State v. Sigmon

• Decision Date: 16 December 1925
• Docket Number: 484.
• Parties: STATE v. SIGMON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

130 S.E. 854

190 N.C. 684

STATE v. SIGMON.

No. 484.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 16, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Catawba County; Shaw, Judge.

Loy Sigmon was convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor, and he appeals. No error.

Probative force of facts on charge of unlawful transporting of intoxicating liquor held for jury.

The defendant was tried on "a true bill" found by the grand jury, which was sent them by the solicitor of the district, Hon. R. L. Huffman, containing 8 counts. The only count that need be considered is the fourth, as follows "The jurors of the state, upon their oath, do present that Loy Sigmon, late of the county aforesaid, on the 12th day of June, 1925, with force and arms, at and in the county aforesaid, unlawfully and willfully did transport intoxicating liquors, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state."

The state offered the following evidence:

Tom Gabriel testified:

"I am chief of the police of the town of Newton. On Friday night, June 12th, in company with Mr. Curlee, jailer, we went over in the west edge of town, near Albert Little's place on the sand-clay road leading into Newton from Saint Paul's church, and just off the sand-clay road on a road that leads into Little's house we found the car belonging to this defendant. I know him, his name is Loy Sigmon. His car was just off the main sand-clay road. By the side of car were three jugs--gallon jugs--all empty and with no odor about them at all. Near the jugs was a funnel that smelled like it had had whisky run through it. The cap of the defendant was hanging on the tail light of car. Defendant was not there. Lights were on car. The rear of car had nothing in it--it was a Ford roadster--though there was a smell like whisky in the rear of car. There was nothing else in car. After we had been there for few moments, defendant called to us to turn on lights, and he would come out. This we did, and he came to the car. We arrested him, and took him to town. He gave bond, and in a few minutes we went back to place and searched for whisky. We found none. Shortly after we got there, car passed and stopped up the road toward the church, and then car went on. There was no actual whisky found in car, nor was there any; just the odors that I have told you about. Car that stopped up the road turned up there somewhere, and then went toward Newton. It was not Sigmon's car that went up the road."

W. C. Curlee testified:

"I am jailer for Catawba county; live in Newton. On the night Mr. Gabriel testified about he and I went out from Newton on the Saint Paul road, and just off the road on road leading into home of Albert Little, a negro, we saw Ford roadster parked, with lights burning. It was about 9 o'clock in the nighttime. There was a cap hanging over the rear light on bracket that light is fastened to; front lights shining up the road toward Little's house. There was three empty jugs sitting in the road off from the car. There was nothing in the jugs, and nothing had been in them so far as any smell was concerned--no liquor. There was a funnel lying near the jugs that smelled like it had had whisky run through it. We searched the car, but there was nothing in it at all. We raised the cooter shell or back of the Ford, and it smelled like whisky had been in there, that is, there was an odor like whisky, but there was no whisky in it at all. This cooter shell is in back of car and over the exhaust of motor and drive shaft. It was a wooden floor with open joints that you can see through. We found no whisky. In few moments the defendant--I know him, his name is Loy Sigmon--called to us to turn on our lights so that he could get out, and we did, and he came up to where we were; we arrested him and brought him to town. Just as we went up, and while there, I heard some one run down through the field. After we brought Sigmon to town and he gave bond we went back to search for whisky, but we found nothing--no cans or anything. While there, we heard car go up sand-clay road towards the church, stop, and turn around and go back to town. That is all I know. It was not the Sigmon car; no sir."

The defendant introduced no evidence, and, at the close of the state's evidence, moved for judgment as of nonsuit.

The jury rendered a verdict of "guilty of transporting intoxicating liquors." Judgment was rendered, exceptions and assignments of error were duly made by defendant, and appeal taken to the Supreme Court.

Wilson Warlick, of Newton, for appellant.

Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARKSON J.

C. S. § 4643, in part is as follows:

"When on the trial of any criminal action in the superior court, or in any criminal court, the state has produced its evidence and rested its case, the defendant may move to dismiss the action or for judgment of nonsuit. If the motion is allowed, judgment shall be entered accordingly; and such judgment shall have the force and effect of a verdict of 'not guilty' as to such defendant. If the motion is refused, the defendant may except; and if the defendant introduces no evidence, the case shall be submitted to the jury as in other cases, and the defendant shall have the benefit of his exception on appeal to the Supreme Court." Mason Act.

