State v. Small
| Decision Date | 10 June 1882 |
| Citation | 29 Minn. 216,12 N.W. 703 |
| Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA v SMALL. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Certified from district court, county of Hennepin. W. J. Hahn, Atty. Gen., and W. E. Hale, for the State.
Levi & Cray, for Small.
The defendant was indicted under section 34, c. 94, Gen. St. 1878, for manslaughter in the fourth degree, committed on the tenth of January, 1881. By act of the legislature, passed February 17, 1881, entitled “An act to amend section 34, c. 94, Gen. St. 1878, relating to manslaughter in the fourth degree,” the statute under which the indictment was found had been amended by increasing the punishment. Section 2 of this amendatory act reads as follows:
The only question in this case is whether under this section the original statute is continued in force for the purpose of the punishment of offences committed prior to the passage of the amendatory act. It is perfectly apparent that the only doubt on the subject, if doubt there be, is caused by the use of the word “murder,” by mistake, for “manslaughter.” It is perfectly clear, both from the face of the act itself and from the statute amended, that the legislature meant “manslaughter” in the fourth degree, and not “murder.” Such being the case, a court has a right to construe the act in accordance with the plain and manifest intention of the legislature. If the mistake is apparent upon the face of the statute, which may be corrected by other language in the act itself, such mistake is not fatal, and the clear legislative will must prevail. That the legislature intended by this section to save the existing law as to past offences, and that the word “murder” was used by mistake instead of “manslaughter,” can admit of no doubt.
The title of the act relates to manslaughter. The statute amended refers to manslaughter in the fourth degree and nothing else, and there is no such thing as murder in the fourth degree. Furthermore, all reference to murder in the fourth degree may be rejected as surplusage and meaningless, and the remainder of the section would be sufficient as a good saving clause. As to the rules of construction where a statute contains a false reference or other mistake, plainly such from the face of the statute, see Potter's Dwarris, Stat. Construction, 183; Inhabitants of Shrewsbury v. Boylston, 1 Pick. 105;People v. King, 28 Cal. 265;Watervleit Turnpike Co. v. McKeon, 6 Hill, 616;Moody v. Stephenson, 1 Minn. 401, (Gil. 289;)City of Winona v. Whipple, 24 Minn. 61;Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330. It is urged that this is contrary to the rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly. By this rule nothing more is meant than that penal statutes shall not, by what may be thought their spirit and equity, be extended to offences other than those which are specifically and clearly described and provided for. The reason of...
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