State v. Slaughter
Decision Date | 17 April 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 40414,40414 |
Citation | 252 Ga. 435,315 S.E.2d 865 |
Parties | The STATE v. SLAUGHTER. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
William J. Smith, Dist. Atty., Douglas C. Pullen, Asst. Dist. Atty., Columbus, for the State.
Herbert Shafer, Atlanta, for Robert Earl Slaughter.
Joseph L. Chambers, Charles T. Shean III, Amicus curiae.
After his motion to suppress was denied, Robert Earl Slaughter was tried by a jury and convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of less than an ounce of marijuana. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order denying Slaughter's motion to suppress, and remanded for a new hearing on the motion to suppress and for a new trial. Slaughter v. State, 168 Ga.App. 58, 308 S.E.2d 6 (1983). We granted certiorari.
After observing Slaughter smoking marijuana in the parking lot of a nightclub and arresting him, the police found cocaine in Slaughter's possession. The arresting officer then obtained a search warrant pursuant to which he searched Slaughter's car looking for cocaine. The search revealed, among other things, a pistol (for which the defendant had a permit), a certificate of deposit for $175,000, and two marijuana cigarettes, all of which were admitted into evidence. No cocaine was found in the car.
Shortly before trial Slaughter filed a motion to suppress alleging, among other grounds that the search warrant was signed by a magistrate who "was not a neutral and detached Magistrate as required by the Constitution [and] the laws of the state of Georgia and of the United States in [that] said recorder was the attorney of record in a civil action filed against your petitioner with which he had your petitioner served and upon which he had an interest in the outcome as your petitioner believes the said recorder to have represented the plaintiff in said action on a contingency fee."
At the motion to suppress hearing, conducted immediately prior to the trial, the state produced the search warrant and the officer's supporting affidavit. The trial judge began to read the recently filed motion to suppress, quoted in part above, and noting the absence of any allegation that the issuing magistrate was biased or prejudiced, asked defense counsel to explain how the civil action affected the defendant in the criminal case. Defense counsel responded that the defendant's being in jail hampered defense of the civil case and that conviction in the criminal case would mean that the defendant could be impeached in the civil case.
The court then inquired as to the nature of the civil action, and the defense stated that it was a collection case involving $351. Defense counsel then was asked by the court how it was known that the magistrate was representing the plaintiff in the civil case on a contingent fee. Defense counsel stated that he had been told of the contingent fee arrangement by the defendant's lawyer who was defending the civil case. The trial judge said that the information as to the contingent fee was hearsay and not proof of bias or prejudice, and he would on that basis overrule the motion to suppress. Defense counsel offered to call the magistrate to testify as to his fee arrangement. However, the trial judge continued reading the next ground of the motion to suppress. 1 After hearing testimony from the arresting officer relating to the sufficiency of the search warrant affidavit, the motion to suppress was overruled as to all grounds. The state was not called upon, and did not offer, to put up evidence regarding the issue now before us.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the defendant had "set out facts that, if proven, could have resulted in a granting of his motion to suppress", 168 Ga.App. 58, 308 S.E.2d 6, the burden of proof was on the state, and because the state did not introduce evidence rebutting the allegation that the magistrate was not neutral and detached, it failed to carry its burden of proof. The state applied for certiorari complaining particularly, as do amicus curiae, of the statement by the Court of Appeals that "The possibility that the defendant may not have competent evidence to support his allegation is irrelevant until the state has entered evidence that specifically rebuts the defendant's charge." 167 Ga.App. 58-59, 308 S.E.2d 6. The state also urges that the decision in this case is in conflict with Pope v. State, 134 Ga.App. 455, 214 S.E.2d 686 (1975).
Searches are conducted either with or without a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ( ).
Because the burden is on those officers who conduct a search without a warrant to show that the search was conducted pursuant to an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, it can be said that a search without a warrant is presumed to be invalid and the burden is on the state to show that the warrantless search was valid. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-391, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412-2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).
On the other hand, a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, regular and proper on its face, is presumed to be valid and the burden is on the person who moves to suppress the items found to show that the search warrant was invalid. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.1969).
In Franks, supra, the officer's affidavit supporting issuance of the warrant stated that affiant personally interviewed two named people at the defendant's place of employment and they said that defendant wore specified items of clothing (which the affidavit showed a rape victim had described as being worn by her assailant). In seeking a hearing on his motion to suppress, defense counsel stated that the two named people would testify that the officer never interviewed them personally and the clothing they described to another officer was somewhat different from that described in the affidavit. The trial court sustained the state's objection to the proferred testimony and denied movant a hearing on the motion to suppress.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, saying (438 U.S. at 171-172, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-2685): The foregoing requirements (e.g., specificity of allegations, accompanied by an offer of proof in affidavit form) placed upon the person who makes a motion to suppress are court imposed.
Our statute, OCGA § 17-5-30 (Code Ann. § 27-313), provides, in pertinent part:
Under our statute, a motion to suppress must be in writing and "state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful" 3 and "the burden of proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the state." 4
The state contends that our Code sec...
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