State v. Simpson

• Citation: 92 A. 898,113 Me. 27
• Parties: STATE v. SIMPSON.
• Decision Date: 03 February 1915
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

92 A. 898

113 Me. 27

STATE

v. SIMPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 3, 1915.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Hancock County, at Law.

Ambrose Simpson was found guilty of being a common seller of intoxicating liquors, and he brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled, and judgment directed on the verdict.

Argued before SPEAR, CORNISH, BIRD, and HANSON, JJ.; KING, J., ruled.

Herbert L. Graham, Co. Atty., of Bar Harbor, for the State.

D. E. Hurley, of Ellsworth, for defendant.

CORNISH, J. The respondent was indicted as a common seller of intoxicating liquors, under R. S. c. 29, § 42. After the state had introduced all its evidence, the respondent requested the presiding justice to direct a verdict in his favor on the ground of insufficient evidence. The presiding justice refused to direct a verdict, and exceptions were taken by the respondent to this ruling. The respondent introduced no evidence, the case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict of guilty was rendered. The respondent then filed a motion before the presiding justice to set aside the verdict as against the law and the evidence. The presiding justice overruled this motion, and the respondent alleged exceptions to this ruling.

As a matter of practice, and independent of the merits, both exceptions must be overruled. The respondent had the legal right to except to the refusal of the presiding justice to direct a verdict in his favor. When the evidence in support of an indictment is so slight that a verdict based upon it could not be allowed to stand, it is the duty of the presiding justice to direct a verdict in the respondent's favor. State v. Cady, 82 Me. 426, 19 Atl. 908. Had the respondent stood upon his legal rights in prosecuting that exception, he could have brought the case to the law court, and obtained its decision and opinion as to the sufficiency of the evidence. But subsequently the respondent abandoned that remedy and that course of procedure, and sought the decision and opinion of the presiding justice upon precisely the same question. He filed a motion asking the presiding justice to set aside the verdict. The only ground on which the verdict could be set aside was that the evidence was insufficient to support it, which was the precise point raised in the first request. If the evidence was sufficient, the direction of a verdict had been properly refused. If the evidence was insufficient, the verdict should have been ordered. It follows, therefore, that exactly the same question was presented to the determination of the presiding justice by the motion, which would have been presented to the law court, on the first exception, and, having failed on the motion, the respondent cannot now be allowed to revive his exceptions and seek another tribunal. The decision of the presiding justice on such a motion is final. It is a matter within his discretion, and exceptions do not lie to his ruling. Moulton v. Jose, 25 Me. 76. If made in a civil case, no appeal lies from the decision of the presiding justice to the law court, and a defeated party cannot be heard on a motion both before the single justice and the law court. He must exercise his oftion and take one course or the other. He cannot take both. And having exercised his choice he...