Defendant introduced no evidence.

"The motion we are now considering was made under C. S. § 4643, a statute which serves, and was intended to serve, the same purpose in criminal prosecutions as is accomplished by C. S. § 567, in civil actions." State v. Fulcher, 184 N.C. 665, 113 S.E. 769.

In State v. Rountree, 181 N.C. at page 537, 106 S.E. 669, 671, it was said:

"Considering the testimony in its most favorable light to the state, the accepted position on a motion of this kind, we think his honor properly submitted the case to the jury. State v. Oakley, 176 N.C. 755 ; State v. Carlson, 171 N.C. 818, . The court's inquiry upon such a motion is directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to support or warrant a verdict (State v. Hart, 116 N.C. 976 ), and not to its weight or to the credibility of the witnesses (State v. Utley, 126 N.C. 997 )."

In State v. Palmore, 189 N.C. at page 541, 127 S.E. 599, 600, it is held:

"In State v. Starling, 51 N.C. 367, Pearson, C.J., approves the charge of Shepherd, J., in the court below: 'Reasonable doubt, in the humanity of our law, is exercised for a prisoner's sake, that he may be acquitted if his case will allow it. It is never applied for his condemnation.' Speas v. Bank, 188 N.C. 528 . In the interest of humanity, except in certain cases changed by statute, the accused is entitled to an instruction that the prosecution must prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In material or civil matters, ordinarily the rule is different--by preponderance or greater weight of the evidence."

In State v. Schoolfield, 184 N.C. at page 723, 114 S.E. 466, reasonable doubt is defined:

"A reasonable doubt is not a vain, imaginary, or fanciful doubt, but it is a sane, rational doubt. When it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be 'fully satisfied' (State v. Sears, 61 N.C. 146), or 'entirely convinced' (State v. Parker, 61 N.C. 473), or 'satisfied to a moral certainty' ( State v. Wilcox, 132 N.C. 1137 ), of the truth of the charge (State v. Charles, 161 N.C. 287 ). If after considering, comparing, and weighing all the evidence the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say they have an abiding faith, to a moral certainty, in the defendant's guilt, then they have a reasonable doubt; otherwise not. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 730; 12 Cyc. 625; 16 C.J. 988; 4 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p. 155."

In State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506, 130 S.E. 308, it is said:

"We suggest, in addition to the definitions heretofore approved, for its practical terms, the following: 'A reasonable doubt, as that term is employed in the administration of criminal law, is an honest, substantial misgiving, generated by the insufficiency of the proof; an insufficiency which fails to convince your judgment and conscience, and satisfy your reason as to the guilt of the accused.' It is not 'a doubt suggested by the ingenuity of counsel, or by your own ingenuity, not legitimately warranted by the testimony, or one born of a merciful inclination or disposition to permit the defendant to escape the penalty of the law, or one prompted by sympathy for him or those connected with him.' Jackson, J., in U.S. v. Harper (C. C.) 33 F. 471."

The charge of the court below is not in the record.

"In Indemnity Co. v. Tanning Co., 187 N.C. p. 196 , it was said: 'The presumption of law from the record is that the court below charged the law correctly bearing on the evidence as testified to by the witness at the trial.' " In re Westfeldt, 188 N.C. 705, 125 S.E. 531.

From the record it is presumed that the court below charged fully as to reasonable doubt, and gave defendant the full benefit of the definition as to what was the law in regard to reasonable doubt.

In State v. McAllister, 187 N.C. at page 404, 121 S.E. 739, 741, we quoted from Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 43 S.Ct. 504, 67 L.Ed. 894, 27 A. L. R. 1306, opinion by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who said:

"Some of the contentions ascribe a technical meaning to the words 'transportation' and 'importation.' We think they are to be taken in their ordinary sense, for it better comports with the object to be attained. In that sense transportation comprehends any real carrying about or from one place to another. It is not

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