State v. Sims

• Decision Date: 14 March 2019
• Docket Number: No. 95479-8,95479-8
• Citation: 193 Wash.2d 86,441 P.3d 262
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Anthony J. SIMS Respondent, Department of Social & Health Services, and Western State Hospital, Petitioners, and Other Similar Cases Consolidated on Appeal.

193 Wash.2d 86

441 P.3d 262

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Anthony J. SIMS Respondent,Department of Social & Health Services, and Western State Hospital, Petitioners,andOther Similar Cases Consolidated on Appeal.

No. 95479-8

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued September 20, 2018

Filed March 14, 2019

Gregory Kennedy Ziser, Washington State Attorney General's Office, 7141 Cleanwater Drive SW, P.O. Box 40124, Olympia, WA 98504-0124, Jay Douglas Geek, Office of the Attorney General, 1125 Washington Street SE, Olympia, WA 98504-0100, for Petitioners.

Eric J. Nielsen, Jennifer J. Sweigert, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, 1908 E. Madison Street, Seattle, WA 98122-2842, for Respondents.

Randy J. Flyckt, Adams County Prosecutors Office, 210 W. Broadway Avenue, Ritzville, WA 99169-1860, for Adams County.

MADSEN, J.

¶1 This case concerns contempt sanctions imposed against the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) for failing to timely complete competency evaluations for criminal defendants. Specifically at issue is whether the State has waived its sovereign immunity under RCW 7.21.030 as regards the imposition of interest concerning imposed contempt sanctions. We find no waiver under this statute’s plain language or in the context presented. We also determine whether remedial sanctions run from the date of the trial court’s oral ruling imposing the sanctions or the filing of the written sanction order. We hold that the oral ruling determining contempt and imposing sanctions triggers the running of the contempt sanctions. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part, as explained below.

FACTS

¶2 This case is a consolidation of multiple cases brought by criminal defendants against DSHS and state hospitals for the State’s failure to provide timely competency evaluations to the criminal defendants.¹ In these cases, DSHS and the hospital appealed contempt sanctions that were imposed for delays in providing the competency evaluations. The parties agree that the facts in State v. Sims, 1 Wash. App. 2d 472, 406 P.3d 649 (2017), serve as a template for all of these appeals. See Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 3; Suppl. Br. of DSHS at 3.

¶3 In 2014, the State charged Anthony J. Sims with second degree burglary. Sims, 1 Wash. App. 2d at 477, 406 P.3d 649. When a question as to Sims’s competency arose, his case was stayed on October 14, 2014. The stay order directed that a competency evaluation be conducted in accordance with chapter 10.77 RCW. On November 13, 2014, Sims filed a motion to compel his competency evaluation because the hospital had still not yet conducted his evaluation.² On November 20, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which time the State reported that Sims was and always had been scheduled to have his evaluation on December 15. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered DSHS to perform Sims’s competency evaluation by December 2. The trial court’s order was not reduced to written form.

¶4 On November 26, 2014, Sims filed a motion asking the trial court to order DSHS to show cause for its failure to schedule his evaluation in compliance with the court’s November 20 order. Sims asked the court to impose remedial sanctions of $ 500 per day against DSHS for every day past December 2 until he received his competency evaluation.

¶5 A hearing on this motion began on December 11, 2014, at which time the trial court heard from Sims and five other similarly situated defendants. During this hearing, DSHS presented evidence that the state hospital was having difficulty completing competency evaluations due to insufficient funding and personnel in light of the hospital’s large scope of responsibility. At the conclusion of this hearing, on December 12, the trial court orally imposed sanctions on DSHS in the amount of $ 200 per day for every day the evaluations were not completed in compliance with the prior court ordered deadlines.³

Sims’s competency evaluation occurred as originally scheduled on December 15. The trial court did not enter a written contempt order with findings until a month later on January 16, 2015.⁴

¶6 DSHS appealed the contempt sanctions to the Court of Appeals, Division Three.⁵ The Court of Appeals held: (1) where a court imposes sanctions for contempt that did not occur in its presence, statutory sanctions are limited to remedial sanctions; (2) sanctions for past violations were impermissibly punitive rather than remedial, but remedial sanctions from the date of the order were appropriate; (3) nothing in the remedial sanctions statute requires a court to enter a written order prior to sanctions becoming effective; and (4) the State has impliedly consented to interest on statutory sanctions imposed against it. Sims , 1 Wash. App. 2d at 476, 480-81, 484, 406 P.3d 649. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the sanctions order to the extent it imposed punitive sanctions for past delays where DSHS had no opportunity to purge the contempt. However, it upheld remedial sanctions running from the date of the oral sanctions order until the date that the competency evaluation was completed, finding these sanctions permissible under the contempt sanctions statute, RCW 7.21.030. Sims, 1 Wash. App. 2d at 482-83, 406 P.3d 649.

