State v. Sledd
Decision Date | 17 January 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 64992,64992 |
Citation | 250 Kan. 15,825 P.2d 114 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Melvin SLEDD, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the burden of proof required of a criminal defendant in order to establish a prima facie case of impermissible purposeful discrimination by the State in the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection requires that the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
2. Appellate review of a trial court's determination relative to whether or not the prima facie showing required by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), has been made is plenary as it involves a question of legal sufficiency. In contrast, appellate review of a trial court's acceptance of the State's announced reasons for removal of a juror as being racially neutral is on the basis of abuse of discretion.
Rick Kittel, Asst. Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, Michael L. McCoy, Asst. Appellate Defender, and Steven R. Zinn, Deputy Appellate Defender, were with him on the briefs for appellant.
Jean M. Schmidt, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Jennifer O'Connell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gene M. Olander, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were with her on the briefs for appellee.
Melvin M. Sledd, Jr., appeals his jury trial conviction of involuntary manslaughter (K.S.A. 21-3404).
The underlying facts are only peripherally involved in the single issue raised on appeal. The factual summary will be limited, accordingly, to facts that relate to the issue. The victim was two-and-one-half-year-old Michael Emery, who resided in Topeka with his mother, younger brother, and the defendant, who was the mother's boyfriend. On July 5, 1989, Medevac personnel responded to an emergency call. Michael was not breathing when Medevac arrived. He was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. The conclusion at the autopsy was that the child had been repeatedly struck in the abdominal area approximately 24 hours before his death. Numerous bruises were noticed on various parts of his body. It was the State's theory that the child had been beaten by the defendant, said beating having resulted in the child's death. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder but convicted of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court violated defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial when it denied defendant's challenge to the State's removal by peremptory challenge of two black prospective jurors. The relevant jury selection facts must be set forth in some detail.
As this case was tried on the first-degree murder charge, 36 prospective jurors were qualified for cause with the State and defendant each to exercise 12 peremptory challenges. Defendant is black, as were 4 of the 36 prospective jurors. The procedure employed in exercising the challenges was for the State to write the name of its first challenge on a piece of paper and pass it to defense counsel, who wrote thereon the name of his first challenge. The paper was then passed back and forth until all challenges had been exercised. The State's challenge number seven was to a black woman, Marcella Brown. The State's twelfth challenge was to a black man, Gary Lassiter. Two black jurors remained on the panel at this time, although, apparently, one of those was subsequently removed through the exercise of defendant's final peremptory challenge. Immediately after the State exercised its peremptory challenge removing Lassiter, the following occurred:
....
The State then proceeded to state its reasons for the exercise of the Lassiter challenge, the thrust of which was that he was a leader in a church which approved corporal punishment. The State was concerned that Mr. Lassiter would not be a good choice for a juror in a case involving the beating of a child. Comments were then made by both counsel relative to Mr. Lassiter's answers to questions on corporal punishment of children.
The trial court then stated:
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State v. Gadelkarim, 69897
...is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Walston, 256 Kan. 372, 886 P.2d 349 (1994); State v. Sledd, 250 Kan. 15, Syl. p 2, 825 P.2d 114, cert. denied 506 U.S. 849, 113 S.Ct. 147, 121 L.Ed.2d 98 The United States Supreme Court discussed disparate imp......
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State v. Rice, 71971
...we are obligated to make plenary review of this issue, citing State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 664, 847 P.2d 1280 (1993); State v. Sledd, 250 Kan. 15, 21, 825 P.2d 114, cert. denied 506 U.S. 849, 113 S.Ct. 147, 121 L.Ed.2d 98 (1992); City of Chanute v. Polson, 17 Kan.App.2d 159, 160, 836 P.2d ......
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State v. Kingsley
...of the State's announced reasons for removal of a juror as being racially neutral is on the basis of abuse of discretion." State v. Sledd, 250 Kan. 15, Syl. p 2, 825 P.2d 114, cert. denied 506 U.S. 849, 113 S.Ct. 147, 121 L.Ed.2d 98 In State v. Belnavis, 246 Kan. 309, 312, 787 P.2d 1172 (19......
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