State v. Simmons
| Decision Date | 16 October 1981 |
| Citation | 435 A.2d 1090 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Randall SIMMONS. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Charles K. Leadbetter, Linda Crawford, Anita St. Onge (orally), Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.
Steven C. Peterson (orally), Camden, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.
Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Lincoln County, Randall Simmons was convicted of manslaughter, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203. On appeal, Simmons questions the admission at trial of oral and written statements he made to police and the use at a pretrial hearing of an oral statement which the State failed to reveal to his defense counsel. We affirm the conviction.
The victim, Michael Simmons, and the defendant had been friends. 1 A few days prior to his death, Michael Simmons had made advances to the defendant's girlfriend, had convinced her to accompany him in his automobile, and had compelled her to kiss him before he would agree to take her home. The defendant's girlfriend told the defendant of her encounter with the victim.
On September 26, 1980, the defendant met the victim at the home of Robin Johnson, the victim's girlfriend in Waldoboro. The defendant arrived at the Johnson residence accompanied by Raymond Quimby and Kevin Brochu. Quimby was driving. The defendant got out of Quimby's car and was met by Michael Simmons who came out of the Johnson residence. Michael Simmons took a shirt belonging to the defendant from his car. An argument ensued. Michael Simmons then either began to hand the shirt to the defendant, or began to swing at him. Quimby and Brochu testified that the victim had an object in his hand. 2 The defendant then struck the victim on the side of the head. The blow knocked the victim to the ground where he landed on his face. The defendant then kicked or "stomped" the victim between two and seven times. Quimby and Brochu pulled the defendant away from the victim and the three men drove off in Quimby's car. The victim died two days later as a result of the injuries inflicted by the defendant.
The defendant on appeal claims that the Court erred in admitting oral statements he made to police officers following the incident, on the grounds that he was not informed that the statements he made could and would be used against him in a court of law. These statements were made shortly after the incident to Chief Judkins of the Waldoboro Police Department under circumstances which the trial judge assumed to be custodial interrogation. Judkins testified that he administered a Miranda 3 warning from memory in his police cruiser in the presence of Conrad McNaughton of the Maine State Police. He could not recall, however, whether he had specifically advised the defendant that anything he said could or would be used against him in a court of law. McNaughton testified that Judkins had, in fact, advised the defendant that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law. McNaughton testified he specifically remembered that Judkins advised him of that right as he was impressed at the time by Judkins' ability to recite Miranda warnings from memory.
In a pretrial hearing, the Court was persuaded by McNaughton's testimony that Chief Judkins initially gave the defendant a complete Miranda warning. Even though the State's burden was less, 4 the justice noted that he was persuaded "beyond a reasonable doubt." That finding must be sustained because the record furnishes "rational support for the conclusions he reached." State v. Stone, Me., 397 A.2d 989, 995 (1979), State v. Collins, Me., 297 A.2d 620, 625 (1972).
The defendant also claims that the admission at trial of a written statement signed by him was error as it was not made voluntarily. At approximately 10:40 p. m., on the day of the incident Chief Judkins and Detective Rexford Kelley of the Maine State Police arrived at the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office where the defendant had been taken after his arrest. Kelley carefully advised the defendant in accordance with Miranda, and he waived his rights. Subsequent questioning lasted until approximately 12:30 a. m. The defendant was returned to his cell and Kelley's notes of the interview were typed into a statement for the defendant to sign. At approximately 2:15 a. m. the defendant was brought back out of his cell. Kelley again read to the defendant the Miranda warnings. The defendant filled out the heading of the statement. Thereafter, Kelley read the statement page by page to the defendant who made some minor changes and signed each page. The defendant signed the last page at approximately 2:45 a. m.
After a pretrial hearing, the Court determined "beyond a reasonable doubt that all statements both written and oral and all waivers of Miranda rights both written and oral were indeed intelligently and knowingly and voluntarily made." The Court further determined that "I don't find that there is any influence whatsoever in the lateness of the hour in this case." The defendant argues, however, that the totality of the circumstances surrounding his written statement were such as to compel a finding that the statements were not made voluntarily. Even if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement might have permitted the trial court to entertain a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the written statement, we cannot say that the trial court was compelled to entertain such a doubt.
--- A.2d at ----. (Slip op. at 12-13.)
While the lateness of the hour might make proof of voluntariness more difficult, ample evidence provided rational support for the finding of the Superior Court justice. The police carefully advised the defendant and the defendant acknowledged his understanding of his rights. The defendant was not intoxicated but appeared coherent, responsive and cooperative. No threatening, coercion or intimidation occurred. After the statement had been typed, Kelley again read the defendant the Miranda warning and the defendant signed the waiver form. As Kelley read the statement the defendant followed along nodding his head in agreement and making minor changes which both he and Kelley initialed. In light of this testimony, we find no merit to the appellant's argument that the statement was not voluntarily made.
The final issue the appellant raises on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Ledger
...the letter by May 27, 1980, less than two weeks after the homicide, and trial did not commence until February 1981. Cf. State v. Simmons, Me., 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1981). We must thus determine whether within a "reasonable time" after the State acquired the letter, it became subject to a du......
-
State v. Coombs
...court's factual findings regarding voluntariness will be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary inference. See State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.1981). In my opinion, the totality of the circumstances, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, compels a reaso......
-
State v. Reilly
...404, 409-11 (1982); State v. Terrio, Me., 442 A.2d 537, 543 (1982); State v. Collin, Me., 441 A.2d 693, 696-97 (1982); State v. Simmons, Me., 435 A.2d 1090, 1093-94 (1981); State v. Connor, Me., 434 A.2d 509, 511-12 (1981); State v. Gaudette, Me., 431 A.2d 31, 32-34 (1981); State v. Vigue, ......
-
State v. Knights
...statements or confessions, the error would be to the defendant's benefit and, thus, would gain him nothing. See State v. Simmons, 435 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Me.1981); State v. Stone, 397 A.2d 989, 995 (Me.1979). In final analysis on this appeal, we must determine whether, from the totality of the......