State v. Sinclair

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–475.,10–475.
• Citation: 49 A.3d 152,2012 VT 47
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Eddie SINCLAIR.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

49 A.3d 152
2012 VT 47

STATE of Vermont
v.
Eddie SINCLAIR.

No. 10–475.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 8, 2012.

[49 A.3d 153]

Thomas Donovan, Jr., Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant–Appellant.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, SKOGLUND and ROBINSON, JJ., and KUPERSMITH, Supr. J., Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the criminal division, seeking to vacate a conviction from 1993 on the ground that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The court denied the motion, concluding there was no basis for a collateral attack on defendant's plea. Defendant appeals, arguing his plea should be vacated because the sentencing court did not substantially comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. We affirm.

¶ 2. In October 1992, the State charged defendant with assault and robbery. Defendant entered a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of two-to-twelve years. In March 1993, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing and engaged defendant

[49 A.3d 154]

in plea colloquy. The court then accepted the plea and subsequently sentenced defendant in accordance with the agreement.

¶ 3. In November 2010, long after his sentence had been served, defendant filed a pro se motion in the criminal division “pursuant to coram nobis” to “vacate/bring to trial/set aside” his 1993 conviction. Defendant claimed the plea was entered involuntarily because he was not told that the plea could be used to enhance a future sentence and he was under the influence of narcotics at that time. The motion alleged that he was currently serving a federal sentence that was enhanced based on his 1993 Vermont conviction. In a written order, the court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had failed to demonstrate the plea colloquy was inadequate and that there was no basis for a collateral attack on the plea. Defendant appealed.

¶ 4. On appeal, now represented by counsel, defendant raises arguments aimed at challenging the adequacy of the plea colloquy. He argues that at the change-of-plea hearing in 1993 the court failed to substantially comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Although disagreeing on the merits, the State's arguments are primarily aimed at alleged procedural deficiencies in defendant's petition for relief. The State contends that defendant's petition is improperly brought in the criminal division because defendant may not avail himself of coram nobis when post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings are available to him, and that they are available in this case. Thus, the State argues that the petition should be dismissed without reaching the merits of defendant's arguments.

¶ 5. We begin with the threshold question of whether coram nobis relief is available to defendant. Coram nobis is an ancient common law writ. L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 9, at 36 (1981). “At early common law, there was no remedy comparable to the modern motion for a new trial or, indeed, appellate review.” Id. § 9, at 37. The writ was designed to fill this gap somewhat to correct errors of fact “affecting the validity and regularity of the judgment.” Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647, 655 (2000) (quotation omitted). It was commonly used in civil cases, but seldom in criminal cases. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 1882 WL 6389, at *4 (1882). While coram nobis was originally sought by initiating a new proceeding through a writ, in the United States “proceeding by motion is the modern substitute.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67, 35 S.Ct. 16, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914).

¶ 6. Early on, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the availability of a common law writ of coram nobis, describing it as a means “to bring ... errors in matters of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon and were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself,” such as the minority or death of a party. Id. at 68, 35 S.Ct. 16. The Court described the writ narrowly as confined to addressing factual errors “of the most fundamental character” and not designed to raise questions such as newly discovered evidence, or the misbehavior or partiality of jurors. Id. at 69, 35 S.Ct. 16.

¶ 7. Following adoption of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which abolished use of coram nobis in civil cases, “[i]t was far from clear that coram nobis was available in federal courts in 1948.” 3 C. Wright & S. Welling, Federal Practice and Procedure § 624, at 649 (4th ed.2011). In United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954),

[49 A.3d 155]

the U.S. Supreme Court resurrected the doctrine, concluding that federal district courts had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to entertain petitions for coram nobis. 346 U.S. at 511, 74 S.Ct. 247. In Morgan, the defendant was serving an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction. The defendant argued that the prior conviction was invalid because it was based on a guilty plea that he entered without the benefit of counsel. The defendant could not seek habeas corpus relief because he was no longer “in custody.” Id. at 510, 74 S.Ct. 247; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (providing means for “prisoner in custody under sentence” to challenge conviction). In concluding that the defendant could bring an application for a writ of coram nobis based on his lack of counsel—a fact known at the time of the plea hearing—the Court concluded that the writ reached legal errors “ ‘of the most fundamental character.’ ” Id. at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247 (quoting Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69, 35 S.Ct. 16); see Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal.1984) (granting coram nobis relief based on prosecutorial misconduct of deliberately omitting relevant information in papers presented to court). The Court also emphasized that coram nobis is available only in cases where no other remedy exists and there are “sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247.

¶ 8. Therefore, under the modern-day formulation in federal courts “coram nobis is broad enough to encompass not only errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of legal proceedings, but also legal errors of a constitutional or fundamental proportion.” 3 C. Wright & S. Welling, supra,§ 624, at 650 (footnotes omitted).¹ It remains, however, limited to situations where a defendant has no other remedy available. United States v. Folak, 865 F.2d 110, 113 (7th Cir.1988) (“Relief in the nature of a writ of coram nobis is only available to the extent that it...