State v. Slagle
| Decision Date | 14 October 1905 |
| Citation | 89 S.W. 326 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. LITTLE v. SLAGLE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Quo warranto by the state, on the relation of Daniel W. Little, against William Slagle, to test defendant's right to an office. From a decree dismissing the bill, the relator appeals. Affirmed.
John W. Green, for appellant. E. F. Mynatt and J. C. Ford, for appellee.
The facts out of which the present controversy arose are as follows:
At the August election, 1904, Daniel W. Little was elected one of the constables for the Fourth district of Knox county, and duly qualified and entered upon his duties as such. In December, 1904, the sheriff of Knox county appointed Mr. Little one of his regular deputies, to serve process in the portion of the county in which the latter resided, being a section of the county remote from Knoxville. Mr. Little accepted the appointment and entered upon the discharge of the duties assigned him. Thereupon, at the January term, 1905, the county court of Knox county, without citation or notice to Mr. Little and without a trial, summarily declared the office of constable, to which Mr. Little had been elected, vacant, and appointed the present defendant, William Slagle, to fill the vacancy. Mr. Slagle accepted the appointment and entered upon the discharge of its duties at once. Thereupon the present bill was filed, in the nature of a proceeding in quo warranto, to test the right of Mr. Slagle to hold the office. The chancellor dismissed the bill on demurrer.
The first question to be determined is whether the same person can hold the office of constable and that of deputy sheriff at the same time without violating article 2, § 26, of the Constitution of 1870, which declares that no person in this state shall hold "more than one lucrative office at the same time."
Is a deputy sheriff an officer, in the legal sense of that term? and, if so is the office he holds a lucrative one in the constitutional sense?
Under our statutes (Shannon's Code, § 448) the sheriff of a county may appoint as many regular and special deputies as he may see proper. It is to be deduced from the section of the Code referred to and from our decisions upon the subject that the sheriff may appoint his deputies for such length of time, within his own term, as he may desire, and the compensation for his services may be arranged by contract between the sheriff and his deputy; that process does not run to the deputy, but to the sheriff, yet the deputy may execute any process so directed that comes to his hands, and he has all of the powers of the sheriff himself in respect thereof, yet, if he be guilty of any default, the recourse of the injured party is not upon him, but upon the sheriff, and the latter may look to the deputy for reimbursement. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. 144, 152-155; Rose v. Lane, 3 Humph. 218-220; Vance v. Campbell, 8 Humph. 527; Robertson v. Lessan, 7 Cold. 160; Reves v. State, 11 Lea, 124. In the first of these cases it was said, arguendo, that the deputy was not an officer; in the last, it was held that he was an officer, in the sense of Code 1858, § 4750 (Shannon's Code, § 6634), which allowed $50 to every officer prosecuting to conviction a certain class of offenders. In Robertson v. Glenn, 3 Baxt. 164, the right of a constable to accept a special deputation from the sheriff and to act thereunder was recognized; and in Lewis v. Nashville, 101 Tenn. 659, 49 S. W. 749, the right of a regular policeman of a city to hold the position of deputy sheriff was recognized, but in that case he was denied the right to compensation or fees as deputy sheriff, on special grounds appearing therein that do not affect the general question. In the Constitution (article 10, § 1) it is provided that "every person who is chosen or appointed to any office of trust or profit shall, before entering on the duties thereof, take an oath to support the Constitution of this state and of the United States, and an oath of office." Sections 1073 and 1081 and 445 of Shannon's Code set out the contents of the oath of office referred to in the Constitution. Section 1079 reads: "Whenever any officer is authorized or required to appoint a deputy, such deputy, before he proceeds to act, shall take the constitutional oaths...
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