State v. Sigler

• Decision Date: 18 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-138,83-138
• Citation: 210 Mont. 248,41 St.Rep. 1039,688 P.2d 749
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Russell SIGLER, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 749

688 P.2d 749

210 Mont. 248

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Russell SIGLER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 83-138.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted April 16, 1984.

Decided June 4, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1984.

Carl Englund argued, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Kim Kradolfer argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Robert L. Deschamps, III, County Atty., Missoula, Robert J. Sullivan argued, Deputy County Atty., Missoula, for plaintiff and respondent.

SHEEHY, Justice.

William Russell Sigler appeals from a judgment of conviction in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, of the deliberate homicide of 19-month-old Paul T. Wilkinson.

The issues we treat in this opinion are: (1) the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts; (2) the admissibility of an inflammatory photograph; and (3) whether the instructions defining deliberate homicide were in error.

On February 23, 1982, 19-month-old Paul T. Wilkinson was found dead in the East Missoula trailer occupied by his mother, Kathleen Rachel Wilkinson and her male friend, the appellant William Russell Sigler.

Missoula County authorities had responded to a late afternoon call that a child in the residence had stopped breathing. When found, the child was naked and his stomach was noticeably distended and hard. The child was pronounced dead by Missoula County deputy coroner.

An autopsy was performed on the child and the examining pathologist found that the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the abdomen which perforated the small bowel in two places, causing acute inflammation of the abdomen, peritonitis and eventual death. The pathologist characterized the force causing the death as severe, and estimated that the injury to the child which resulted in the death occurred within 24 hours before his death and that most likely the cause of injury was a blow by a fist or a foot. He rejected any accidental fall as a cause because the force would not be sufficient and because he found a number of other injuries of varying ages on the body of the child. The other injuries found during the autopsy included hemorrhage around the adrenal glands; an old untreated fracture of the right wrist; a contusion surrounding the left testis; a hematoma to the head; and numerous other abrasions, contusions, and scars on the head, face, abdomen, hands, back and legs. At least one of the scars could be attributed to a cigarette burn. Three additional medical doctors concurred with the pathologist's opinion that the death could not have been caused accidentally.

Evidence was introduced at trial of the past history of the child's care by his mother and Sigler. On the evening before the death, neighbors Donna Collins and Larry Strange had been in the trailer and were told the child was quite ill and vomiting that evening. Ms. Collins strongly advised that the child be taken to the doctor immediately.

Strange testified that he visited the trailer almost every day, that he usually observed the child to be sitting in his highchair or his potty chair and that the child would get quite tense when Sigler approached him. Strange saw Sigler give the child hard spankings, and once saw him pick the child up by the hand while he was being spanked. He stated that the child had been spanked for merely crying. He had seen cigarette burns on the child's hand and had seen a bruise underneath his left eye ten days to two weeks prior to the death. He saw Sigler once "whop" the child on the forehead when he would not eat. He heard the child vomiting about every 20 minutes to a half hour from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the evening before the death.

Tim Keatron, the 16-year-old son of Donna Collins testified he was in the trailer home about three to four times a week. He had seen Sigler pick the child up by his arm and spank him and testified that the defendant hit the child hard for the child's size. Two days before the death, he had seen Sigler slap the child on the face so hard that it caused his head to nearly touch his shoulder and blood to come from his nose. The reason for that discipline was that the child would not eat his cereal. Keatron also had seen the defendant kick the child during the same period.

The mother testified that she had surrendered the discipline of the child to Sigler. None of the witnesses who testified saw the child's mother discipline the child in the manner exhibited by Sigler.

The defendant did not testify, but he had made statements to law officers during the early investigation of the incident. In the statements, he hypothesized that the child had been hurt by falling on a footlocker or on a large plastic dump truck. He further told the officers that on the morning of the death, the child appeared to be feeling better, that he had been fed, and that he was blabbering and talking to himself up to ten minutes before he was found not to be breathing. The medical witnesses discounted the possibility that this last testimony was correct.

The child's mother, Kathleen Wilkinson, a codefendant in the original action had entered into a plea bargain with the State in connection with her testimony. She testified that the child was healthy until the day before the death. She had gone to the trailer of Donna Collins at about 3:30 p.m., and at about 5:30 p.m. Sigler had appeared and ordered her to return to the home. She was told by Sigler that the child had fallen out of bed. She examined the child, and found him acting sluggish and tired. The child vomited during the evening and refused to eat. She denied ever striking the child in the abdomen or face hard enough to leave a bruise.

The jury found Sigler guilty of deliberate homicide. This appeal ensued.

I.

Sigler attacks the testimony of witnesses relating to other crimes, wrongs or acts by him toward the child on the grounds that the elements required in State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957, and State v. Jensen (1969), 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631 were not met; that the acts of Sigler as testified to by the witnesses indicated only that Sigler spanked the child, slapped his hands, or flipped the child's head with his finger, none of which would have caused his death, and so are dissimilar to the acts which brought about the death of the child; and that the acts were no more than normal disciplinary procedures and were not "unusual and distinctive" so as to qualify for wrongful acts or crimes under State v. Hansen (Mont.1980), 608 P.2d 1083, 37 St.Rep. 657.

The State replies that the evidence meets the guidelines imposed in Just, supra; that the evidence of prior acts of discipline are a part of the entire corpus delicti of the charged offense, citing State v. Riley (Mont.1982), 649 P.2d 1273, 39 St.Rep. 1491; and that when a battered child is the victim, the pattern of conduct exhibited by the defendant-caretaker toward the child victim is within the scope of the issues before the court. State v. Tanner (Utah 1983), 675 P.2d 539.

The contention that the acts of discipline reported by the neighbor witnesses used by Sigler on the child are dissimilar to the kind of force required to bring about the child's death is not supportable. The mother testified that Sigler was the sole disciplinarian of the child. Under the evidence, his response to any perceived need for disciplining the child was always intemperate, and slipped into gear on the slightest provocation. His treatment of a 19-month-old infant was brutal, heedless and unfeeling. We cannot agree that his treatment constituted "normal" discipline.

In Just, we set out a four-element test to determine the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts in criminal prosecutions. They are (1) similarity of crimes or acts; (2) nearness in time; (3) tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or system; and, (4) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant.

The testimony of the witnesses here meets the Just elements in each particular, and in addition, meets our statement in State v. Brubaker (1979), 184 Mont. 294, 307, 602 P.2d 974, 981, relating to evidence of other crimes or acts:

"For evidence of unrelated crimes to be admissible, as an exception to the general rule, it must appear that the evidence of the other crimes tends to establish a common scheme, plan, system, design or course of conduct similar to or closely connected with the one charged and not too remote; and the evidence must tend to establish crimes so related that proof of one tends to establish the other. Within those words must be found the paste and cover for the admissibility of the unrelated acts ..."

The District Court here had a situation where only circumstantial evidence could bring out the case against the defendant. There were many reasons for a jury to distrust the defendant's statement of the incident. We stated in Brubaker, that evidence of other crimes or acts should not be admitted if it leads the jury to surmise that the defendant was probably guilty of the offense. But when evidence of unrelated acts tends toward the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged with moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, it is certainly admissible. Brubaker, supra. In Tanner, supra, the Utah court pointed out that the only available link between the specific nature of the child's injuries and the caretaker may be the evidence of prior abusive conduct by the caretaker.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is an exception to the general rule that evidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Rule 404, M.R.Evid. A trait of character is to be distinguished from habit. "A habit is a person's regular response to a repeated specific situation." Rule 406, M.P.Evid. Habit or routine practice...