant followed her from where she saw him nearly to the post office; that she saw nothing of him, after she left him near the post office, till she reached Kregel's gate, where she found him; and that he seized her, threw her to the ground, tore open her drawers, during which time she, to use her own language, “was in fits.” We understand this to mean that she fainted. The testimony of the defendant shows substantially the following facts: That on the Friday evening before Pentecost he was sitting in front of a barber shop in Garnavillo, with one Hill, when the prosecuting witness came along, who was then a stranger to him, and said to him, “Good evening,” and that he answered, “Good evening.” That he again saw her about 15 or 20 minutes after, having followed her, and asked her where she was going, to which she answered that she thought she was going home. He then inquired “what was the matter” of his going with her, and she said, “Nothing at all.” That they then went together to Kregel's gate, and he told her to take the mail and a pail she had in, and then come out again, and she said, “No, if she took them in she would have to stay;” and he then said, “We will take them with us.” That they passed the house, turned a corner, and went to near Kregel's pig pen, near the next corner, and that he then solicited and had intercourse with her, by her consent, and without any resistance on her part. He also testified that he followed her with a view of having intercourse with her if possible, because he thought she was a sporting woman. That after she passed the post office he inquired of those with him who she was, and they did not know. He then went to the hotel, and inquired, and she was not known there, and he then followed and found her, with the results as above stated.

There is much in the record to both strengthen and impair these statements by each of them, and they are only stated to indicate, in a general way, the claims of the parties. It is said in argument that the evidence of the assault was “manufactured for the purpose of shielding the prosecutrix from the shame of having voluntarily surrendered her virtue.” We do not see how such a conclusion should result from the record, any more than that the defendant, who confesses himself a stranger to virtue, should manufacture the evidence of a voluntary surrender by her to shield himself from the consequences of the crime charged. The motive with him is certainly as great as it is with her, and the statement, as an argument, is in the nature of a two-edged sword, which is to be handled with exceeding care.

From the peculiar condition of the testimony, the jury was forced to the conclusion, upon the testimony of the prosecuting witness, with the corroborating facts, to find that the defendant made the assault with which he stands convicted; or to the conclusion from the testimony of the defendant, with his corroborating facts, that the prosecuting witness is an abandoned prostitute. No other solution of the case is possible, and none other is claimed.

The confession of the defendant to the actual intercourse, which, if the offense was committed as charged, would furnish the corroboration to sustain the conviction, makes it necessary to maintain his innocence of the assault upon the ruins of her character. The attempt at intercourse by him is admitted. Whether the attempt was in the nature of an assault, or by mere solicitation, is the important question. The jury, in the light of the entire evidence, believed that he made the assault. We cannot notice all, but we will some, of the particular facts commented upon, as against the probabilities in support of the verdict. There was an attempt to impeach the moral character of the prosecuting witness, and it is urged that there was no effort by the state to support it. With the presumption in her favor, it would hardly seem that such an effort was necessary. The testimony against her character was slight, and confined to talk growing out of the affair with the defendant. That affair, because of a dispute as to the facts, had given rise to both favorable and unfavorable comments as to her character. “Some claimed it was good and others it was bad.” Nothing more serious appears in the evidence. The testimony of the prosecuting witness is, in some particulars, quite contradictory, and importance is attached to this fact. She is a German...