State v. Sinnott

• Decision Date: 21 March 1896
• Citation: 89 Me. 41,35 A. 1007
• Parties: STATE v. SINNOTT et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

35 A. 1007

89 Me. 41

STATE

v. SINNOTT et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 21, 1896.

Official.

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, York county.

Austin L. Sinnott and William Stone were convicted of violation of the game and fish statute, and appeal. Exceptions overruled.

Willis T. Emmons, Co. Atty., for the State.

B. F. Hamilton and B. F. Cleaves, for defendants.

PETERS, C. J. The two respondents were convicted and sentenced to pay each a fine of $57.50 by the Saco municipal court upon a complaint for unlawfully having in possession 115 short lobsters, contrary to the statute. Rev. St. c. 40, § 21, as amended by Acts 1885, c. 275, Acts 1887, c. 144, and Acts 1889, c. 292. They thereupon appealed to this court, in York county, and there moved for a dismissal of this particular prosecution upon the ground that they could not be convicted of the offense upon a complaint, but only after an indictment.

Must their conviction be preceded by an indictment, or may it be had upon a complaint? In the act of 1885 (chapter 258) it is expressly declared that judges of municipal and police courts and trial justices within their counties have by complaint original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial and superior courts in all prosecutions under Rev. St. c. 40 (the fish and game statute), and under the acts amendatory of said chapter. In the act of 1891 (chapter 126) it is again expressly declared that all fines and penalties under any law relating to game, fish, or shellfish may be recovered by complaint, indictment, or action of debt. These two statutes make it sufficiently clear that a conviction under these fish statutes may be had upon a complaint, and in a municipal court. The power of the legislature to provide for such a conviction for such an offense is indisputable. State v. Cram, 84 Me. 271, 24 Atl. 853.

The respondents, however, contend that the act of 1885 (chapter 258) was repealed upon this point by the act of 1887 (chapter 144, § 7), which enacted that all fines and penalties under that act should be recovered by indictment or action of debt, and made no mention of a complaint as a mode of recovery. They also contend that it was again completely repealed by act of 1889 (chapter 292), which re-enacted in section 6 the above limitation of modes of prosecution to indictment and action of debt, and by section 8 enacted that "all laws, acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed."

But the still later act of 1891 (chapter 120), above cited, expressly restored the mode of prosecution by complaint...