State v. Skipper
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-0944 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIEN MARTELL SKIPPER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey D Bert, Judge.
A defendant seeks resentencing, alleging a breach of the plea agreement and an abuse of discretion in running the new sentences consecutive to his parole revocation. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
In a bargain with the State, Julien Skipper pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault resulting in bodily injury and a sex offender registry violation. For its part, the State agreed that it would not resist his request for concurrent sentences. When sentencing rolled around, the State did not oppose concurrent terms for those two pleas but urged the district court to run those terms consecutive to Skipper's probation revocation. Skipper now contends the State breached the plea agreement. He also maintains that the court abused its discretion in adopting the State's recommendation.
Because the plea agreement did not encompass the probation revocation, the State's recommendation involving that separate sentence was not a breach. And seeing no abuse of discretion at the sentencing hearing, we affirm.
This sentencing appeal involves three criminal cases. But the plea bargain embraced only two of them. The first negotiated case (FECR419243) stemmed from Skipper's domestic violence against his girlfriend. The State charged him with domestic abuse assault by strangulation, a class "D" felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(5) (2021). The State reduced that charge to domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, in violation of section 708.2A(2)(b), a serious misdemeanor, in return for Skipper's guilty plea.
The second negotiated case (FECR419630) dealt with his sex offender registry violations. The State charged Skipper with two counts of failing to notify the sheriff of changes to relevant information about his principal place of residence, each as a second or subsequent offense, class "D" felonies, in violation of Iowa Code sections 692A.101(23)(a)(21) and 692A.111(1). The State also announced its intent to seek sentencing enhancements based on Skipper's status as a habitual offender. Under the agreement, Skipper pleaded guilty to one violation, and the State dismissed the other count.
The memorandum of plea agreement also included this provision:
What wasn't in the plea agreement was any mention of the parole revocation. When he committed the current offenses, Skipper was subject to a special sentence of lifetime parole for 2007 convictions for lascivious acts with a child (FECR300399). See Iowa Code § 903B.1. The court revoked his parole and imposed five years incarceration. So he was back in prison at the time of this sentencing.
Before sentencing, Skipper sent the district court a letter asking the judge to "run [his] class D felony with [his] lifetime special sentence." He expressed remorse "for being incarcerated" and asserted that he had been "report free" and hadn't had "a conviction in eight years." He also noted his completion of domestic violence education, a cognitive awareness program, and a parenting course. The court treated that communication as part of Skipper's sentencing allocution.
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the court impose concurrent sentences for the domestic abuse assault and the sex offender registry violation, as stated in the plea agreement. But it recommended those terms run consecutive to the parole-revocation sentence that Skipper was serving. In support of its latter recommendation, the State pointed to Skipper's criminal history, "which is not short and also includes some very serious offenses." The State also noted that Skipper "has violated his probation and has at least one conviction for being a fugitive from justice." The State clarified that the current conviction was Skipper's third sex offender registration violation and he was on "special parole when these offenses occurred." The prosecutor concluded: "He's already incarcerated as it stands from his parole revocation, and I think running this concurrent to his parole revocation would simply not serve the protection of the community and the rehabilitation needs of Mr. Skipper." The presentence investigation report also recommended incarceration run consecutive to the parole revocation.
Defense counsel reiterated Skipper's written request that the new sentences be imposed concurrent to the parole revocation. Skipper-who agreed to appear by video conferencing-then told the court: Skipper said he was "not denying" that he had been in a "toxic relationship" and he was "very remorseful" for being back in court. Skipper also reminded the court that he was "on a lifetime parole."
The court followed the parties' recommendation that the sentences for the two new offenses be served concurrently but was "persuaded by the State's argument" to run them consecutive to the parole revocation. As the court announced its sentence, Skipper interjected: When warned not to interrupt, Skipper persisted: "This ain't right. This ain't fair. Listen, sir, I did-I took this deal because, sir, I can't have this running consecutive.
Whatever, man, this is crazy." Before the court had him muted, Skipper added:
Skipper appeals.[1]
We review sentences for correction of legal error. Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 130. We will reverse if the record reveals an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure. Id. The State's breach of a plea agreement counts as a defect. Id. On the choice of sentence, we will reverse only if the district court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020).
A plea bargain is like a contract. State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa 2020). Both sides receive a benefit. Id. But because the accused waives fundamental rights by pleading guilty, the prosecution must "scrupulously honor the letter and spirit of plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the pleabargaining process." State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Iowa 2015). Even technical compliance with the terms is not enough if the prosecutor otherwise "undercuts" the bargain. Beres, 943 N.W.2d at 582.
Skipper contends that the prosecutor's advocacy for the new concurrent sentences to run consecutive to the parole revocation undercut their agreement.
Although the memorandum expressly limited the agreement to the "filed and pending charges" in FECR419243 and FECR419630, Skipper contends the reference to "concurrent sentences" did "not exclude the revocation." He also asserts that he was "completely taken aback when the court imposed consecutive sentences." He relies on that reaction as proof that the prosecutor acted contrary to his "justified expectations." See Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 131.
At first blush, Skipper's contention has some appeal. Indeed, the prosecution gave a more full-throated endorsement of its desire for the new sentences to run consecutive to the parole revocation than it did for the agreement to concurrent sentences in the plea agreement.
Trouble is, nothing in the plea agreement prevented the prosecution from pushing that position. The State only agreed not to "resist" concurrent sentences. And the parole revocation was...
To continue reading
Request your trial