State v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 01 November 2016
• Docket Number: AC 38643
• Citation: 169 Conn.App. 168,150 A.3d 699
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Earl SIMPSON
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

169 Conn.App. 168

150 A.3d 699

STATE of Connecticut

v.Earl SIMPSON

AC 38643

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 9, 2016

Officially released November 1, 2016

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, former state's attorney, and Brett R. Aiello, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Beach, Keller and Bear, Js.

KELLER, J.

Following the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea under the Alford doctrine, ¹ the defendant, Earl Simpson, was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8.² The defendant now appeals from the judgment, claiming that: (1) on the basis of facts and circumstances that were apparent to the court at the time of the plea and which undermined a finding that the defendant understood the nature of the charge at issue, the court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing and, in the alternative, abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion; (2) the court violated the defendant's right to counsel by failing to address the grievances that the defendant raised to the court concerning his attorney and, in the alternative, abused its discretion by failing to inquire with respect to such complaints; and (3) the court abused its discretion by accepting the plea and that its acceptance of the plea violated the defendant's right to due process. We agree with the defendant that the court improperly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to his motion to withdraw his plea and failed to undertake a necessary inquiry with respect to his complaints concerning his attorney. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings with respect to those issues.

The following undisputed facts, which may be gleaned from the record of the underlying proceedings, are relevant to the claims raised in the present appeal. The defendant, represented by counsel, entered an Alford plea in this case on September 19, 2014. The state, by way of a long form information, filed on June 29, 2012,³ charged the defendant in count one with felony murder under General Statutes §§ 53a–54c and 53a–8, in count two with murder as an accessory under §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8, and in count three with robbery or attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–134 (a) (1). Count two stated: "And the [State's Attorney for the Judicial District of New Haven] further accuses [the defendant] of Murder and charges that at the City of New Haven, on or about the 9th day of July, 2011, at approximately 6:00 a.m., in the area of Howard and Putnam Streets, the said [defendant] did, with intent to cause the death of another person, to wit: John Claude James, did shoot such person and caused the death of such person, said conduct being in violation of [§ ] 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8 of the Connecticut General Statutes."

At the plea canvass, the prosecutor stated that it was his understanding that the defendant was prepared to enter an Alford plea "on the second count of the information charging murder." The court clerk,⁴ addressing the defendant, stated in relevant part: "[Y]ou've been charged in the second count with murder in violation of Section 53a–54a of the Connecticut General Statutes. How do you plead, guilty or not guilty?" The defendant replied, "Guilty." The court acknowledged that the plea was made under the Alford doctrine. Thereafter, the defendant admitted that he had violated his probation in violation of General Statutes § 53a–32.

The prosecutor addressed the court to set forth the factual basis underlying the plea with respect to the murder count, as follows: "[W]ith respect to the plea on the second count of murder, the state is prepared to prove the following facts: On July 9, 2011, at about 6 p.m., New Haven police officers responded to the area of Howard Avenue and Putnam Street based upon a report of shots fired. They located the body of John Claude James, age twenty-six. It was evident to them that he had been shot several times. A later autopsy determined that he had been shot five times in the back area. All but one bullet had exited the body. They were never located.

"During the investigation, a witness stated she was in her apartment nearby. Moments after hearing the shots, Cody Franklin and the defendant ... ran into her apartment. Franklin said that he had just shot someone. The witness also said [the defendant] offered her weed to say that he and Franklin had not been in her apartment. [The defendant] then called his sister, Isis Hargrove, asking her to pick them up. Franklin and the defendant ... were a short time later seen getting into Isis' car and leaving the area. Also, a witness told police he saw Franklin shoot Mr. James and [the defendant] was with Franklin at the time.

"The crime scene investigation resulted in the location of six shell casings found in the immediate area where witnesses saw the shots being fired. A ballistics examination disclosed that five casings had been ejected from the same gun, while the sixth casing was ejected from a different gun. Such [evidence] is clearly consistent with there being two shooters. Another witness told police that he saw Franklin and [the defendant] together just before the shooting and saw Mr. Franklin fire shots, but he did not admit that he had seen [the defendant] fire any shots.

"On May 19, 2014, the defendant ... was being interviewed by a member of the State's Attorney's Office in Waterbury in connection with another shooting. When asked about the previous shooting of John Claude James, the defendant ... admitted that he was one of the shooters."

Thereafter, the court canvassed the defendant with respect to his pleas. During the canvass, the defendant stated that he was not under the influence of any alcohol, drugs or medication; he had had a sufficient opportunity prior to the plea canvass to discuss his pleas with counsel; he was satisfied with his counsel's advice; he was entering his "guilty plea" and his "probation plea" voluntarily; and nobody was forcing or threatening him to enter the pleas. The defendant stated that he understood the rights he was giving up by entering his pleas, including his right against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.

The following colloquy between the court and the defendant ensued:

"The Court: A person violates their probation when they are on probation and they violate the terms of it, and you could have gotten up to three years on that. Do you understand that?

"[The Defendant]: Yes.

"The Court: Do you agree you violated your probation?

"[The Defendant]: Yes.

"The Court: And on that, I'm going to terminate [probation] at the time of sentencing. On the crime of murder, the state would have to prove that with the intent to cause the death of another person, you caused the death of such person or of a third person, and that is punishable by up to sixty years in prison, twenty-five years at the minimum or nonsuspendable portion. Do you understand that?

"[The Defendant]: Yes."

The court proceeded to ask the defendant if he understood the nature of an Alford plea and if he understood the sentence to which he was exposed as well as the agreement in place with the state for a sentence of thirty-two and one-half years imprisonment, with a twenty-five year minimum sentence. The defendant stated that he understood these matters and that no additional promises had been made to him with respect to the pleas. The court stated: "Once I accept these pleas, you can't change your mind later on unless there's some valid legal reason. Do you understand that?" The defendant replied affirmatively. At the conclusion of the canvass, the defendant stated that he had understood the questions directed to him by the court and that there was nothing that he wished to raise to the court or his attorney prior to the court's acceptance of the pleas.

The court accepted the defendant's pleas, finding that they were "understandably made with the assistance of competent counsel." The court found that the defendant was "guilty" and that he had violated his probation. The court then continued the matter to a later date.

By handwritten letter dated October 27, 2014, and addressed to the court, the defendant stated that he wanted to withdraw his plea and that he desired a new attorney. In relevant part, the letter, signed by the defendant, stated: "I request to withdraw my guilty plea. I have a legitimate claim. I am not guilty of murder. I am claiming ineffective counsel. I was not explained all elements of the crime of murder. There was no testimony at Cody Franklin's trial that I assisted, aided, or conspiracy. There was no intent on my part. The mere fact that I did not assist and help Cody Franklin from the testimony of the state witnesses is enough to have the charges against me dismissed.

"Had my attorney investigated and told me all the facts I wouldn't have pled guilty to a charge that I didn't commit. I felt pressured to take the plea because I was told I had 'no chance' of winning [at] trial. Individuals trying to say I confessed to things I did not. I didn't sign anything or state anything on the record. (Absent this so-called confession.)

"I need a new attorney and I need for him to request a 'Motion to Vacate' and a 'evidentiary hearing.' My counsel also failed to file a 'Motion to Dismiss' the murder charges after the Cody Franklin trial. Please look into this matter."

Additionally, the defendant wrote: "My attorney never told me the difference between accessory after the fact and obstruction of justice, and aiding and abetting. I never and did not encourage, and or facilitate or participate in the [crime] by the testimony of the state witness...