¶7 Relevant here, the Court of Appeals rejected DSHS’s argument that as to the remedial sanctions, the State’s sovereign immunity precluded the accrual of statutory interest on unpaid sanctions. Id. at 484, 406 P.3d 649. The Court of Appeals further held that the sanctions order became effective when it was orally entered by the superior court, even though it was not reduced to writing for several weeks. Id. at 481, 484-85, 406 P.3d 649.¶8 Judge Korsmo dissented in part. While the dissent agreed with the majority that an order need not be reduced to writing before it takes effect, it disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that interest is available on contempt sanctions. Id. at 490-91, 406 P.3d 649 (Korsmo, J., dissenting).⁶

¶9 DSHS petitioned this court for review of the published Court of Appeals’ split decision on two issues only: (1) whether the State consented to be subject to interest payments on the contempt sanctions and (2) whether a trial court’s oral contempt ruling should not be considered effective until it is filed as a written order. This court granted review of these two issues.⁷

ANALYSIS

1. The State has not consented to liability for interest on contempt sanctions imposed under RCW 7.21.030

¶10 The doctrine of sovereign immunity requires a state to consent before a court can hold it liable for interest on its debts. Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin County, 120 Wash.2d 439, 455-56, 842 P.2d 956 (1993) (quoting Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 92 Wash.2d 521, 524, 598 P.2d 1372 (1979) ). Whether the legislature has waived the State’s sovereign immunity by statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo. Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 171 Wash.2d 54, 59, 248 P.3d 83 (2011). Waiver of sovereign immunity can be express or implied, whereby a state can place itself expressly, or by reasonable construction of a contract or statute, in a position of attendant liability. Id. Here, the Court of Appeals held that due to the comprehensive nature of relief afforded by the contempt sanctions statute, the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity as to interest payments on contempt sanctions. We disagree.

¶11 The issue is the effect of the remedial sanctions statute, RCW 7.21.030, specifically, whether it authorizes the imposition of interest. First, as demonstrated below, the statute’s plain, unambiguous language does not provide for interest. Nor does the statute provide "comprehensive relief" that would warrant finding an implied waiver.

¶12 RCW 7.21.030 provides in relevant part that a court "may initiate a proceeding to impose a remedial sanction on ... the motion of a person aggrieved by a contempt of court in the proceeding to which the contempt is related ... [and] after notice and hearing, may impose a remedial sanction" on a person in contempt. The statute lists the following available sanctions in subsection (2): (a) imprisonment, (b) "[a] forfeiture not to exceed two thousand dollars for each day the contempt of court continues," (c) an order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court, (d) "[a]ny other remedial sanction ... if the court expressly finds that those [above listed] sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court," and (e) commitment to juvenile detention. RCW 7.21.030 (emphasis added). The statute further provides, "The court may, in addition to the remedial sanctions set forth [above], order a person found in contempt of court to pay a party for any losses suffered by the party as a result of the contempt and any costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees ." RCW 7.21.030(3) (emphasis added). As can be seen, the plain language of the statute does not address, include, or provide for interest.

¶13 As DSHS notes, where the legislature has intended a waiver of sovereign immunity for interest, it has done so with express statutory language. See Suppl. Br. of DSHS at 9-10; see also RCW 4.56.110, .115 (expressly providing for interest on judgments founded on tortious conduct of the State); RCW 51.32.080(4) (addressing "interest paid on ... permanent partial disability compensation"); RCW 82.32.060 (providing for interest on tax refunds).

¶14 Further, in Union Elevator, this court reiterated the rule applicable in this case, stating, "A waiver of sovereign immunity exists when the State has expressly, or by reasonable construction of a contract or statute, placed itself in a position of attendant liability." 171 Wash.2d at 68, 248 P.3d 83 (emphasis added). This court held:

The legislature enacted statutes expressly permitting interest on condemnation awards but did not

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